1607 lines
43 KiB
C
1607 lines
43 KiB
C
/*
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*************************************************************************
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* Ralink Tech Inc.
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* 5F., No.36, Taiyuan St., Jhubei City,
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* Hsinchu County 302,
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* Taiwan, R.O.C.
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*
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* (c) Copyright 2002-2007, Ralink Technology, Inc.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify *
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or *
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* (at your option) any later version. *
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* *
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, *
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of *
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the *
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* GNU General Public License for more details. *
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* *
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
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* along with this program; if not, write to the *
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* Free Software Foundation, Inc., *
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* 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. *
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* *
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*************************************************************************
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Module Name:
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wpa.c
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Abstract:
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Revision History:
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Who When What
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-------- ---------- ----------------------------------------------
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Jan Lee 03-07-22 Initial
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Paul Lin 03-11-28 Modify for supplicant
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*/
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#include "../rt_config.h"
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// WPA OUI
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UCHAR OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x00};
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UCHAR OUI_WPA_VERSION[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01};
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UCHAR OUI_WPA_TKIP[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02};
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UCHAR OUI_WPA_CCMP[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x04};
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UCHAR OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01};
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UCHAR OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02};
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// WPA2 OUI
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UCHAR OUI_WPA2_WEP40[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01};
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UCHAR OUI_WPA2_TKIP[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02};
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UCHAR OUI_WPA2_CCMP[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x04};
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UCHAR OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01};
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UCHAR OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02};
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// MSA OUI
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UCHAR OUI_MSA_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05}; // Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
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UCHAR OUI_MSA_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x06}; // Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
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/*
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========================================================================
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Routine Description:
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The pseudo-random function(PRF) that hashes various inputs to
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derive a pseudo-random value. To add liveness to the pseudo-random
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value, a nonce should be one of the inputs.
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It is used to generate PTK, GTK or some specific random value.
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Arguments:
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UCHAR *key, - the key material for HMAC_SHA1 use
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INT key_len - the length of key
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UCHAR *prefix - a prefix label
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INT prefix_len - the length of the label
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UCHAR *data - a specific data with variable length
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INT data_len - the length of a specific data
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INT len - the output lenght
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Return Value:
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UCHAR *output - the calculated result
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Note:
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802.11i-2004 Annex H.3
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========================================================================
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*/
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VOID PRF(
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IN UCHAR *key,
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IN INT key_len,
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IN UCHAR *prefix,
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IN INT prefix_len,
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IN UCHAR *data,
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IN INT data_len,
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OUT UCHAR *output,
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IN INT len)
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{
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INT i;
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UCHAR *input;
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INT currentindex = 0;
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INT total_len;
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// Allocate memory for input
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os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&input, 1024);
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if (input == NULL)
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{
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DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!PRF: no memory!!!\n"));
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return;
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}
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// Generate concatenation input
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NdisMoveMemory(input, prefix, prefix_len);
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// Concatenate a single octet containing 0
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input[prefix_len] = 0;
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// Concatenate specific data
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NdisMoveMemory(&input[prefix_len + 1], data, data_len);
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total_len = prefix_len + 1 + data_len;
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// Concatenate a single octet containing 0
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// This octet shall be update later
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input[total_len] = 0;
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total_len++;
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// Iterate to calculate the result by hmac-sha-1
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// Then concatenate to last result
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for (i = 0; i < (len + 19) / 20; i++)
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{
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HMAC_SHA1(input, total_len, key, key_len, &output[currentindex]);
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currentindex += 20;
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// update the last octet
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input[total_len - 1]++;
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}
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os_free_mem(NULL, input);
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}
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/*
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========================================================================
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Routine Description:
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It utilizes PRF-384 or PRF-512 to derive session-specific keys from a PMK.
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It shall be called by 4-way handshake processing.
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Arguments:
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pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
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PMK - pointer to PMK
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ANonce - pointer to ANonce
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AA - pointer to Authenticator Address
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SNonce - pointer to SNonce
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SA - pointer to Supplicant Address
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len - indicate the length of PTK (octet)
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Return Value:
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Output pointer to the PTK
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Note:
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Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 8.5.1.2
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========================================================================
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*/
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VOID WpaCountPTK(
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IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
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IN UCHAR *PMK,
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IN UCHAR *ANonce,
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IN UCHAR *AA,
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IN UCHAR *SNonce,
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IN UCHAR *SA,
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OUT UCHAR *output,
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IN UINT len)
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{
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UCHAR concatenation[76];
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UINT CurrPos = 0;
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UCHAR temp[32];
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UCHAR Prefix[] = {'P', 'a', 'i', 'r', 'w', 'i', 's', 'e', ' ', 'k', 'e', 'y', ' ',
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'e', 'x', 'p', 'a', 'n', 's', 'i', 'o', 'n'};
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// initiate the concatenation input
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NdisZeroMemory(temp, sizeof(temp));
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NdisZeroMemory(concatenation, 76);
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// Get smaller address
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if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1)
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NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, AA, 6);
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else
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NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, SA, 6);
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CurrPos += 6;
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// Get larger address
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if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1)
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NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SA, 6);
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else
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NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], AA, 6);
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// store the larger mac address for backward compatible of
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// ralink proprietary STA-key issue
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NdisMoveMemory(temp, &concatenation[CurrPos], MAC_ADDR_LEN);
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CurrPos += 6;
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// Get smaller Nonce
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if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0)
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NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32); // patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue
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else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1)
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NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32);
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else
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NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32);
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CurrPos += 32;
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// Get larger Nonce
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if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0)
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NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32); // patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue
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else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1)
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NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32);
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else
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NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32);
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CurrPos += 32;
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hex_dump("concatenation=", concatenation, 76);
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// Use PRF to generate PTK
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PRF(PMK, LEN_MASTER_KEY, Prefix, 22, concatenation, 76, output, len);
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}
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/*
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========================================================================
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Routine Description:
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Generate random number by software.
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Arguments:
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pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
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macAddr - pointer to local MAC address
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Return Value:
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Note:
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802.1ii-2004 Annex H.5
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========================================================================
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*/
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VOID GenRandom(
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IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
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IN UCHAR *macAddr,
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OUT UCHAR *random)
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{
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INT i, curr;
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UCHAR local[80], KeyCounter[32];
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UCHAR result[80];
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ULONG CurrentTime;
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UCHAR prefix[] = {'I', 'n', 'i', 't', ' ', 'C', 'o', 'u', 'n', 't', 'e', 'r'};
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// Zero the related information
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NdisZeroMemory(result, 80);
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NdisZeroMemory(local, 80);
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NdisZeroMemory(KeyCounter, 32);
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for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
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{
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// copy the local MAC address
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COPY_MAC_ADDR(local, macAddr);
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curr = MAC_ADDR_LEN;
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// concatenate the current time
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NdisGetSystemUpTime(&CurrentTime);
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NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &CurrentTime, sizeof(CurrentTime));
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curr += sizeof(CurrentTime);
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// concatenate the last result
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NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], result, 32);
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curr += 32;
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// concatenate a variable
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NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &i, 2);
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curr += 2;
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// calculate the result
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PRF(KeyCounter, 32, prefix,12, local, curr, result, 32);
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}
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NdisMoveMemory(random, result, 32);
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}
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/*
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========================================================================
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Routine Description:
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Build cipher suite in RSN-IE.
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It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
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Arguments:
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pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
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ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
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WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
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bMixCipher - a boolean to indicate the pairwise cipher and group
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cipher are the same or not
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Return Value:
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Note:
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========================================================================
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*/
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static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
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IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
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IN UCHAR ElementID,
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IN UINT WepStatus,
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IN BOOLEAN bMixCipher,
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IN UCHAR FlexibleCipher,
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OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
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OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
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{
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UCHAR PairwiseCnt;
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*rsn_len = 0;
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// decide WPA2 or WPA1
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if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
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{
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RSNIE2 *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE2*)pRsnIe;
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// Assign the verson as 1
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pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
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switch (WepStatus)
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{
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// TKIP mode
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case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
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pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
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*rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
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break;
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// AES mode
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case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
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if (bMixCipher)
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
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else
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
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pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
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*rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
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break;
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// TKIP-AES mix mode
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case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
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PairwiseCnt = 1;
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// Insert WPA2 TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
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if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
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{
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
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// Insert WPA2 AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
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if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
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{
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
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PairwiseCnt = 2;
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}
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}
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else
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{
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// Insert WPA2 AES as the first pairwise cipher
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
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}
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pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
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*rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
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break;
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}
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// swap for big-endian platform
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pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
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pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
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}
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else
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{
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RSNIE *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE*)pRsnIe;
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// Assign OUI and version
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->oui, OUI_WPA_VERSION, 4);
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pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
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switch (WepStatus)
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{
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// TKIP mode
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case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
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pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
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*rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
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break;
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// AES mode
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case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
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if (bMixCipher)
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
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else
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
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pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
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*rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
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break;
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// TKIP-AES mix mode
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case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
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PairwiseCnt = 1;
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// Insert WPA TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
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if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
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{
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
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// Insert WPA AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
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if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
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{
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
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PairwiseCnt = 2;
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}
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}
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else
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{
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// Insert WPA AES as the first pairwise cipher
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
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}
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pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
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*rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
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break;
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}
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// swap for big-endian platform
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pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
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pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
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}
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}
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/*
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========================================================================
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Routine Description:
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Build AKM suite in RSN-IE.
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It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
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Arguments:
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pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
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ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
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AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
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apidx - indicate the interface index
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Return Value:
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Note:
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========================================================================
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*/
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static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(
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IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
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IN UCHAR ElementID,
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IN UINT AuthMode,
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IN UCHAR apidx,
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OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
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OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
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{
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RSNIE_AUTH *pRsnie_auth;
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pRsnie_auth = (RSNIE_AUTH*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
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// decide WPA2 or WPA1
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if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
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{
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switch (AuthMode)
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{
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case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2:
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case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
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pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM, 4);
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break;
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case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK:
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case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
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pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM, 4);
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break;
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}
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}
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else
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{
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switch (AuthMode)
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{
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case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA:
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case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
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pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM, 4);
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break;
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case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK:
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case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
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pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
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NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM, 4);
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break;
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case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone:
|
|
pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM, 4);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pRsnie_auth->acount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_auth->acount);
|
|
|
|
(*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH); // update current RSNIE length
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
|
|
Routine Description:
|
|
Build capability in RSN-IE.
|
|
It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
|
|
ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
|
|
apidx - indicate the interface index
|
|
|
|
Return Value:
|
|
|
|
Note:
|
|
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(
|
|
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
|
IN UCHAR ElementID,
|
|
IN UCHAR apidx,
|
|
OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
|
|
OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
|
|
{
|
|
RSN_CAPABILITIES *pRSN_Cap;
|
|
|
|
// it could be ignored in WPA1 mode
|
|
if (ElementID == WpaIe)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
pRSN_Cap = (RSN_CAPABILITIES*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
|
|
|
|
|
|
pRSN_Cap->word = cpu2le16(pRSN_Cap->word);
|
|
|
|
(*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES); // update current RSNIE length
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
|
|
Routine Description:
|
|
Build RSN IE context. It is not included element-ID and length.
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
|
|
AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
|
|
WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
|
|
apidx - indicate the interface index
|
|
|
|
Return Value:
|
|
|
|
Note:
|
|
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
|
|
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
|
IN UINT AuthMode,
|
|
IN UINT WepStatus,
|
|
IN UCHAR apidx)
|
|
{
|
|
PUCHAR pRsnIe = NULL; // primary RSNIE
|
|
UCHAR *rsnielen_cur_p = 0; // the length of the primary RSNIE
|
|
UCHAR *rsnielen_ex_cur_p = 0; // the length of the secondary RSNIE
|
|
UCHAR PrimaryRsnie;
|
|
BOOLEAN bMixCipher = FALSE; // indicate the pairwise and group cipher are different
|
|
UCHAR p_offset;
|
|
WPA_MIX_PAIR_CIPHER FlexibleCipher = MIX_CIPHER_NOTUSE; // it provide the more flexible cipher combination in WPA-WPA2 and TKIPAES mode
|
|
|
|
rsnielen_cur_p = NULL;
|
|
rsnielen_ex_cur_p = NULL;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT
|
|
IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef WPA_SUPPLICANT_SUPPORT
|
|
if (pAd->StaCfg.WpaSupplicantUP != WPA_SUPPLICANT_DISABLE)
|
|
{
|
|
if (AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA)
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif // WPA_SUPPLICANT_SUPPORT //
|
|
{
|
|
// Support WPAPSK or WPA2PSK in STA-Infra mode
|
|
// Support WPANone in STA-Adhoc mode
|
|
if ((AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
|
|
(AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
|
|
(AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone)
|
|
)
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("==> RTMPMakeRSNIE(STA)\n"));
|
|
|
|
// Zero RSNIE context
|
|
pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len = 0;
|
|
NdisZeroMemory(pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE, MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE);
|
|
|
|
// Pointer to RSNIE
|
|
rsnielen_cur_p = &pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len;
|
|
pRsnIe = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE;
|
|
|
|
bMixCipher = pAd->StaCfg.bMixCipher;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif // CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT //
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// indicate primary RSNIE as WPA or WPA2
|
|
if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) ||
|
|
(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) ||
|
|
(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone) ||
|
|
(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2) ||
|
|
(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK))
|
|
PrimaryRsnie = WpaIe;
|
|
else
|
|
PrimaryRsnie = Wpa2Ie;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// Build the primary RSNIE
|
|
// 1. insert cipher suite
|
|
RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, bMixCipher, FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
|
|
|
|
// 2. insert AKM
|
|
RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
|
|
|
|
// 3. insert capability
|
|
RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 4. update the RSNIE length
|
|
*rsnielen_cur_p = p_offset;
|
|
|
|
hex_dump("The primary RSNIE", pRsnIe, (*rsnielen_cur_p));
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
==========================================================================
|
|
Description:
|
|
Check whether the received frame is EAP frame.
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
|
|
pEntry - pointer to active entry
|
|
pData - the received frame
|
|
DataByteCount - the received frame's length
|
|
FromWhichBSSID - indicate the interface index
|
|
|
|
Return:
|
|
TRUE - This frame is EAP frame
|
|
FALSE - otherwise
|
|
==========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
|
|
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
|
IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
|
|
IN PUCHAR pData,
|
|
IN ULONG DataByteCount,
|
|
IN UCHAR FromWhichBSSID)
|
|
{
|
|
ULONG Body_len;
|
|
BOOLEAN Cancelled;
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(DataByteCount < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H))
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Skip LLC header
|
|
if (NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_802_1H, pData, 6) ||
|
|
// Cisco 1200 AP may send packet with SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL
|
|
NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL, pData, 6))
|
|
{
|
|
pData += 6;
|
|
}
|
|
// Skip 2-bytes EAPoL type
|
|
if (NdisEqualMemory(EAPOL, pData, 2))
|
|
{
|
|
pData += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
|
|
switch (*(pData+1))
|
|
{
|
|
case EAPPacket:
|
|
Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAP-Packet frame, TYPE = 0, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
|
|
break;
|
|
case EAPOLStart:
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Start frame, TYPE = 1 \n"));
|
|
if (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning != EAPOL_START_DISABLE)
|
|
{
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n"));
|
|
RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->EnqueueStartForPSKTimer, &Cancelled);
|
|
pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning = EAPOL_START_DISABLE;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case EAPOLLogoff:
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLLogoff frame, TYPE = 2 \n"));
|
|
break;
|
|
case EAPOLKey:
|
|
Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Key frame, TYPE = 3, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
|
|
break;
|
|
case EAPOLASFAlert:
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLASFAlert frame, TYPE = 4 \n"));
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
==========================================================================
|
|
Description:
|
|
ENCRYPT AES GTK before sending in EAPOL frame.
|
|
AES GTK length = 128 bit, so fix blocks for aes-key-wrap as 2 in this function.
|
|
This function references to RFC 3394 for aes key wrap algorithm.
|
|
Return:
|
|
==========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(
|
|
IN UCHAR *key,
|
|
IN UCHAR *plaintext,
|
|
IN UCHAR p_len,
|
|
OUT UCHAR *ciphertext)
|
|
{
|
|
UCHAR A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
|
|
UCHAR R[512];
|
|
INT num_blocks = p_len/8; // unit:64bits
|
|
INT i, j;
|
|
aes_context aesctx;
|
|
UCHAR xor;
|
|
|
|
rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
|
|
|
|
// Init IA
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
|
|
A[i] = 0xa6;
|
|
|
|
//Input plaintext
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_blocks; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
|
|
R[8 * (i + 1) + j] = plaintext[8 * i + j];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Key Mix
|
|
for (j = 0; j < 6; j++)
|
|
{
|
|
for(i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
//phase 1
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[8 * i], 8);
|
|
rtmp_aes_encrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
|
|
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
|
|
xor = num_blocks * j + i;
|
|
A[7] = BOUT[7] ^ xor;
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(&R[8 * i], &BOUT[8], 8);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Output ciphertext
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(ciphertext, A, 8);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
|
|
ciphertext[8 * i + j] = R[8 * i + j];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
|
|
Routine Description:
|
|
Misc function to decrypt AES body
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
|
|
Return Value:
|
|
|
|
Note:
|
|
This function references to RFC 3394 for aes key unwrap algorithm.
|
|
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(
|
|
IN UCHAR *key,
|
|
OUT UCHAR *plaintext,
|
|
IN UCHAR c_len,
|
|
IN UCHAR *ciphertext)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
UCHAR A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
|
|
UCHAR xor;
|
|
INT i, j;
|
|
aes_context aesctx;
|
|
UCHAR *R;
|
|
INT num_blocks = c_len/8; // unit:64bits
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&R, 512);
|
|
|
|
if (R == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP: no memory!!!\n"));
|
|
return;
|
|
} /* End of if */
|
|
|
|
// Initialize
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(A, ciphertext, 8);
|
|
//Input plaintext
|
|
for(i = 0; i < (c_len-8); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
R[ i] = ciphertext[i + 8];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
|
|
|
|
for(j = 5; j >= 0; j--)
|
|
{
|
|
for(i = (num_blocks-1); i > 0; i--)
|
|
{
|
|
xor = (num_blocks -1 )* j + i;
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
|
|
BIN[7] = A[7] ^ xor;
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[(i-1)*8], 8);
|
|
rtmp_aes_decrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(&R[(i-1)*8], &BOUT[8], 8);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// OUTPUT
|
|
for(i = 0; i < c_len; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
plaintext[i] = R[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_free_mem(NULL, R);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
==========================================================================
|
|
Description:
|
|
Report the EAP message type
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
msg - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1
|
|
EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2
|
|
EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3
|
|
EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4
|
|
EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1
|
|
EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2
|
|
|
|
Return:
|
|
message type string
|
|
|
|
==========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
CHAR *GetEapolMsgType(CHAR msg)
|
|
{
|
|
if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
|
|
return "Pairwise Message 1";
|
|
else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2)
|
|
return "Pairwise Message 2";
|
|
else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
|
|
return "Pairwise Message 3";
|
|
else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)
|
|
return "Pairwise Message 4";
|
|
else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
|
|
return "Group Message 1";
|
|
else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
|
|
return "Group Message 2";
|
|
else
|
|
return "Invalid Message";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
|
|
Routine Description:
|
|
Check Sanity RSN IE of EAPoL message
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
|
|
Return Value:
|
|
|
|
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(
|
|
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
|
IN PUCHAR pData,
|
|
IN UCHAR DataLen,
|
|
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
|
|
OUT UCHAR *Offset)
|
|
{
|
|
PUCHAR pVIE;
|
|
UCHAR len;
|
|
PEID_STRUCT pEid;
|
|
BOOLEAN result = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
pVIE = pData;
|
|
len = DataLen;
|
|
*Offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (len > sizeof(RSNIE2))
|
|
{
|
|
pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pVIE;
|
|
// WPA RSN IE
|
|
if ((pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, WPA_OUI, 4)))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
|
|
(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
|
|
(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2)))
|
|
{
|
|
result = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
|
|
}
|
|
// WPA2 RSN IE
|
|
else if ((pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet + 2, RSN_OUI, 3)))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
|
|
(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
|
|
(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2))/* ToDo-AlbertY for mesh*/)
|
|
{
|
|
result = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pVIE += (pEid->Len + 2);
|
|
len -= (pEid->Len + 2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
|
|
Routine Description:
|
|
Parse KEYDATA field. KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK.
|
|
GTK is encaptulated in KDE format at p.83 802.11i D10
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
|
|
Return Value:
|
|
|
|
Note:
|
|
802.11i D10
|
|
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(
|
|
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
|
IN PUCHAR pKeyData,
|
|
IN UCHAR KeyDataLen,
|
|
IN UCHAR GroupKeyIndex,
|
|
IN UCHAR MsgType,
|
|
IN BOOLEAN bWPA2,
|
|
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
|
|
{
|
|
PKDE_ENCAP pKDE = NULL;
|
|
PUCHAR pMyKeyData = pKeyData;
|
|
UCHAR KeyDataLength = KeyDataLen;
|
|
UCHAR GTKLEN = 0;
|
|
UCHAR DefaultIdx = 0;
|
|
UCHAR skip_offset;
|
|
|
|
// Verify The RSN IE contained in pairewise_msg_2 && pairewise_msg_3 and skip it
|
|
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
|
|
{
|
|
// Check RSN IE whether it is WPA2/WPA2PSK
|
|
if (!RTMPCheckRSNIE(pAd, pKeyData, KeyDataLen, pEntry, &skip_offset))
|
|
{
|
|
// send wireless event - for RSN IE different
|
|
if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
|
|
RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_RSNIE_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
|
|
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("RSN_IE Different in msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
|
|
hex_dump("Receive RSN_IE ", pKeyData, KeyDataLen);
|
|
hex_dump("Desired RSN_IE ", pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len);
|
|
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
|
|
{
|
|
// skip RSN IE
|
|
pMyKeyData += skip_offset;
|
|
KeyDataLength -= skip_offset;
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> WPA2/WPA2PSK RSN IE matched in Msg 3, Length(%d) \n", skip_offset));
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> KeyDataLength %d without RSN_IE \n", KeyDataLength));
|
|
|
|
// Parse EKD format in pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 && group_msg_1_WPA2
|
|
if (bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
|
{
|
|
if (KeyDataLength >= 8) // KDE format exclude GTK length
|
|
{
|
|
pKDE = (PKDE_ENCAP) pMyKeyData;
|
|
|
|
|
|
DefaultIdx = pKDE->GTKEncap.Kid;
|
|
|
|
// Sanity check - KED length
|
|
if (KeyDataLength < (pKDE->Len + 2))
|
|
{
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: The len from KDE is too short \n"));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get GTK length - refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 p.82
|
|
GTKLEN = pKDE->Len -6;
|
|
if (GTKLEN < LEN_AES_KEY)
|
|
{
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key length is too short (%d) \n", GTKLEN));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: KDE format length is too short \n"));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK in KDE format ,DefaultKeyID=%d, KeyLen=%d \n", DefaultIdx, GTKLEN));
|
|
// skip it
|
|
pMyKeyData += 8;
|
|
KeyDataLength -= 8;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
|
|
{
|
|
DefaultIdx = GroupKeyIndex;
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK DefaultKeyID=%d \n", DefaultIdx));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Sanity check - shared key index must be 1 ~ 3
|
|
if (DefaultIdx < 1 || DefaultIdx > 3)
|
|
{
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key index(%d) is invalid in %s %s \n", DefaultIdx, ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT
|
|
// Todo
|
|
#endif // CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT //
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
|
|
Routine Description:
|
|
Construct EAPoL message for WPA handshaking
|
|
Its format is below,
|
|
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Protocol Version | 1 octet
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Protocol Type | 1 octet
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Body Length | 2 octets
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Descriptor Type | 1 octet
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Key Information | 2 octets
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Key Length | 1 octet
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Key Repaly Counter | 8 octets
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Key Nonce | 32 octets
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Key IV | 16 octets
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Key RSC | 8 octets
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Key ID or Reserved | 8 octets
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Key MIC | 16 octets
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Key Data Length | 2 octets
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
| Key Data | n octets
|
|
+--------------------+
|
|
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
pAd Pointer to our adapter
|
|
|
|
Return Value:
|
|
None
|
|
|
|
Note:
|
|
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID ConstructEapolMsg(
|
|
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
|
IN UCHAR AuthMode,
|
|
IN UCHAR WepStatus,
|
|
IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
|
|
IN UCHAR MsgType,
|
|
IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
|
|
IN UCHAR *ReplayCounter,
|
|
IN UCHAR *KeyNonce,
|
|
IN UCHAR *TxRSC,
|
|
IN UCHAR *PTK,
|
|
IN UCHAR *GTK,
|
|
IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
|
|
IN UCHAR RSNIE_Len,
|
|
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOLEAN bWPA2 = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
// Choose WPA2 or not
|
|
if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
|
|
bWPA2 = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
// Init Packet and Fill header
|
|
pMsg->ProVer = EAPOL_VER;
|
|
pMsg->ProType = EAPOLKey;
|
|
|
|
// Default 95 bytes, the EAPoL-Key descriptor exclude Key-data field
|
|
pMsg->Body_Len[1] = LEN_EAPOL_KEY_MSG;
|
|
|
|
// Fill in EAPoL descriptor
|
|
if (bWPA2)
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA2_KEY_DESC;
|
|
else
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA1_KEY_DESC;
|
|
|
|
// Fill in Key information, refer to IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 page 78
|
|
// When either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES, the DESC_TYPE_AES(2) shall be used.
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer =
|
|
(((WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) || (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) ? (DESC_TYPE_AES) : (DESC_TYPE_TKIP));
|
|
|
|
// Specify Key Type as Group(0) or Pairwise(1)
|
|
if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = GROUPKEY;
|
|
else
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = PAIRWISEKEY;
|
|
|
|
// Specify Key Index, only group_msg1_WPA1
|
|
if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex = DefaultKeyIdx;
|
|
|
|
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Install = 1;
|
|
|
|
if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyAck = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyMic = 1;
|
|
|
|
if ((bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)) || (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
|
|
{
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Secure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (bWPA2 && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
|
|
{
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// key Information element has done.
|
|
*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo));
|
|
|
|
// Fill in Key Length
|
|
{
|
|
if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
|
|
{
|
|
// the length of group key cipher
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? TKIP_GTK_LENGTH : LEN_AES_KEY);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
// the length of pairwise key cipher
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_KEY : LEN_AES_KEY);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fill in replay counter
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
|
|
|
|
// Fill Key Nonce field
|
|
// ANonce : pairwise_msg1 & pairwise_msg3
|
|
// SNonce : pairwise_msg2
|
|
// GNonce : group_msg1_wpa1
|
|
if ((MsgType <= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || ((!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))))
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
|
|
|
|
// Fill key IV - WPA2 as 0, WPA1 as random
|
|
if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
|
{
|
|
// Suggest IV be random number plus some number,
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, &KeyNonce[16], LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv[15] += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fill Key RSC field
|
|
// It contains the RSC for the GTK being installed.
|
|
if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
|
{
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyRsc, TxRSC, 6);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Clear Key MIC field for MIC calculation later
|
|
NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
|
|
|
|
ConstructEapolKeyData(pAd,
|
|
AuthMode,
|
|
WepStatus,
|
|
GroupKeyWepStatus,
|
|
MsgType,
|
|
DefaultKeyIdx,
|
|
bWPA2,
|
|
PTK,
|
|
GTK,
|
|
RSNIE,
|
|
RSNIE_Len,
|
|
pMsg);
|
|
|
|
// Calculate MIC and fill in KeyMic Field except Pairwise Msg 1.
|
|
if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
|
|
{
|
|
CalculateMIC(pAd, WepStatus, PTK, pMsg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> ConstructEapolMsg for %s %s\n", ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Body length = %d \n", pMsg->Body_Len[1]));
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Key length = %d \n", pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1]));
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
|
|
Routine Description:
|
|
Construct the Key Data field of EAPoL message
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
pAd Pointer to our adapter
|
|
Elem Message body
|
|
|
|
Return Value:
|
|
None
|
|
|
|
Note:
|
|
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID ConstructEapolKeyData(
|
|
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
|
IN UCHAR AuthMode,
|
|
IN UCHAR WepStatus,
|
|
IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
|
|
IN UCHAR MsgType,
|
|
IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
|
|
IN BOOLEAN bWPA2Capable,
|
|
IN UCHAR *PTK,
|
|
IN UCHAR *GTK,
|
|
IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
|
|
IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN,
|
|
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
|
|
{
|
|
UCHAR *mpool, *Key_Data, *Rc4GTK;
|
|
UCHAR ekey[(LEN_KEY_DESC_IV+LEN_EAP_EK)];
|
|
UCHAR data_offset;
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
// allocate memory pool
|
|
os_alloc_mem(pAd, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, 1500);
|
|
|
|
if (mpool == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* Rc4GTK Len = 512 */
|
|
Rc4GTK = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(mpool, 4);
|
|
/* Key_Data Len = 512 */
|
|
Key_Data = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(Rc4GTK + 512, 4);
|
|
|
|
NdisZeroMemory(Key_Data, 512);
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] = 0;
|
|
data_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
// Encapsulate RSNIE in pairwise_msg2 & pairwise_msg3
|
|
if (RSNIE_LEN && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)))
|
|
{
|
|
if (bWPA2Capable)
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = IE_WPA2;
|
|
else
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = IE_WPA;
|
|
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = RSNIE_LEN;
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset + 2], RSNIE, RSNIE_LEN);
|
|
data_offset += (2 + RSNIE_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Encapsulate KDE format in pairwise_msg3_WPA2 & group_msg1_WPA2
|
|
if (bWPA2Capable && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
|
|
{
|
|
// Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43w and Table-20h
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
|
|
|
|
if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x16;// 4+2+16(OUI+DataType+DataField)
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x26;// 4+2+32(OUI+DataType+DataField)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0x00;
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0x0F;
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0xAC;
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0x01;
|
|
|
|
// GTK KDE format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43x
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 6] = (DefaultKeyIdx & 0x03);
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 7] = 0x00; // Reserved Byte
|
|
|
|
data_offset += 8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Encapsulate GTK and encrypt the key-data field with KEK.
|
|
// Only for pairwise_msg3_WPA2 and group_msg1
|
|
if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
|
{
|
|
// Fill in GTK
|
|
if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, LEN_AES_KEY);
|
|
data_offset += LEN_AES_KEY;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, TKIP_GTK_LENGTH);
|
|
data_offset += TKIP_GTK_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Still dont know why, but if not append will occur "GTK not include in MSG3"
|
|
// Patch for compatibility between zero config and funk
|
|
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable)
|
|
{
|
|
if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0;
|
|
data_offset += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0;
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0;
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0;
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0;
|
|
Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0;
|
|
data_offset += 6;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Encrypt the data material in key data field
|
|
if (WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(&PTK[16], Key_Data, data_offset, Rc4GTK);
|
|
// AES wrap function will grow 8 bytes in length
|
|
data_offset += 8;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
// PREPARE Encrypted "Key DATA" field. (Encrypt GTK with RC4, usinf PTK[16]->[31] as Key, IV-field as IV)
|
|
// put TxTsc in Key RSC field
|
|
pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = PPPINITFCS32; //Init crc32.
|
|
|
|
// ekey is the contanetion of IV-field, and PTK[16]->PTK[31]
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(ekey, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(&ekey[LEN_KEY_DESC_IV], &PTK[16], LEN_EAP_EK);
|
|
ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, ekey, sizeof(ekey)); //INIT SBOX, KEYLEN+3(IV)
|
|
pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = RTMP_CALC_FCS32(pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32, Key_Data, data_offset);
|
|
WPAARCFOUR_ENCRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Rc4GTK, Key_Data, data_offset);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Rc4GTK, data_offset);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Key_Data, data_offset);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// set key data length field and total length
|
|
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] = data_offset;
|
|
pMsg->Body_Len[1] += data_offset;
|
|
|
|
os_free_mem(pAd, mpool);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
|
|
Routine Description:
|
|
Calcaulate MIC. It is used during 4-ways handsharking.
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
|
|
PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
|
|
|
|
Return Value:
|
|
|
|
Note:
|
|
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
VOID CalculateMIC(
|
|
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
|
IN UCHAR PeerWepStatus,
|
|
IN UCHAR *PTK,
|
|
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
|
|
{
|
|
UCHAR *OutBuffer;
|
|
ULONG FrameLen = 0;
|
|
UCHAR mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC];
|
|
UCHAR digest[80];
|
|
|
|
// allocate memory for MIC calculation
|
|
os_alloc_mem(pAd, (PUCHAR *)&OutBuffer, 512);
|
|
|
|
if (OutBuffer == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!CalculateMIC: no memory!!!\n"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// make a frame for calculating MIC.
|
|
MakeOutgoingFrame(OutBuffer, &FrameLen,
|
|
pMsg->Body_Len[1] + 4, pMsg,
|
|
END_OF_ARGS);
|
|
|
|
NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic));
|
|
|
|
// Calculate MIC
|
|
if (PeerWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
HMAC_SHA1(OutBuffer, FrameLen, PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, digest);
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
hmac_md5(PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, mic);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// store the calculated MIC
|
|
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
|
|
|
|
os_free_mem(pAd, OutBuffer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
|
|
Routine Description:
|
|
Some received frames can't decrypt by Asic, so decrypt them by software.
|
|
|
|
Arguments:
|
|
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
|
|
PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
|
|
|
|
Return Value:
|
|
NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS - decryption successful
|
|
NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE - decryption failure
|
|
|
|
========================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
NDIS_STATUS RTMPSoftDecryptBroadCastData(
|
|
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
|
IN RX_BLK *pRxBlk,
|
|
IN NDIS_802_11_ENCRYPTION_STATUS GroupCipher,
|
|
IN PCIPHER_KEY pShard_key)
|
|
{
|
|
PRXWI_STRUC pRxWI = pRxBlk->pRxWI;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// handle WEP decryption
|
|
if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption1Enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
if (RTMPSoftDecryptWEP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, pShard_key))
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
//Minus IV[4] & ICV[4]
|
|
pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 8;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : Software decrypt WEP data fails.\n"));
|
|
// give up this frame
|
|
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// handle TKIP decryption
|
|
else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
if (RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, 0, pShard_key))
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
//Minus 8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV, 4 bytes ICV
|
|
pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 20;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP Failed\n"));
|
|
// give up this frame
|
|
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// handle AES decryption
|
|
else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
|
{
|
|
if (RTMPSoftDecryptAES(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount , pShard_key))
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
//8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV (CCMP Header)
|
|
pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 16;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptAES Failed\n"));
|
|
// give up this frame
|
|
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
// give up this frame
|
|
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|