Userspace pairing code can be simplified if it doesn't have to fall
back to using L2CAP_LM in the case of L2CAP raw sockets. This patch
allows the BT_SECURITY socket option to be used for these sockets.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The CID value of L2CAP sockets need to be set to zero. All userspace
applications do this via memset() on the sockaddr_l2 structure. The
RFCOMM implementation uses in-kernel L2CAP sockets and so it has to
make sure that l2_cid is set to zero.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
In the future the L2CAP layer will have full support for fixed channels
and right now it already can export the channel assignment, but for the
functions bind() and connect() the usage of only CID 0 is allowed. This
allows an easy detection if the kernel supports fixed channels or not,
because otherwise it would impossible for application to tell.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
When BT_DEFER_SETUP is enabled on a RFCOMM socket, then switch its
current state from BT_OPEN to BT_CONNECT2. This gives the Bluetooth
core a unified way to handle L2CAP and RFCOMM sockets. The BT_CONNECT2
state is designated for incoming connections.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
When BT_DEFER_SETUP has been enabled on a Bluetooth socket it keeps
signaling POLLIN all the time. This is a wrong behavior. The POLLIN
should only be signaled if the client socket is in BT_CONNECT2 state
and the parent has been BT_DEFER_SETUP enabled.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The authentication requirement got only updated when the security level
increased. This is a wrong behavior. The authentication requirement is
read by the Bluetooth daemon to make proper decisions when handling the
IO capabilities exchange. So set the value that is currently expected by
the higher layers like L2CAP and RFCOMM.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The L2CAP layer can trigger the authentication via an ACL connection or
later on to increase the security level. When increasing the security
level it didn't use the same authentication requirements when triggering
a new ACL connection. Make sure that exactly the same authentication
requirements are used. The only exception here are the L2CAP raw sockets
which are only used for dedicated bonding.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Some of the qualification tests demand that in case of failures in L2CAP
the HCI disconnect should indicate a reason why L2CAP fails. This is a
bluntly layer violation since multiple L2CAP connections could be using
the same ACL and thus forcing a disconnect reason is not a good idea.
To comply with the Bluetooth test specification, the disconnect reason
is now stored in the L2CAP connection structure and every time a new
L2CAP channel is added it will set back to its default. So only in the
case where the L2CAP channel with the disconnect reason is really the
last one, it will propagated to the HCI layer.
The HCI layer has been extended with a disconnect indication that allows
it to ask upper layers for a disconnect reason. The upper layer must not
support this callback and in that case it will nicely default to the
existing behavior. If an upper layer like L2CAP can provide a disconnect
reason that one will be used to disconnect the ACL or SCO link.
No modification to the ACL disconnect timeout have been made. So in case
of Linux to Linux connection the initiator will disconnect the ACL link
before the acceptor side can signal the specific disconnect reason. That
is perfectly fine since Linux doesn't make use of this value anyway. The
L2CAP layer has a perfect valid error code for rejecting connection due
to a security violation. It is unclear why the Bluetooth specification
insists on having specific HCI disconnect reason.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
In preparation for L2CAP fixed channel support, the CID value of a
L2CAP connection needs to be accessible via the socket interface. The
CID is the connection identifier and exists as source and destination
value. So extend the L2CAP socket address structure with this field and
change getsockname() and getpeername() to fill it in.
The bind() and connect() functions have been modified to handle L2CAP
socket address structures of variable sizes. This makes them future
proof if additional fields need to be added.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
If the extended features mask indicates support for fixed channels,
request the list of available fixed channels. This also enables the
fixed channel features bit so remote implementations can request
information about it. Currently only the signal channel will be
listed.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The recommendation for the L2CAP PSM 1 (SDP) is to not use any kind
of authentication or encryption. So don't trigger authentication
for incoming and outgoing SDP connections.
For L2CAP PSM 3 (RFCOMM) there is no clear requirement, but with
Bluetooth 2.1 the initiator is required to enable authentication
and encryption first and this gets enforced. So there is no need
to trigger an additional authentication step. The RFCOMM service
security will make sure that a secure enough link key is present.
When the encryption gets enabled after the SDP connection setup,
then switch the security level from SDP to low security.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
If the remote L2CAP server uses authentication pending stage and
encryption is enabled it can happen that a L2CAP connection request is
sent twice due to a race condition in the connection state machine.
When the remote side indicates any kind of connection pending, then
track this state and skip sending of L2CAP commands for this period.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
When two L2CAP connections are requested quickly after the ACL link has
been established there exists a window for a race condition where a
connection request is sent before the information response has been
received. Any connection request should only be sent after an exchange
of the extended features mask has been finished.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
When no authentication requirements are selected, but an outgoing or
incoming connection has requested any kind of security enforcement,
then set these authentication requirements.
This ensures that the userspace always gets informed about the
authentication requirements (if available). Only when no security
enforcement has happened, the kernel will signal invalid requirements.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
When receiving incoming connection to specific services, always use
general bonding. This ensures that the link key gets stored and can be
used for further authentications.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
When attempting to setup eSCO connections it can happen that some link
manager implementations fail to properly negotiate the eSCO parameters
and thus fail the eSCO setup. Normally the link manager is responsible
for the negotiation of the parameters and actually fallback to SCO if
no agreement can be reached. In cases where the link manager is just too
stupid, then at least try to establish a SCO link if eSCO fails.
For the Bluetooth devices with EDR support this includes handling packet
types of EDR basebands. This is particular tricky since for the EDR the
logic of enabling/disabling one specific packet type is turned around.
This fix contains an extra bitmask to disable eSCO EDR packet when
trying to fallback to a SCO connection.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
For L2CAP sockets with medium and high security requirement a missing
encryption will enforce the closing of the link. For the L2CAP raw
sockets this is not needed, so skip that check.
This fixes a crash when pairing Bluetooth 2.0 (and earlier) devices
since the L2CAP state machine got confused and then locked up the whole
system.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Submitting the bulk URBs for ACL data transfers only on demand has no
real benefit compared to just submit them when a Bluetooth device gets
opened. So when submitting the interrupt URBs for HCI events, just
submit the bulk URBs, too.
This solves a problem with some Bluetooth USB dongles that has been
reported over the last few month. These devices require that the bulk
URBs are actually present. These devices are really broken, but there
is nothing we can do about it.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
During a role change with pre-Bluetooth 2.1 devices, the remote side drops
the encryption of the RFCOMM connection. We allow a grace period for the
encryption to be re-established, before dropping the connection. During
this grace period, the RFCOMM_SEC_PENDING flag is set. Check this flag
before sending RFCOMM packets.
Signed-off-by: Jaikumar Ganesh <jaikumar@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This eliminates a sparse warning that symbol 'stat' shadows an earlier one.
Signed-off-by: Andre Haupt <andre@bitwigglers.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Due to lockdep changes, the CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC ifdef is not needed
now. So just remove it here.
The following commit fixed the !lockdep build warnings:
commit e8f6fbf62d
Author: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Date: Wed Nov 12 01:38:36 2008 +0000
lockdep: include/linux/lockdep.h - fix warning in net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
With the support for the enhanced security model and the support for
deferring connection setup, it is a good idea to increase various
version numbers.
This is purely cosmetic and has no effect on the behavior, but can
be really helpful when debugging problems in different kernel versions.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The new socket options should only be evaluated for SOL_BLUETOOTH level
and not for every other level. Previously this causes some minor issues
when detecting if a kernel with certain features is available.
Also restrict BT_SECURITY to SOCK_SEQPACKET for L2CAP and SOCK_STREAM for
the RFCOMM protocol.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
For L2CAP connections with high security setting, the link will be
immediately dropped when the encryption gets disabled. For L2CAP
connections with medium security there will be grace period where
the remote device has the chance to re-enable encryption. If it
doesn't happen then the link will also be disconnected.
The requirement for the grace period with medium security comes from
Bluetooth 2.0 and earlier devices that require role switching.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
A role switch with devices following the Bluetooth pre-2.1 standards
or without Encryption Pause and Resume support is not possible if
encryption is enabled. Most newer headsets require the role switch,
but also require that the connection is encrypted.
For connections with a high security mode setting, the link will be
immediately dropped. When the connection uses medium security mode
setting, then a grace period is introduced where the TX is halted and
the remote device gets a change to re-enable encryption after the
role switch. If not re-enabled the link will be dropped.
Based on initial work by Ville Tervo <ville.tervo@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and
SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is
no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as
SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE.
Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this
actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends
on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your
existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of
course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place
is a security issue.
The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now
used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this
way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation
is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also
enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since
this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of
the authentication can't be guaranteed.
As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level
is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on
PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with
a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be
used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level
will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only
the HIGH security level will require this.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
When the remote device supports only SCO connections, on receipt of
the HCI_EV_CONN_COMPLETE event packet, the connect state is changed to
BT_CONNECTED, but the socket state is not updated. Hence, the connect()
call times out even though the SCO connection has been successfully
established.
Based on a report by Jaikumar Ganesh <jaikumar@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
All SCO and eSCO connection are auto-accepted no matter if there is a
corresponding listening socket for them. This patch changes this and
connection requests for SCO and eSCO without any socket are rejected.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
In order to decide if listening L2CAP sockets should be accept()ed
the BD_ADDR of the remote device needs to be known. This patch adds
a socket option which defines a timeout for deferring the actual
connection setup.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
In order to decide if listening RFCOMM sockets should be accept()ed
the BD_ADDR of the remote device needs to be known. This patch adds
a socket option which defines a timeout for deferring the actual
connection setup.
The connection setup is done after reading from the socket for the
first time. Until then writing to the socket returns ENOTCONN.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The L2CAP and RFCOMM applications require support for authorization
and the ability of rejecting incoming connection requests. The socket
interface is not really able to support this.
This patch does the ground work for a socket option to defer connection
setup. Setting this option allows calling of accept() and then the
first read() will trigger the final connection setup. Calling close()
would reject the connection.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The socket option levels SOL_L2CAP, SOL_RFOMM and SOL_SCO are currently
in use by various Bluetooth applications. Going forward the common
option level SOL_BLUETOOTH should be used. This patch prepares the clean
split of the old and new option levels while keeping everything backward
compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
In case of connection failures the rfcomm_sock_sendmsg() should return
an error and not a 0 value.
Signed-off-by: Victor Shcherbatyuk <victor.shcherbatyuk@tomtom.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
This patch adds two new device ids to the asix driver.
One comes directly from the asix driver on their web site, the other was
reported by Armani Liao as needed for the MSI X320 to get the driver to
work properly for it.
Reported-by: Armani Liao <aliao@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently there are two paths for filling rx buffer queues. One is
used during initialization and the other during runtime. This patch
removes ql_alloc_sbq_buffers() and ql_alloc_lbq_buffers() and replaces
them with a call to the runtime functions ql_update_lbq() and
ql_update_sbq().
Signed-off-by: Ron Mercer <ron.mercer@qlogic.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
RX Buffers are refilled in chunks of 16 at a time before notifying the
hardware with a register write. This can cause several writes to take
place in a given napi poll call. This change causes the write to take place
only once at the end of the call.
Signed-off-by: Ron Mercer <ron.mercer@qlogic.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Instead of taking/giving the hw semaphore repeatedly when iterating over
several frame to queue route settings, we have the caller hold it until
all are done.
This reduces PCI bus chatter and possible waits.
Signed-off-by: Ron Mercer <ron.mercer@qlogic.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Instead of taking/giving the semaphore repeatedly when iterating over
several adderesses, we have the caller hold it until all are done. This
reduces PCI bus chatter and possible waits.
Signed-off-by: Ron Mercer <ron.mercer@qlogic.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Setting MAC addresses and routing frames to various queues will need to
be done in response to firmware events as well as during initialization.
This change encapsulates the facilities into a single call that can
later me made from other places.
Signed-off-by: Ron Mercer <ron.mercer@qlogic.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The functions time_before is more robust for comparing
jiffies against other values.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The functions time_before is more robust for comparing
jiffies against other values.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The functions time_before is more robust for comparing
jiffies against other values.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Remove some pointless conditionals before kfree_skb().
The semantic match that finds the problem is as follows:
(http://www.emn.fr/x-info/coccinelle/)
// <smpl>
@@
expression E;
@@
- if (E)
- kfree_skb(E);
+ kfree_skb(E);
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch changes the return value of nlmsg_notify() as follows:
If NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR is set by any of the listeners and
an error in the delivery happened, return the broadcast error;
else if there are no listeners apart from the socket that
requested a change with the echo flag, return the result of the
unicast notification. Thus, with this patch, the unicast
notification is handled in the same way of a broadcast listener
that has set the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket flag.
This patch is useful in case that the caller of nlmsg_notify()
wants to know the result of the delivery of a netlink notification
(including the broadcast delivery) and take any action in case
that the delivery failed. For example, ctnetlink can drop packets
if the event delivery failed to provide reliable logging and
state-synchronization at the cost of dropping packets.
This patch also modifies the rtnetlink code to ignore the return
value of rtnl_notify() in all callers. The function rtnl_notify()
(before this patch) returned the error of the unicast notification
which makes rtnl_set_sk_err() reports errors to all listeners. This
is not of any help since the origin of the change (the socket that
requested the echoing) notices the ENOBUFS error if the notification
fails and should resync itself.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Wei Yongjun