A number of places in the audit system we send an op= followed by a string
that includes spaces. Somehow this works but it's just wrong. This patch
moves all of those that I could find to be quoted.
Example:
Change From: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=remove rule
key="number2" list=4 res=0
Change To: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op="remove rule"
key="number2" list=4 res=0
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
audit_get_nd() is only used by audit_watch and could be more cleanly
implemented by having the audit watch functions call it when needed rather
than making the generic audit rule parsing code deal with those objects.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
In preparation for converting audit to use fsnotify instead of inotify we
seperate the inode watching code into it's own file. This is similar to
how the audit tree watching code is already seperated into audit_tree.c
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
audit_update_watch() runs all of the rules for a given watch and duplicates
them, attaches a new watch to them, and then when it finishes that process
and has called free on all of the old rules (ok maybe still inside the rcu
grace period) it proceeds to use the last element from list_for_each_entry_safe()
as if it were a krule rather than being the audit_watch which was anchoring
the list to output a message about audit rules changing.
This patch unfies the audit message from two different places into a helper
function and calls it from the correct location in audit_update_rules(). We
will now get an audit message about the config changing for each rule (with
each rules filterkey) rather than the previous garbage.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
When an audit watch is added to a parent the temporary watch inside the
original krule from userspace is freed. Yet the original watch is used after
the real watch was created in audit_add_rules()
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
There is what we believe to be a false positive reported by lockdep.
inotify_inode_queue_event() => take inotify_mutex => kernel_event() =>
kmalloc() => SLOB => alloc_pages_node() => page reclaim => slab reclaim =>
dcache reclaim => inotify_inode_is_dead => take inotify_mutex => deadlock
The plan is to fix this via lockdep annotation, but that is proving to be
quite involved.
The patch flips the allocation over to GFP_NFS to shut the warning up, for
the 2.6.30 release.
Hopefully we will fix this for real in 2.6.31. I'll queue a patch in -mm
to switch it back to GFP_KERNEL so we don't forget.
=================================
[ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
2.6.30-rc2-next-20090417 #203
---------------------------------
inconsistent {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} -> {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} usage.
kswapd0/380 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
(&inode->inotify_mutex){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff8112f1b5>] inotify_inode_is_dead+0x35/0xb0
{RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} state was registered at:
[<ffffffff81079188>] mark_held_locks+0x68/0x90
[<ffffffff810792a5>] lockdep_trace_alloc+0xf5/0x100
[<ffffffff810f5261>] __kmalloc_node+0x31/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81130652>] kernel_event+0xe2/0x190
[<ffffffff81130826>] inotify_dev_queue_event+0x126/0x230
[<ffffffff8112f096>] inotify_inode_queue_event+0xc6/0x110
[<ffffffff8110444d>] vfs_create+0xcd/0x140
[<ffffffff8110825d>] do_filp_open+0x88d/0xa20
[<ffffffff810f6b68>] do_sys_open+0x98/0x140
[<ffffffff810f6c50>] sys_open+0x20/0x30
[<ffffffff8100c272>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
irq event stamp: 690455
hardirqs last enabled at (690455): [<ffffffff81564fe4>] _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x80
hardirqs last disabled at (690454): [<ffffffff81565372>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x32/0xa0
softirqs last enabled at (690178): [<ffffffff81052282>] __do_softirq+0x202/0x220
softirqs last disabled at (690157): [<ffffffff8100d50c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x50
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by kswapd0/380:
#0: (shrinker_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff810d0bd7>] shrink_slab+0x37/0x180
#1: (&type->s_umount_key#17){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff8110cfbf>] shrink_dcache_memory+0x11f/0x1e0
stack backtrace:
Pid: 380, comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 2.6.30-rc2-next-20090417 #203
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810789ef>] print_usage_bug+0x19f/0x200
[<ffffffff81018bff>] ? save_stack_trace+0x2f/0x50
[<ffffffff81078f0b>] mark_lock+0x4bb/0x6d0
[<ffffffff810799e0>] ? check_usage_forwards+0x0/0xc0
[<ffffffff8107b142>] __lock_acquire+0xc62/0x1ae0
[<ffffffff810f478c>] ? slob_free+0x10c/0x370
[<ffffffff8107c0a1>] lock_acquire+0xe1/0x120
[<ffffffff8112f1b5>] ? inotify_inode_is_dead+0x35/0xb0
[<ffffffff81562d43>] mutex_lock_nested+0x63/0x420
[<ffffffff8112f1b5>] ? inotify_inode_is_dead+0x35/0xb0
[<ffffffff8112f1b5>] ? inotify_inode_is_dead+0x35/0xb0
[<ffffffff81012fe9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81077165>] ? lock_release_holdtime+0x35/0x1c0
[<ffffffff8112f1b5>] inotify_inode_is_dead+0x35/0xb0
[<ffffffff8110c9dc>] dentry_iput+0xbc/0xe0
[<ffffffff8110cb23>] d_kill+0x33/0x60
[<ffffffff8110ce23>] __shrink_dcache_sb+0x2d3/0x350
[<ffffffff8110cffa>] shrink_dcache_memory+0x15a/0x1e0
[<ffffffff810d0cc5>] shrink_slab+0x125/0x180
[<ffffffff810d1540>] kswapd+0x560/0x7a0
[<ffffffff810ce160>] ? isolate_pages_global+0x0/0x2c0
[<ffffffff81065a30>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
[<ffffffff8107953d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[<ffffffff810d0fe0>] ? kswapd+0x0/0x7a0
[<ffffffff8106555b>] kthread+0x5b/0xa0
[<ffffffff8100d40a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20
[<ffffffff8100cdd0>] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30
[<ffffffff81065500>] ? kthread+0x0/0xa0
[<ffffffff8100d400>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20
[eparis@redhat.com: fix audit too]
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
make the e->rule.xxx shorter in kernel/auditfilter.c
--
---------------------------------
Zhenwen Xu - Open and Free
Home Page: http://zhwen.org
My Studio: http://dim4.cn
>From 99692dc640b278f1cb1a15646ce42f22e89c0f77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zhenwen Xu <Helight.Xu@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2009 22:04:59 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] make the e->rule.xxx shorter in kernel/auditfilter.c
Signed-off-by: Zhenwen Xu <Helight.Xu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Don't store the field->op in the messy (and very inconvenient for e.g.
audit_comparator()) form; translate to dense set of values and do full
validation of userland-submitted value while we are at it.
->audit_init_rule() and ->audit_match_rule() get new values now; in-tree
instances updated.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix the actual rule listing; add per-type lists _not_ used for matching,
with all exit,... sitting on one such list. Simplifies "do something
for all rules" logics, while we are at it...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Problem: ordering between the rules on exit chain is currently lost;
all watch and inode rules are listed after everything else _and_
exit,never on one kind doesn't stop exit,always on another from
being matched.
Solution: assign priorities to rules, keep track of the current
highest-priority matching rule and its result (always/never).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Inotify watch removals suck violently.
To kick the watch out we need (in this order) inode->inotify_mutex and
ih->mutex. That's fine if we have a hold on inode; however, for all
other cases we need to make damn sure we don't race with umount. We can
*NOT* just grab a reference to a watch - inotify_unmount_inodes() will
happily sail past it and we'll end with reference to inode potentially
outliving its superblock.
Ideally we just want to grab an active reference to superblock if we
can; that will make sure we won't go into inotify_umount_inodes() until
we are done. Cleanup is just deactivate_super().
However, that leaves a messy case - what if we *are* racing with
umount() and active references to superblock can't be acquired anymore?
We can bump ->s_count, grab ->s_umount, which will almost certainly wait
until the superblock is shut down and the watch in question is pining
for fjords. That's fine, but there is a problem - we might have hit the
window between ->s_active getting to 0 / ->s_count - below S_BIAS (i.e.
the moment when superblock is past the point of no return and is heading
for shutdown) and the moment when deactivate_super() acquires
->s_umount.
We could just do drop_super() yield() and retry, but that's rather
antisocial and this stuff is luser-triggerable. OTOH, having grabbed
->s_umount and having found that we'd got there first (i.e. that
->s_root is non-NULL) we know that we won't race with
inotify_umount_inodes().
So we could grab a reference to watch and do the rest as above, just
with drop_super() instead of deactivate_super(), right? Wrong. We had
to drop ih->mutex before we could grab ->s_umount. So the watch
could've been gone already.
That still can be dealt with - we need to save watch->wd, do idr_find()
and compare its result with our pointer. If they match, we either have
the damn thing still alive or we'd lost not one but two races at once,
the watch had been killed and a new one got created with the same ->wd
at the same address. That couldn't have happened in inotify_destroy(),
but inotify_rm_wd() could run into that. Still, "new one got created"
is not a problem - we have every right to kill it or leave it alone,
whatever's more convenient.
So we can use idr_find(...) == watch && watch->inode->i_sb == sb as
"grab it and kill it" check. If it's been our original watch, we are
fine, if it's a newcomer - nevermind, just pretend that we'd won the
race and kill the fscker anyway; we are safe since we know that its
superblock won't be going away.
And yes, this is far beyond mere "not very pretty"; so's the entire
concept of inotify to start with.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> shouldn't these be using the "audit_get_loginuid(current)" and if we
> are going to output loginuid we also should be outputting sessionid
Thanks for your detailed explanation.
I have made a new patch for outputing "loginuid" and "sessionid" by audit_get_loginuid(current) and audit_get_sessionid(current).
If there are some deficiencies, please give me your indication.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The second argument "type" is not used in audit_filter_user(), so I think that type can be removed. If I'm wrong, please tell me.
Signed-off-by: Peng Haitao <penght@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fix auditfilter kernel-doc misssing parameter description:
Warning(lin2626-rc3//kernel/auditfilter.c:1551): No description found for parameter 'sessionid'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'audit.b50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current:
[PATCH] new predicate - AUDIT_FILETYPE
[patch 2/2] Use find_task_by_vpid in audit code
[patch 1/2] audit: let userspace fully control TTY input auditing
[PATCH 2/2] audit: fix sparse shadowed variable warnings
[PATCH 1/2] audit: move extern declarations to audit.h
Audit: MAINTAINERS update
Audit: increase the maximum length of the key field
Audit: standardize string audit interfaces
Audit: stop deadlock from signals under load
Audit: save audit_backlog_limit audit messages in case auditd comes back
Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messages
Audit: end printk with newline
Some drivers have duplicated unlikely() macros. IS_ERR() already has
unlikely() in itself.
This patch cleans up such pointless code.
Signed-off-by: Hirofumi Nakagawa <hnakagawa@miraclelinux.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Cc: Paul Clements <paul.clements@steeleye.com>
Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@rpsys.net>
Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it>
Cc: David Brownell <david-b@pacbell.net>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <aia21@cantab.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Argument is S_IF... | <index>, where index is normally 0 or 1.
Triggers if chosen element of ctx->names[] is present and the
mode of object in question matches the upper bits of argument.
I.e. for things like "is the argument of that chmod a directory",
etc.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use msglen as the identifier.
kernel/audit.c:724:10: warning: symbol 'len' shadows an earlier one
kernel/audit.c:575:8: originally declared here
Don't use ino_f to check the inode field at the end of the functions.
kernel/auditfilter.c:429:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditfilter.c:420:21: originally declared here
kernel/auditfilter.c:542:22: warning: symbol 'f' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditfilter.c:529:21: originally declared here
i always used as a counter for a for loop and initialized to zero before
use. Eliminate the inner i variables.
kernel/auditsc.c:1295:8: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here
kernel/auditsc.c:1320:7: warning: symbol 'i' shadows an earlier one
kernel/auditsc.c:1152:6: originally declared here
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Leave audit_sig_{uid|pid|sid} protected by #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL.
Noticed by sparse:
kernel/audit.c:73:6: warning: symbol 'audit_ever_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c💯8: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_uid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:101:8: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_pid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:102:6: warning: symbol 'audit_sig_sid' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/audit.c:117:23: warning: symbol 'audit_ih' was not declared. Should it be static?
kernel/auditfilter.c:78:18: warning: symbol 'audit_filter_list' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Previously I added sessionid output to all audit messages where it was
available but we still didn't know the sessionid of the sender of
netlink messages. This patch adds that information to netlink messages
so we can audit who sent netlink messages.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to
lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of
the exported SELinux interface.
Basically, use:
security_audit_rule_init
secuirty_audit_rule_free
security_audit_rule_known
security_audit_rule_match
instad of (respectively) :
selinux_audit_rule_init
selinux_audit_rule_free
audit_rule_has_selinux
selinux_audit_rule_match
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Stop using the following exported SELinux interfaces:
selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
kfree(ctx)
and use following generic LSM equivalents respectively:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
security_ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
security_task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
security_sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
security_release_secctx(ctx, len)
Call security_release_secctx only if security_secid_to_secctx
succeeded.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and
vfsmount of a struct path in the right order
* Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path)
* Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional()
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.
Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
<dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:
without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux
with patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux
This patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Some audit messages (namely configuration changes) are still emitted even if
the audit subsystem has been explicitly disabled. This patch turns those
messages off as well.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
New kind of audit rule predicates: "object is visible in given subtree".
The part that can be sanely implemented, that is. Limitations:
* if you have hardlink from outside of tree, you'd better watch
it too (or just watch the object itself, obviously)
* if you mount something under a watched tree, tell audit
that new chunk should be added to watched subtrees
* if you umount something in a watched tree and it's still mounted
elsewhere, you will get matches on events happening there. New command
tells audit to recalculate the trees, trimming such sources of false
positives.
Note that it's _not_ about path - if something mounted in several places
(multiple mount, bindings, different namespaces, etc.), the match does
_not_ depend on which one we are using for access.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Right now the audit filter can match on = != > < >= blah blah blah.
This allow the filter to also look at bitwise AND operations, &
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The sanity check in audit_match_class() is wrong. We are able to audit
2048 syscalls but in audit_match_class() we were accidentally using
sizeof(_u32) instead of number of bits in _u32 when deciding how many
syscalls were valid. On ia64 in particular we were hitting syscall
numbers over the (wrong) limit of 256. Fixing the audit_match_class
check takes care of the problem.
Signed-off-by: Klaus Weidner <klaus@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Kill this warning...
kernel/auditfilter.c: In function ‘audit_receive_filter’:
kernel/auditfilter.c:1213: warning: ‘ndw’ may be used uninitialized in this function
kernel/auditfilter.c:1213: warning: ‘ndp’ may be used uninitialized in this function
...with a simplification of the code. audit_put_nd() can accept NULL
arguments, just like kfree(). It is cleaner to init two existing vars
to NULL, remove the redundant test variable 'putnd_needed' branches, and call
audit_put_nd() directly.
As a desired side effect, the warning goes away.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
When auditing syscalls that send signals, log the pid and security
context for each target process. Optimize the data collection by
adding a counter for signal-related rules, and avoiding allocating an
aux struct unless we have more than one target process. For process
groups, collect pid/context data in blocks of 16. Move the
audit_signal_info() hook up in check_kill_permission() so we audit
attempts where permission is denied.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
I was looking at parsing some of these messages and found that I wanted what
it was doing next to an op= for the parser to key on. Also missing was the list
number and results.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
gcc emits this warning:
kernel/auditfilter.c: In function 'audit_filter_user':
kernel/auditfilter.c:1611: warning: 'state' is used uninitialized in this function
I tend to agree with gcc - there are a couple of plausible exit paths from
audit_filter_user_rules() where it does not set 'state', keeping the
variable uninitialized. For example if a filter rule has an AUDIT_POSSIBLE
action. Initialize to 'wont audit'. Fix whitespace damage too.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kstrdup() returns NULL on error.
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Currently the kernel audit system represents arch's as numbers and will
gladly accept comparisons between archs using >, <, >=, <= when the only
thing that makes sense is = or !=. I'm told that the next revision of
auditctl will do this checking but this will provide enforcement in the
kernel even for old userspace. A simple command to show the issue would
be to run
auditctl -d entry,always -F arch>i686 -S chmod
with this patch the kernel will reject this with -EINVAL
Please comment/ack/nak as soon as possible.
-Eric
kernel/auditfilter.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Rename selinux_ctxid_to_string to selinux_sid_to_string to be
consistent with other interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Make the audit message for implicit rule removal more informative.
Make the rule update message consistent with other messages.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Hello,
During some troubleshooting, I found that ppid was accidentally omitted from
the legacy rule section. This resulted in EINVAL for any rule with ppid sent
with AUDIT_ADD.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Michael C Thompson wrote: [Tue Aug 01 2006, 02:36:36PM EDT]
> The trigger for this oops is:
> # auditctl -a exit,always -S pread64 -F 'inode<1'
Setting the err value will fix it.
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Allow to tie upper bits of syscall bitmap in audit rules to kernel-defined
sets of syscalls. Infrastructure, a couple of classes (with 32bit counterparts
for biarch targets) and actual tie-in on i386, amd64 and ia64.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements
of the SELinux context.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++----
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
