Commit graph

56 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric W. Biederman
c9235f4872 userns: Make credential debugging user namespace safe.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-08-23 22:54:18 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov
f23ca33546 keys: kill task_struct->replacement_session_keyring
Kill the no longer used task_struct->replacement_session_keyring, update
copy_creds() and exit_creds().

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-23 22:11:41 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
644473e9c6 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
 "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
  reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
  implementation.

  Highlights:
   - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
     code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.

   - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
     config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
     user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
     checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.

   - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
     user namespace before they are processed.  Removing the need to add
     an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
     uids remains the same.

   - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
     better than it is today.

   - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
     operationally with the user namespace enabled.

   - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
     billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
     enabled.  This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
     164ns per stat operation).

   - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
     Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
     anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
     entertaining failures in userspace.

   - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
     I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
     could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
     handle the case where setuid fails.

   - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
     we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid.  The LFS
     experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
     better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
     can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
     can't map.

   - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
     safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.

  My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
  kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."

Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
  userns:  Silence silly gcc warning.
  cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
  userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
  userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
  userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
  userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
  userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
  userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
  userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
  userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
  userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
  userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
  userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
  userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
  ...
2012-05-23 17:42:39 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
078de5f706 userns: Store uid and gid values in struct cred with kuid_t and kgid_t types
cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed.  The rest of the users
of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make
in one go and leave the change reviewable.  If the user namespace is disabled and
CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile
and behave correctly.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-05-03 03:28:38 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov
79549c6dfd cred: copy_process() should clear child->replacement_session_keyring
keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().

However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).

change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-11 08:20:11 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
0093ccb68f cred: Refcount the user_ns pointed to by the cred.
struct user_struct will shortly loose it's user_ns reference
so make the cred user_ns reference a proper reference complete
with reference counting.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-04-07 16:55:52 -07:00
Al Viro
4040153087 security: trim security.h
Trim security.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-02-14 10:45:42 +11:00
Paul Gortmaker
9984de1a5a kernel: Map most files to use export.h instead of module.h
The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the
EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else.  Revector them
onto the isolated export header for faster compile times.

Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of:

  -#include <linux/module.h>
  +#include <linux/export.h>

This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets
will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2011-10-31 09:20:12 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
36b8d186e6 Merge branch 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security
* 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits)
  TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek.
  Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user
  TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option.
  Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access
  Smack: compilation fix
  Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte
  Smack: domain transition protections (v3)
  Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED)
  Smack: Clean up comments
  Smack: Repair processing of fcntl
  Smack: Rule list lookup performance
  Smack: check permissions from user space (v2)
  TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector.
  TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock.
  TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning.
  TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock.
  TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector.
  TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings.
  target: check hex2bin result
  encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result
  ...
2011-10-25 09:45:31 +02:00
Axel Lin
8ad346c62a CRED: fix build error due to 'tgcred' undeclared
This patch adds CONFIG_KEYS guard for tgcred to fix below build error
if CONFIG_KEYS is not configured.

  CC      kernel/cred.o
kernel/cred.c: In function 'prepare_kernel_cred':
kernel/cred.c:657: error: 'tgcred' undeclared (first use in this function)
kernel/cred.c:657: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
kernel/cred.c:657: error: for each function it appears in.)
make[1]: *** [kernel/cred.o] Error 1
make: *** [kernel] Error 2

Signed-off-by: Axel Lin <axel.lin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-08-23 18:22:28 +10:00
David Howells
012146d072 CRED: Fix prepare_kernel_cred() to provide a new thread_group_cred struct
Fix prepare_kernel_cred() to provide a new, separate thread_group_cred struct
otherwise when using request_key() ____call_usermodehelper() calls
umh_keys_init() with the new creds pointing to init_tgcred, which
umh_keys_init() then blithely alters.

The problem can be demonstrated by:

	# keyctl request2 user a debug:a @s
	249681132
	# grep req /proc/keys
	079906a5 I--Q--     1 perm 1f3f0000     0     0 keyring   _req.249681132: 1/4
	38ef1626 IR----     1 expd 0b010000     0     0 .request_ key:ee1d4ec pid:4371 ci:1

The keyring _req.XXXX should have gone away, but something (init_tgcred) is
pinning it.

That key actually requested can then be removed and a new one created:

	# keyctl unlink 249681132
	1 links removed
	[root@andromeda ~]# grep req /proc/keys
	116cecac IR----     1 expd 0b010000     0     0 .request_ key:eeb4911 pid:4379 ci:1
	36d1cbf8 I--Q--     1 perm 1f3f0000     0     0 keyring   _req.250300689: 1/4

which causes the old _req keyring to go away and a new one to take its place.

This is a consequence of the changes in:

	commit 879669961b
	Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
	Date:   Fri Jun 17 11:25:59 2011 +0100
	KEYS/DNS: Fix ____call_usermodehelper() to not lose the session keyring

and:

	commit 17f60a7da1
	Author: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
	Date:   Fri Apr 1 17:07:50 2011 -0400
	capabilites: allow the application of capability limits to usermode helpers

After this patch is applied, the _req keyring and the .request_key key are
cleaned up.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-08-23 09:57:35 +10:00
Vasiliy Kulikov
72fa59970f move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common()
The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC
check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and
similar functions.

Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed
number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on
rlimit only.  But the check created new security threat: many poorly
written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it
cannot fail if executed with root privileges.  So, the check is removed
in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to
buggy programs.

The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons
spawning user processes.  Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve().
The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in
setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues.

Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the
limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag.  With the change only
this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve()
behaviour is not changed.

Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still
exceeded at the moment of execve().  If the process was sleeping for
days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down
under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was
exceeded days ago would be unexpected.  If the limit is not exceeded
anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork().

The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit
was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one.

Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag).

v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user().

Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-08-11 11:24:42 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
e52e713ec3 Merge branch 'docs-move' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs
* 'docs-move' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs:
  Create Documentation/security/, move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/   to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file>   to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
2011-05-27 10:25:02 -07:00
Randy Dunlap
d410fa4ef9 Create Documentation/security/,
move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/
  to Documentation/security/,
add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and
update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file>
  to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
2011-05-19 15:59:38 -07:00
James Morris
12a5a2621b Merge branch 'master' into next
Conflicts:
	include/linux/capability.h

Manually resolve merge conflict w/ thanks to Stephen Rothwell.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-05-19 18:51:57 +10:00
Serge E. Hallyn
47a150edc2 Cache user_ns in struct cred
If !CONFIG_USERNS, have current_user_ns() defined to (&init_user_ns).

Get rid of _current_user_ns.  This requires nsown_capable() to be
defined in capability.c rather than as static inline in capability.h,
so do that.

Request_key needs init_user_ns defined at current_user_ns if
!CONFIG_USERNS, so forward-declare that in cred.h if !CONFIG_USERNS
at current_user_ns() define.

Compile-tested with and without CONFIG_USERNS.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
[ This makes a huge performance difference for acl_permission_check(),
  up to 30%.  And that is one of the hottest kernel functions for loads
  that are pathname-lookup heavy.  ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-05-13 11:45:33 -07:00
Eric Paris
a3232d2fa2 capabilities: delete all CAP_INIT macros
The CAP_INIT macros of INH, BSET, and EFF made sense at one point in time,
but now days they aren't helping.  Just open code the logic in the
init_cred.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-04-04 10:31:16 +10:00
Serge E. Hallyn
3486740a4f userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespace
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
  user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
  user namespace.

The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces.  It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.

I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.

Changelog:
	11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
	12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
	Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
	capabilities to the user_ns he created.  THis is because we
	were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
	he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
	he was the creator.  Reverse those checks.
	12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
	01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
	01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
	02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
		    init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
		    it!  Fix the check in cap_capable().
	02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
		    fixing a compile failure.
	02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments.  Some
		    couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
		    them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY).  Add
		    a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
		    without #including cred.h.  Move all forward declarations
		    together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
		    kernel-doc format.
	02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
	02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.

(Original written and signed off by Eric;  latest, modified version
acked by him)

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23 19:47:02 -07:00
Ingo Molnar
a3ec4a603f Merge commit 'v2.6.38-rc5' into core/locking
Merge reason: pick up upstream fixes.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-02-16 13:33:41 +01:00
Tetsuo Handa
fb2b2a1d37 CRED: Fix memory and refcount leaks upon security_prepare_creds() failure
In prepare_kernel_cred() since 2.6.29, put_cred(new) is called without
assigning new->usage when security_prepare_creds() returned an error.  As a
result, memory for new and refcount for new->{user,group_info,tgcred} are
leaked because put_cred(new) won't call __put_cred() unless old->usage == 1.

Fix these leaks by assigning new->usage (and new->subscribers which was added
in 2.6.32) before calling security_prepare_creds().

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-07 14:04:00 -08:00
Tetsuo Handa
2edeaa34a6 CRED: Fix BUG() upon security_cred_alloc_blank() failure
In cred_alloc_blank() since 2.6.32, abort_creds(new) is called with
new->security == NULL and new->magic == 0 when security_cred_alloc_blank()
returns an error.  As a result, BUG() will be triggered if SELinux is enabled
or CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y.

If CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y, BUG() is called from __invalid_creds() because
cred->magic == 0.  Failing that, BUG() is called from selinux_cred_free()
because selinux_cred_free() is not expecting cred->security == NULL.  This does
not affect smack_cred_free(), tomoyo_cred_free() or apparmor_cred_free().

Fix these bugs by

(1) Set new->magic before calling security_cred_alloc_blank().

(2) Handle null cred->security in creds_are_invalid() and selinux_cred_free().

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-02-07 14:04:00 -08:00
Thomas Gleixner
10389a15e2 cred: Replace deprecated spinlock initialization
SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCK is deprecated. Use the lockdep capable variant
instead.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-01-27 12:30:37 +01:00
KOSAKI Motohiro
9b1bf12d5d signals: move cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_struct
Oleg Nesterov pointed out we have to prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec
itself and we can reuse ->cred_guard_mutex for it.  Yes, concurrent
execve() has no worth.

Let's move ->cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_struct.  It
naturally prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec.

Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-10-27 18:03:12 -07:00
David Howells
12fdff3fc2 Add a dummy printk function for the maintenance of unused printks
Add a dummy printk function for the maintenance of unused printks through gcc
format checking, and also so that side-effect checking is maintained too.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-08-12 09:51:35 -07:00
David Howells
de09a9771a CRED: Fix get_task_cred() and task_state() to not resurrect dead credentials
It's possible for get_task_cred() as it currently stands to 'corrupt' a set of
credentials by incrementing their usage count after their replacement by the
task being accessed.

What happens is that get_task_cred() can race with commit_creds():

	TASK_1			TASK_2			RCU_CLEANER
	-->get_task_cred(TASK_2)
	rcu_read_lock()
	__cred = __task_cred(TASK_2)
				-->commit_creds()
				old_cred = TASK_2->real_cred
				TASK_2->real_cred = ...
				put_cred(old_cred)
				  call_rcu(old_cred)
		[__cred->usage == 0]
	get_cred(__cred)
		[__cred->usage == 1]
	rcu_read_unlock()
							-->put_cred_rcu()
							[__cred->usage == 1]
							panic()

However, since a tasks credentials are generally not changed very often, we can
reasonably make use of a loop involving reading the creds pointer and using
atomic_inc_not_zero() to attempt to increment it if it hasn't already hit zero.

If successful, we can safely return the credentials in the knowledge that, even
if the task we're accessing has released them, they haven't gone to the RCU
cleanup code.

We then change task_state() in procfs to use get_task_cred() rather than
calling get_cred() on the result of __task_cred(), as that suffers from the
same problem.

Without this change, a BUG_ON in __put_cred() or in put_cred_rcu() can be
tripped when it is noticed that the usage count is not zero as it ought to be,
for example:

kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:168!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run
CPU 0
Pid: 2436, comm: master Not tainted 2.6.33.3-85.fc13.x86_64 #1 0HR330/OptiPlex
745
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81069881>]  [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
RSP: 0018:ffff88019e7e9eb8  EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff880161514480 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffff880140c690c0 RDI: ffff880140c690c0
RBP: ffff88019e7e9eb8 R08: 00000000000000d0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff880140c690c0
R13: ffff88019e77aea0 R14: 00007fff336b0a5c R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f12f50d97c0(0000) GS:ffff880007400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8f461bc000 CR3: 00000001b26ce000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process master (pid: 2436, threadinfo ffff88019e7e8000, task ffff88019e77aea0)
Stack:
 ffff88019e7e9ec8 ffffffff810698cd ffff88019e7e9ef8 ffffffff81069b45
<0> ffff880161514180 ffff880161514480 ffff880161514180 0000000000000000
<0> ffff88019e7e9f28 ffffffff8106aace 0000000000000001 0000000000000246
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff810698cd>] put_cred+0x13/0x15
 [<ffffffff81069b45>] commit_creds+0x16b/0x175
 [<ffffffff8106aace>] set_current_groups+0x47/0x4e
 [<ffffffff8106ac89>] sys_setgroups+0xf6/0x105
 [<ffffffff81009b02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 48 8d 71 ff e8 7e 4e 15 00 85 c0 78 0b 8b 75 ec 48 89 df e8 ef 4a 15 00
48 83 c4 18 5b c9 c3 55 8b 07 8b 07 48 89 e5 85 c0 74 04 <0f> 0b eb fe 65 48 8b
04 25 00 cc 00 00 48 3b b8 58 04 00 00 75
RIP  [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
 RSP <ffff88019e7e9eb8>
---[ end trace df391256a100ebdd ]---

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-07-29 15:16:17 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov
c70a626d3e umh: creds: kill subprocess_info->cred logic
Now that nobody ever changes subprocess_info->cred we can kill this member
and related code.  ____call_usermodehelper() always runs in the context of
freshly forked kernel thread, it has the proper ->cred copied from its
parent kthread, keventd.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27 09:12:45 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
96b5b7f4f2 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (61 commits)
  KEYS: Return more accurate error codes
  LSM: Add __init to fixup function.
  TOMOYO: Add pathname grouping support.
  ima: remove ACPI dependency
  TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal
  security/selinux/ss: Use kstrdup
  TOMOYO: Use stack memory for pending entry.
  Revert "ima: remove ACPI dependency"
  Revert "TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal"
  KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()
  TOMOYO: Use mutex_lock_interruptible.
  KEYS: Better handling of errors from construct_alloc_key()
  KEYS: keyring_serialise_link_sem is only needed for keyring->keyring links
  TOMOYO: Use GFP_NOFS rather than GFP_KERNEL.
  ima: remove ACPI dependency
  TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal
  selinux: generalize disabling of execmem for plt-in-heap archs
  LSM Audit: rename LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE
  CRED: Holding a spinlock does not imply the holding of RCU read lock
  SMACK: Don't #include Ext2 headers
  ...
2010-05-20 08:55:50 -07:00
Ingo Molnar
48652ced15 Merge commit 'v2.6.34-rc6' into sched/core 2010-05-07 11:27:54 +02:00
James Morris
0ffbe2699c Merge branch 'master' into next 2010-05-06 10:56:07 +10:00
David Howells
e134d200d5 CRED: Fix a race in creds_are_invalid() in credentials debugging
creds_are_invalid() reads both cred->usage and cred->subscribers and then
compares them to make sure the number of processes subscribed to a cred struct
never exceeds the refcount of that cred struct.

The problem is that this can cause a race with both copy_creds() and
exit_creds() as the two counters, whilst they are of atomic_t type, are only
atomic with respect to themselves, and not atomic with respect to each other.

This means that if creds_are_invalid() can read the values on one CPU whilst
they're being modified on another CPU, and so can observe an evolving state in
which the subscribers count now is greater than the usage count a moment
before.

Switching the order in which the counts are read cannot help, so the thing to
do is to remove that particular check.

I had considered rechecking the values to see if they're in flux if the test
fails, but I can't guarantee they won't appear the same, even if they've
changed several times in the meantime.

Note that this can only happen if CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS is enabled.

The problem is only likely to occur with multithreaded programs, and can be
tested by the tst-eintr1 program from glibc's "make check".  The symptoms look
like:

	CRED: Invalid credentials
	CRED: At include/linux/cred.h:240
	CRED: Specified credentials: ffff88003dda5878 [real][eff]
	CRED: ->magic=43736564, put_addr=(null)
	CRED: ->usage=766, subscr=766
	CRED: ->*uid = { 0,0,0,0 }
	CRED: ->*gid = { 0,0,0,0 }
	CRED: ->security is ffff88003d72f538
	CRED: ->security {359, 359}
	------------[ cut here ]------------
	kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:850!
	...
	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81049889>]  [<ffffffff81049889>] __invalid_creds+0x4e/0x52
	...
	Call Trace:
	 [<ffffffff8104a37b>] copy_creds+0x6b/0x23f

Note the ->usage=766 and subscr=766.  The values appear the same because
they've been re-read since the check was made.

Reported-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-22 09:14:29 +10:00
David Howells
eff30363c0 CRED: Fix double free in prepare_usermodehelper_creds() error handling
Patch 570b8fb505:

	Author: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
	Date:   Tue Mar 30 00:04:00 2010 +0100
	Subject: CRED: Fix memory leak in error handling

attempts to fix a memory leak in the error handling by making the offending
return statement into a jump down to the bottom of the function where a
kfree(tgcred) is inserted.

This is, however, incorrect, as it does a kfree() after doing put_cred() if
security_prepare_creds() fails.  That will result in a double free if 'error'
is jumped to as put_cred() will also attempt to free the new tgcred record by
virtue of it being pointed to by the new cred record.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-21 09:20:35 +10:00
Ingo Molnar
b257c14ceb Merge branch 'linus' into sched/core
Merge reason: merge the latest fixes, update to -rc4.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-04-15 09:36:16 +02:00
Eric Paris
0968d0060a security: remove dead hook cred_commit
Unused hook.  Remove.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-04-12 12:19:15 +10:00
Tejun Heo
336f5899d2 Merge branch 'master' into export-slabh 2010-04-05 11:37:28 +09:00
Li Zefan
32bd7eb5a7 sched: Remove remaining USER_SCHED code
This is left over from commit 7c9414385e ("sched: Remove USER_SCHED"")

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Dhaval Giani <dhaval.giani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
LKML-Reference: <4BA9A05F.7010407@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-04-02 20:12:00 +02:00
Tejun Heo
5a0e3ad6af include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files.  percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed.  Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability.  As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.

  http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

The script does the followings.

* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
  only the necessary includes are there.  ie. if only gfp is used,
  gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
  blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
  to its surrounding.  It's put in the include block which contains
  core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
  alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
  doesn't seem to be any matching order.

* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
  because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
  an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
  file.

The conversion was done in the following steps.

1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
   over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
   and ~3000 slab.h inclusions.  The script emitted errors for ~400
   files.

2. Each error was manually checked.  Some didn't need the inclusion,
   some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
   embedding .c file was more appropriate for others.  This step added
   inclusions to around 150 files.

3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
   from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
   e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
   APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
   editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
   files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell.  Most gfp.h
   inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
   wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros.  Each
   slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
   necessary.

6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
   were fixed.  CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
   distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
   more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
   build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

   * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
   * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
   * s390 SMP allmodconfig
   * alpha SMP allmodconfig
   * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
   a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-30 22:02:32 +09:00
Mathieu Desnoyers
570b8fb505 CRED: Fix memory leak in error handling
Fix a memory leak on an OOM condition in prepare_usermodehelper_creds().

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-03-30 17:15:38 +11:00
Julia Lawall
b8a1d37c5f kernel/cred.c: use kmem_cache_free
Free memory allocated using kmem_cache_zalloc using kmem_cache_free rather
than kfree.

The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)

// <smpl>
@@
expression x,E,c;
@@

 x = \(kmem_cache_alloc\|kmem_cache_zalloc\|kmem_cache_alloc_node\)(c,...)
 ... when != x = E
     when != &x
?-kfree(x)
+kmem_cache_free(c,x)
// </smpl>

Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-02-03 10:21:57 +11:00
Randy Dunlap
764db03fee creds_are_invalid() needs to be exported for use by modules:
ERROR: "creds_are_invalid" [fs/cachefiles/cachefiles.ko] undefined!

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-23 11:02:26 -07:00
Andrew Morton
74908a0009 include/linux/cred.h: fix build
mips allmodconfig:

include/linux/cred.h: In function `creds_are_invalid':
include/linux/cred.h:187: error: `PAGE_SIZE' undeclared (first use in this function)
include/linux/cred.h:187: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
include/linux/cred.h:187: error: for each function it appears in.)

Fixes

commit b6dff3ec5e
Author:     David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Fri Nov 14 10:39:16 2008 +1100
Commit:     James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CommitDate: Fri Nov 14 10:39:16 2008 +1100

    CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct

I think.

It's way too large to be inlined anyway.

Dunno if this needs an EXPORT_SYMBOL() yet.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-23 11:01:25 -07:00
David Howells
4a5d6ba191 CRED: Allow put_cred() to cope with a NULL groups list
put_cred() will oops if given a NULL groups list, but that is now possible with
the existence of cred_alloc_blank(), as used in keyctl_session_to_parent().

Added in commit:

	commit ee18d64c1f
	Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
	Date:   Wed Sep 2 09:14:21 2009 +0100
	KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]

Reported-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-15 09:10:57 +10:00
David Howells
ee18d64c1f KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent.  This
replaces the parent's session keyring.  Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again.  Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.

To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.

The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.

Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.  This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.

This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership.  However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <stdlib.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18

	#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		key_serial_t keyring, key;
		long ret;

		keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
		OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");

		key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
		OSERROR(key, "add_key");

		ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
		OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");

		return 0;
	}

Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:

	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	355907932 --alswrv   4043    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.4043
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
	1055658746 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
	Session Keyring
	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: hello
	340417692 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a

Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:22 +10:00
David Howells
e0e817392b CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]
Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking
for credential management.  The additional code keeps track of the number of
pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that
this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes
all references, not just those from task_structs).

Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security
pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.

This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd
kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the
credential struct has been previously released):

	http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 21:29:01 +10:00
David Howells
5e751e992f CRED: Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against ptrace
Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign
intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace().  The
attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new
credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-11 08:15:36 +10:00
Linus Torvalds
1a7d0f0bec Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
  CRED: Fix commit_creds() on a process that has no mm
2009-01-09 13:59:25 -08:00
David Howells
43529c9712 CRED: Must initialise the new creds in prepare_kernel_cred()
The newly allocated creds in prepare_kernel_cred() must be initialised
before get_uid() and get_group_info() can access them.  They should be
copied from the old credentials.

Reported-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-09 11:53:53 -08:00
David Howells
0de3368141 CRED: Missing put_cred() in prepare_kernel_cred()
Missing put_cred() in the error handling path of prepare_kernel_cred().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-09 11:53:53 -08:00
David Howells
b9456371a7 CRED: Fix commit_creds() on a process that has no mm
Fix commit_creds()'s handling of a process that has no mm (such as one that is
calling or has called daemonize()).  commit_creds() should check to see if
task->mm is not NULL before calling set_dumpable() on it.

Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-01-08 23:13:56 +11:00
Serge Hallyn
18b6e0414e User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2)
The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct
cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise
would not be).  Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are
here as well.

Fix refcounting.  The following rules now apply:
        1. The task pins the user struct.
        2. The user struct pins its user namespace.
        3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it.

User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds().  Unsharing a new user_ns
is no longer possible.  (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code
duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user
namespaces).

When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty
keyrings and a clean group_info.

This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells.  Here
is his original patch description:

>I suggest adding the attached incremental patch.  It makes the following
>changes:
>
> (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user
>     namespace.
>
> (2) Fixes eCryptFS.
>
> (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent
>     with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is
>     superfluous.
>
> (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the
>     beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts
>     at allocation.
>
> (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds
>     to fill in rather than have it return the new root user.  I don't imagine
>     the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred
>     struct.
>
>     This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the
>     reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be
>     transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer.
>
> (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under
>     preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds().
>
>David

>Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Changelog:
	Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments
		1. leave thread_keyring alone
		2. use current_user_ns() in set_user()

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2008-11-24 18:57:41 -05:00
David Howells
3a3b7ce933 CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions
Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then
using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of
a task.

This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the
cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a
potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
credentials.

This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:

 (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
     with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).

 (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the
     security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that
     a task creates.

The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the
LSM functions:

 (1) prepare_kernel_cred()

     Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on
     a daemon's credentials or on init_cred.  All the keyrings are cleared.

 (2) set_security_override()

     Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security
     context, assuming permission from the LSM policy.

 (3) set_security_override_from_ctx()

     As (2), but takes the security context as a string.

 (4) set_create_files_as()

     Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the
     same as that on a particular inode.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:28 +11:00