unregister_key_type() has code to mark a key as dead and make it unavailable in
one loop and then destroy all those unavailable key payloads in the next loop.
However, the loop to mark keys dead renders the key undetectable to the second
loop by changing the key type pointer also.
Fix this by the following means:
(1) The key code has two garbage collectors: one deletes unreferenced keys and
the other alters keyrings to delete links to old dead, revoked and expired
keys. They can end up holding each other up as both want to scan the key
serial tree under spinlock. Combine these into a single routine.
(2) Move the dead key marking, dead link removal and dead key removal into the
garbage collector as a three phase process running over the three cycles
of the normal garbage collection procedure. This is tracked by the
KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1, _2 and _3 state flags.
unregister_key_type() then just unlinks the key type from the list, wakes
up the garbage collector and waits for the third phase to complete.
(3) Downgrade the key types sem in unregister_key_type() once it has deleted
the key type from the list so that it doesn't block the keyctl() syscall.
(4) Dead keys that cannot be simply removed in the third phase have their
payloads destroyed with the key's semaphore write-locked to prevent
interference by the keyctl() syscall. There should be no in-kernel users
of dead keys of that type by the point of unregistration, though keyctl()
may be holding a reference.
(5) Only perform timer recalculation in the GC if the timer actually expired.
If it didn't, we'll get another cycle when it goes off - and if the key
that actually triggered it has been removed, it's not a problem.
(6) Only garbage collect link if the timer expired or if we're doing dead key
clean up phase 2.
(7) As only key_garbage_collector() is permitted to use rb_erase() on the key
serial tree, it doesn't need to revalidate its cursor after dropping the
spinlock as the node the cursor points to must still exist in the tree.
(8) Drop the spinlock in the GC if there is contention on it or if we need to
reschedule. After dealing with that, get the spinlock again and resume
scanning.
This has been tested in the following ways:
(1) Run the keyutils testsuite against it.
(2) Using the AF_RXRPC and RxKAD modules to test keytype removal:
Load the rxrpc_s key type:
# insmod /tmp/af-rxrpc.ko
# insmod /tmp/rxkad.ko
Create a key (http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/rxrpc/listen.c):
# /tmp/listen &
[1] 8173
Find the key:
# grep rxrpc_s /proc/keys
091086e1 I--Q-- 1 perm 39390000 0 0 rxrpc_s 52:2
Link it to a session keyring, preferably one with a higher serial number:
# keyctl link 0x20e36251 @s
Kill the process (the key should remain as it's linked to another place):
# fg
/tmp/listen
^C
Remove the key type:
rmmod rxkad
rmmod af-rxrpc
This can be made a more effective test by altering the following part of
the patch:
if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2)) {
/* Make sure everyone revalidates their keys if we marked a
* bunch as being dead and make sure all keyring ex-payloads
* are destroyed.
*/
kdebug("dead sync");
synchronize_rcu();
To call synchronize_rcu() in GC phase 1 instead. That causes that the
keyring's old payload content to hang around longer until it's RCU
destroyed - which usually happens after GC phase 3 is complete. This
allows the destroy_dead_key branch to be tested.
Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The dead key link reaper should be non-reentrant as it relies on global state
to keep track of where it's got to when it returns to the work queue manager to
give it some air.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make the key reaper non-reentrant by sticking it on the appropriate system work
queue when we queue it. This will allow it to have global state and drop
locks. It should probably be non-reentrant already as it may spend a long time
holding the key serial spinlock, and so multiple entrants can spend long
periods of time just sitting there spinning, waiting to get the lock.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Move the unreferenced key reaper function to the keys garbage collector file
as that's a more appropriate place with the dead key link reaper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
__key_link() should use the RCU deref wrapper rcu_dereference_locked_keyring()
for accessing keyring payloads rather than calling rcu_dereference_protected()
directly.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The keyctl call:
keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 1)
should create a session keyring if the process doesn't have one of its own
because the create flag argument is set - rather than subscribing to and
returning the user-session keyring as:
keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0)
will do.
This can be tested by commenting out pam_keyinit in the /etc/pam.d files and
running the following program a couple of times in a row:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
key_serial_t uk, usk, sk, nsk;
uk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, 0);
usk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
sk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
nsk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 1);
printf("keys: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n", uk, usk, sk, nsk);
return 0;
}
Without this patch, I see:
keys: 3975ddc7 119c0c66 119c0c66 119c0c66
keys: 3975ddc7 119c0c66 119c0c66 119c0c66
With this patch, I see:
keys: 2cb4997b 34112878 34112878 17db2ce3
keys: 2cb4997b 34112878 34112878 39f3c73e
As can be seen, the session keyring starts off the same as the user-session
keyring each time, but with the patch a new session keyring is created when
the create flag is set.
Reported-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If install_session_keyring() is given a keyring, it should install it rather
than just creating a new one anyway. This was accidentally broken in:
commit d84f4f992c
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:23 2008 +1100
Subject: CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
The impact of that commit is that pam_keyinit no longer works correctly if
'force' isn't specified against a login process. This is because:
keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0)
now always creates a new session keyring and thus the check whether the session
keyring and the user-session keyring are the same is always false. This leads
pam_keyinit to conclude that a session keyring is installed and it shouldn't be
revoked by pam_keyinit here if 'revoke' is specified.
Any system that specifies 'force' against pam_keyinit in the PAM configuration
files for login methods (login, ssh, su -l, kdm, etc.) is not affected since
that bypasses the broken check and forces the creation of a new session keyring
anyway (for which the revoke flag is not cleared) - and any subsequent call to
pam_keyinit really does have a session keyring already installed, and so the
check works correctly there.
Reverting to the previous behaviour will cause the kernel to subscribe the
process to the user-session keyring as its session keyring if it doesn't have a
session keyring of its own. pam_keyinit will detect this and install a new
session keyring anyway (and won't clear the revert flag).
This can be tested by commenting out pam_keyinit in the /etc/pam.d files and
running the following program a couple of times in a row:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
key_serial_t uk, usk, sk;
uk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, 0);
usk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
sk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
printf("keys: %08x %08x %08x\n", uk, usk, sk);
return 0;
}
Without the patch, I see:
keys: 3884e281 24c4dfcf 22825f8e
keys: 3884e281 24c4dfcf 068772be
With the patch, I see:
keys: 26be9c83 0e755ce0 0e755ce0
keys: 26be9c83 0e755ce0 0e755ce0
As can be seen, with the patch, the session keyring is the same as the
user-session keyring each time; without the patch a new session keyring is
generated each time.
Reported-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (54 commits)
tpm_nsc: Fix bug when loading multiple TPM drivers
tpm: Move tpm_tis_reenable_interrupts out of CONFIG_PNP block
tpm: Fix compilation warning when CONFIG_PNP is not defined
TOMOYO: Update kernel-doc.
tpm: Fix a typo
tpm_tis: Probing function for Intel iTPM bug
tpm_tis: Fix the probing for interrupts
tpm_tis: Delay ACPI S3 suspend while the TPM is busy
tpm_tis: Re-enable interrupts upon (S3) resume
tpm: Fix display of data in pubek sysfs entry
tpm_tis: Add timeouts sysfs entry
tpm: Adjust interface timeouts if they are too small
tpm: Use interface timeouts returned from the TPM
tpm_tis: Introduce durations sysfs entry
tpm: Adjust the durations if they are too small
tpm: Use durations returned from TPM
TOMOYO: Enable conditional ACL.
TOMOYO: Allow using argv[]/envp[] of execve() as conditions.
TOMOYO: Allow using executable's realpath and symlink's target as conditions.
TOMOYO: Allow using owner/group etc. of file objects as conditions.
...
Fix up trivial conflict in security/tomoyo/realpath.c
Since ca5ecddf (rcu: define __rcu address space modifier for sparse)
rcu_dereference_check use rcu_read_lock_held as a part of condition
automatically so callers do not have to do that as well.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
The 'encrypted' key type defines its own payload format which contains a
symmetric key randomly generated that cannot be used directly to mount
an eCryptfs filesystem, because it expects an authentication token
structure.
This patch introduces the new format 'ecryptfs' that allows to store an
authentication token structure inside the encrypted key payload containing
a randomly generated symmetric key, as the same for the format 'default'.
More details about the usage of encrypted keys with the eCryptfs
filesystem can be found in the file 'Documentation/keys-ecryptfs.txt'.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch introduces a new parameter, called 'format', that defines the
format of data stored by encrypted keys. The 'default' format identifies
encrypted keys containing only the symmetric key, while other formats can
be defined to support additional information. The 'format' parameter is
written in the datablob produced by commands 'keyctl print' or
'keyctl pipe' and is integrity protected by the HMAC.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Some debug messages have been added in the function datablob_parse() in
order to better identify errors returned when dealing with 'encrypted'
keys.
Changelog from version v4:
- made the debug messages more understandable
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Do not dump the master key if an error is encountered during the request.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fix error handling in construct_key_and_link().
If construct_alloc_key() returns an error, it shouldn't pass out through
the normal path as the key_serial() called by the kleave() statement
will oops when it gets an error code in the pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffff84
IP: [<ffffffff8120b401>] request_key_and_link+0x4d7/0x52f
..
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8120b52c>] request_key+0x41/0x75
[<ffffffffa00ed6e8>] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x206/0x226 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa00eb0c9>] CIFS_SessSetup+0x511/0x1234 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa00d9799>] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs]
[<ffffffffa00d9c02>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x34b/0x40f [cifs]
[<ffffffffa00d9e05>] cifs_mount+0x13f/0x504 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa00caabb>] cifs_do_mount+0xc4/0x672 [cifs]
[<ffffffff8113ae8c>] mount_fs+0x69/0x155
[<ffffffff8114ff0e>] vfs_kern_mount+0x63/0xa0
[<ffffffff81150be2>] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xdf
[<ffffffff81152278>] do_mount+0x63c/0x69f
[<ffffffff8115255c>] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2
[<ffffffff814fbdc2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
____call_usermodehelper() now erases any credentials set by the
subprocess_inf::init() function. The problem is that commit
17f60a7da1 ("capabilites: allow the application of capability limits
to usermode helpers") creates and commits new credentials with
prepare_kernel_cred() after the call to the init() function. This wipes
all keyrings after umh_keys_init() is called.
The best way to deal with this is to put the init() call just prior to
the commit_creds() call, and pass the cred pointer to init(). That
means that umh_keys_init() and suchlike can modify the credentials
_before_ they are published and potentially in use by the rest of the
system.
This prevents request_key() from working as it is prevented from passing
the session keyring it set up with the authorisation token to
/sbin/request-key, and so the latter can't assume the authority to
instantiate the key. This causes the in-kernel DNS resolver to fail
with ENOKEY unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Don't return EAGAIN to keyctl_assume_authority() to indicate that a key could
not be found (ENOKEY is only returned if a negative key is found). Instead
return ENOKEY in both cases.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'docs-move' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs:
Create Documentation/security/, move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
Since this cred was not created with copy_creds(), it needs to get
initialized. Otherwise use of syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
can lead to a NULL deref. Thanks to Robert for finding this.
But introduced by commit 47a150edc2 ("Cache user_ns in struct cred").
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.39)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/
to Documentation/security/,
add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and
update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file>
to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
The rcu callback user_update_rcu_disposal() just calls a kfree(),
so we use kfree_rcu() instead of the call_rcu(user_update_rcu_disposal).
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Make request_key() and co. return an error for a negative or rejected key. If
the key was simply negated, then return ENOKEY, otherwise return the error
with which it was rejected.
Without this patch, the following command returns a key number (with the latest
keyutils):
[root@andromeda ~]# keyctl request2 user debug:foo rejected @s
586569904
Trying to print the key merely gets you a permission denied error:
[root@andromeda ~]# keyctl print 586569904
keyctl_read_alloc: Permission denied
Doing another request_key() call does get you the error, as long as it hasn't
expired yet:
[root@andromeda ~]# keyctl request user debug:foo
request_key: Key was rejected by service
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Improve /proc/keys by:
(1) Don't attempt to summarise the payload of a negated key. It won't have
one. To this end, a helper function - key_is_instantiated() has been
added that allows the caller to find out whether the key is positively
instantiated (as opposed to being uninstantiated or negatively
instantiated).
(2) Do show keys that are negative, expired or revoked rather than hiding
them. This requires an override flag (no_state_check) to be passed to
search_my_process_keyrings() and keyring_search_aux() to suppress this
check.
Without this, keys that are possessed by the caller, but only grant
permissions to the caller if possessed are skipped as the possession check
fails.
Keys that are visible due to user, group or other checks are visible with
or without this patch.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a keyctl op (KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV) that is like KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, but
takes an iovec array and concatenates the data in-kernel into one buffer.
Since the KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE copies the data anyway, this isn't too much of a
problem.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code. This works
much the same as negating a key, and so keyctl_negate_key() is made a special
case of keyctl_reject_key(). The difference is that keyctl_negate_key()
selects ENOKEY as the error to be reported.
Typically the key would be rejected with EKEYEXPIRED, EKEYREVOKED or
EKEYREJECTED, but this is not mandatory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a key type operation to permit the key type to vet the description of a new
key that key_alloc() is about to allocate. The operation may reject the
description if it wishes with an error of its choosing. If it does this, the
key will not be allocated.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add an RCU payload dereference macro as this seems to be a common piece of code
amongst key types that use RCU referenced payloads.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix __key_link_end()'s attempt to fix up the quota if an error occurs.
There are two erroneous cases: Firstly, we always decrease the quota if
the preallocated replacement keyring needs cleaning up, irrespective of
whether or not we should (we may have replaced a pointer rather than
adding another pointer).
Secondly, we never clean up the quota if we added a pointer without the
keyring storage being extended (we allocate multiple pointers at a time,
even if we're not going to use them all immediately).
We handle this by setting the bottom bit of the preallocation pointer in
__key_link_begin() to indicate that the quota needs fixing up, which is
then passed to __key_link() (which clears the whole thing) and
__key_link_end().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
One failure path in security/keys/trusted.c::trusted_update() does
not free 'new_p' while the others do. This patch makes sure we also free
it in the remaining path (if datablob_parse() returns different from
Opt_update).
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename encrypted_defined.c and encrypted_defined.h files to encrypted.c and
encrypted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename trusted_defined.c and trusted_defined.h files to trusted.c and
trusted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix up comments in the key management code. No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Do a bit of a style clean up in the key management code. No functional
changes.
Done using:
perl -p -i -e 's!^/[*]*/\n!!' security/keys/*.c
perl -p -i -e 's!} /[*] end [a-z0-9_]*[(][)] [*]/\n!}\n!' security/keys/*.c
sed -i -s -e ": next" -e N -e 's/^\n[}]$/}/' -e t -e P -e 's/^.*\n//' -e "b next" security/keys/*.c
To remove /*****/ lines, remove comments on the closing brace of a
function to name the function and remove blank lines before the closing
brace of a function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We can avoid scattering va_end() within the
va_start();
for (;;) {
}
va_end();
loop, assuming that crypto_shash_init()/crypto_shash_update() return 0 on
success and negative value otherwise.
Make TSS_authhmac()/TSS_checkhmac1()/TSS_checkhmac2() similar to TSS_rawhmac()
by removing "va_end()/goto" from the loop.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TSS_rawhmac() checks for data != NULL before using it.
We should do the same thing for TSS_authhmac().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TSS_rawhmac() forgot to call va_end()/kfree() when data == NULL and
forgot to call va_end() when crypto_shash_update() < 0.
Fix these bugs by escaping from the loop using "break"
(rather than "return"/"goto") in order to make sure that
va_end()/kfree() are always called.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add missing kfree(td) in tpm_seal() before the return, freeing
td on error paths as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Conflicts:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
Verified and added fix by Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Ok'd by Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In construct_alloc_key(), up_write() is called in the error path if
__key_link_begin() fails, but this is incorrect as __key_link_begin() only
returns with the nominated keyring locked if it returns successfully.
Without this patch, you might see the following in dmesg:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
mount.cifs/5769 is trying to release lock (&key->sem) at:
[<ffffffff81201159>] request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
3 locks held by mount.cifs/5769:
#0: (&type->s_umount_key#41/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81131321>] sget+0x278/0x3e7
#1: (&ret_buf->session_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0258e59>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x35a/0x443 [cifs]
#2: (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81201000>] request_key_and_link+0x10a/0x3fc
stack backtrace:
Pid: 5769, comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 2.6.37-rc6+ #1
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffff81081601>] print_unlock_inbalance_bug+0xca/0xd5
[<ffffffff81083248>] lock_release_non_nested+0xc1/0x263
[<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffff81083567>] lock_release+0x17d/0x1a4
[<ffffffff81073f45>] up_write+0x23/0x3b
[<ffffffff81201159>] request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[<ffffffffa026fe9e>] ? cifs_get_spnego_key+0x61/0x21f [cifs]
[<ffffffff812013c5>] request_key+0x41/0x74
[<ffffffffa027003d>] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x200/0x21f [cifs]
[<ffffffffa026e296>] CIFS_SessSetup+0x55d/0x1273 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa02589e1>] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs]
[<ffffffffa0258e7e>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x37f/0x443 [cifs]
[<ffffffffa025a9e3>] cifs_mount+0x1aa1/0x23f3 [cifs]
[<ffffffff8111fd94>] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xdb/0x120
[<ffffffffa027002c>] ? cifs_get_spnego_key+0x1ef/0x21f [cifs]
[<ffffffffa024cc71>] cifs_do_mount+0x165/0x2b3 [cifs]
[<ffffffff81130e72>] vfs_kern_mount+0xaf/0x1dc
[<ffffffff81131007>] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xef
[<ffffffff811483b9>] do_mount+0x6f4/0x733
[<ffffffff8114861f>] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2
[<ffffffff8100ac42>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cleanup based on David Howells suggestions:
- use static const char arrays instead of #define
- rename init_sdesc to alloc_sdesc
- convert 'unsigned int' definitions to 'size_t'
- revert remaining 'const unsigned int' definitions to 'unsigned int'
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Verify the hex ascii datablob length is correct before converting the IV,
encrypted data, and HMAC to binary.
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cleanup based on David Howells suggestions:
- replace kzalloc, where possible, with kmalloc
- revert 'const unsigned int' definitions to 'unsigned int'
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Previously not all TSS return codes were tested, as they were all eventually
caught by the TPM. Now all returns are tested and handled immediately.
This patch also fixes memory leaks in error and non-error paths.
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch fixes the linux-next powerpc build errors as reported by
Stephen Rothwell.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel
generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted'
symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel.
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
Changelog:
- bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore
(reported by David Howells)
- Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output
- Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with
one based on string constants.
- Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells)
- Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int'
(size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long)
- Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
- allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key
(fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered
- cleanup security/Kconfig
- Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu)
- Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure,
remove unnecessary tests.
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random
number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM
only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.
Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs.
Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been
added to support additional usages.
The new options are:
migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated
(resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.)
pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value,
so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed
again until after a reboot.
keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle.
keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth.
blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth.
Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be
investigated for a possible future extension.
Changelog:
- Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h
(David Howell's suggestion.)
- trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure
error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate.
- moved to late_initcall
- updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells)
- reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes
- moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells)
- all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells
- Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe)
- New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on
discussions with Jason Gunthorpe)
- Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn)
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix an incorrect error check that returns 1 for error instead of the
expected error code.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
David Howells