Commit graph

844 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Al Viro
e5467859f7 split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file()
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-31 13:11:54 -04:00
Al Viro
d007794a18 split cap_mmap_addr() out of cap_file_mmap()
... switch callers.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-31 13:10:54 -04:00
Al Viro
cc1dad7183 selinuxfs snprintf() misuses
a) %d does _not_ produce a page worth of output
b) snprintf() doesn't return negatives - it used to in old glibc, but
that's the kernel...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-29 23:28:33 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
cb60e3e65c Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "New notable features:
   - The seccomp work from Will Drewry
   - PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski
   - Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler
   - Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook"

Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
  apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path
  apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined
  ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name
  KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate()
  Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4
  gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?
  Smack: recursive tramsmute
  Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()
  TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / .
  KEYS: Add invalidation support
  KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings
  KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list
  KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction
  KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration
  KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile
  KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig
  KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat
  Yama: remove an unused variable
  samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros
  Yama: add additional ptrace scopes
  ...
2012-05-21 20:27:36 -07:00
James Morris
ff2bb047c4 Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into next
Per pull request, for 3.5.
2012-05-22 11:21:06 +10:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
d16cf20e2f netfilter: remove ip_queue support
This patch removes ip_queue support which was marked as obsolete
years ago. The nfnetlink_queue modules provides more advanced
user-space packet queueing mechanism.

This patch also removes capability code included in SELinux that
refers to ip_queue. Otherwise, we break compilation.

Several warning has been sent regarding this to the mailing list
in the past month without anyone rising the hand to stop this
with some strong argument.

Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2012-05-08 20:25:42 +02:00
Andy Lutomirski
259e5e6c75 Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
With this change, calling
  prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time.  For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set.  The same is true for file capabilities.

Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.

To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
  prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)

This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series.  By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.

Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged.  For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.

Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use.  It is fixed in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-14 11:13:18 +10:00
Eric Paris
c737f8284c SELinux: remove unused common_audit_data in flush_unauthorized_files
We don't need this variable and it just eats stack space.  Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:57 -04:00
Wanlong Gao
562c99f20d SELinux: avc: remove the useless fields in avc_add_callback
avc_add_callback now just used for registering reset functions
in initcalls, and the callback functions just did reset operations.
So, reducing the arguments to only one event is enough now.

Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:44 -04:00
Wanlong Gao
0b36e44cc6 SELinux: replace weak GFP_ATOMIC to GFP_KERNEL in avc_add_callback
avc_add_callback now only called from initcalls, so replace the
weak GFP_ATOMIC to GFP_KERNEL, and mark this function __init
to make a warning when not been called from initcalls.

Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:07 -04:00
Eric Paris
899838b25f SELinux: unify the selinux_audit_data and selinux_late_audit_data
We no longer need the distinction.  We only need data after we decide to do an
audit.  So turn the "late" audit data into just "data" and remove what we
currently have as "data".

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:06 -04:00
Eric Paris
1d34929271 SELinux: remove auditdeny from selinux_audit_data
It's just takin' up space.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:05 -04:00
Eric Paris
50c205f5e5 LSM: do not initialize common_audit_data to 0
It isn't needed.  If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug.  So why waste the cycles?

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:04 -04:00
Eric Paris
b466066f9b LSM: remove the task field from common_audit_data
There are no legitimate users.  Always use current and get back some stack
space for the common_audit_data.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:03 -04:00
Eric Paris
bd5e50f9c1 LSM: remove the COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT type expansion
Just open code it so grep on the source code works better.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:01 -04:00
Eric Paris
d4cf970d07 SELinux: move common_audit_data to a noinline slow path function
selinux_inode_has_perm is a hot path.  Instead of declaring the
common_audit_data on the stack move it to a noinline function only used in
the rare case we need to send an audit message.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:00 -04:00
Eric Paris
602a8dd6ea SELinux: remove inode_has_perm_noadp
Both callers could better be using file_has_perm() to get better audit
results.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:00 -04:00
Eric Paris
2e33405785 SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in selinux_inode_permission
We pay a rather large overhead initializing the common_audit_data.
Since we only need this information if we actually emit an audit
message there is little need to set it up in the hot path.  This patch
splits the functionality of avc_has_perm() into avc_has_perm_noaudit(),
avc_audit_required() and slow_avc_audit().  But we take care of setting
up to audit between required() and the actual audit call.  Thus saving
measurable time in a hot path.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:59 -04:00
Eric Paris
154c50ca4e SELinux: if sel_make_bools errors don't leave inconsistent state
We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the
number of entries in these arrays to 0.  If we error out and then get back
into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief
that they are non-zero length.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
cc: stable@kernel.org
2012-04-09 12:22:58 -04:00
Eric Paris
92ae9e82d9 SELinux: remove needless sel_div function
I'm not really sure what the idea behind the sel_div function is, but it's
useless.  Since a and b are both unsigned, it's impossible for a % b < 0.
That means that part of the function never does anything.  Thus it's just a
normal /.  Just do that instead.  I don't even understand what that operation
was supposed to mean in the signed case however....

If it was signed:
sel_div(-2, 4) == ((-2 / 4) - ((-2 % 4) < 0))
		  ((0)      - ((-2)     < 0))
		  ((0)      - (1))
		  (-1)

What actually happens:
sel_div(-2, 4) == ((18446744073709551614 / 4) - ((18446744073709551614 % 4) < 0))
		  ((4611686018427387903)      - ((2 < 0))
		  (4611686018427387903        - 0)
		  ((unsigned int)4611686018427387903)
		  (4294967295)

Neither makes a whole ton of sense to me.  So I'm getting rid of the
function entirely.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:57 -04:00
Eric Paris
bb7081ab93 SELinux: possible NULL deref in context_struct_to_string
It's possible that the caller passed a NULL for scontext.  However if this
is a defered mapping we might still attempt to call *scontext=kstrdup().
This is bad.  Instead just return the len.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:56 -04:00
Eric Paris
d6ea83ec68 SELinux: audit failed attempts to set invalid labels
We know that some yum operation is causing CAP_MAC_ADMIN failures.  This
implies that an RPM is laying down (or attempting to lay down) a file with
an invalid label.  The problem is that we don't have any information to
track down the cause.  This patch will cause such a failure to report the
failed label in an SELINUX_ERR audit message.  This is similar to the
SELINUX_ERR reports on invalid transitions and things like that.  It should
help run down problems on what is trying to set invalid labels in the
future.

Resulting records look something like:
type=AVC msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): avc:  denied  { mac_admin } for pid=2594 comm="chcon" capability=33 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=capability2
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): op=setxattr invalid_context=unconfined_u:object_r:hello:s0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): arch=c000003e syscall=188 success=no exit=-22 a0=a2c0e0 a1=390341b79b a2=a2d620 a3=1f items=1 ppid=2519 pid=2594 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="chcon" exe="/usr/bin/chcon" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=CWD msg=audit(1319659241.138:71):  cwd="/root" type=PATH msg=audit(1319659241.138:71): item=0 name="test" inode=785879 dev=fc:03 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:admin_home_t:s0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:56 -04:00
Eric Paris
83d498569e SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_open
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:50 -04:00
Eric Paris
95dbf73931 SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls
In RH BZ 578841 we realized that the SELinux sandbox program was allowed to
truncate files outside of the sandbox.  The reason is because sandbox
confinement is determined almost entirely by the 'open' permission.  The idea
was that if the sandbox was unable to open() files it would be unable to do
harm to those files.  This turns out to be false in light of syscalls like
truncate() and chmod() which don't require a previous open() call.  I looked
at the syscalls that did not have an associated 'open' check and found that
truncate(), did not have a seperate permission and even if it did have a
separate permission such a permission owuld be inadequate for use by
sandbox (since it owuld have to be granted so liberally as to be useless).
This patch checks the OPEN permission on truncate.  I think a better solution
for sandbox is a whole new permission, but at least this fixes what we have
today.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:49 -04:00
Eric Paris
eed7795d0a SELinux: add default_type statements
Because Fedora shipped userspace based on my development tree we now
have policy version 27 in the wild defining only default user, role, and
range.  Thus to add default_type we need a policy.28.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:48 -04:00
Eric Paris
aa893269de SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/range
When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to
determine the type of the new object.  We aren't quite as flexible or
mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range.  This
patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role,
and range should come from.  For users and roles it can come from either
the source or the target of the operation.  aka for files the user can
either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or
it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file)

examples always are done with
directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512
process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023

[no rule]
	unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0   test_none
[default user source]
	unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0   test_user_source
[default user target]
	system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0       test_user_target
[default role source]
	unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source
[default role target]
	unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0   test_role_target
[default range source low]
	unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low
[default range source high]
	unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high
[default range source low-high]
	unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high
[default range target low]
	unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low
[default range target high]
	unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high
[default range target low-high]
	unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:47 -04:00
Eric Paris
72e8c8593f SELinux: loosen DAC perms on reading policy
There is no reason the DAC perms on reading the policy file need to be root
only.  There are selinux checks which should control this access.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:36 -04:00
Eric Paris
47a93a5bcb SELinux: allow seek operations on the file exposing policy
sesearch uses:
lseek(3, 0, SEEK_SET)                   = -1 ESPIPE (Illegal seek)

Make that work.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:30 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
b61c37f579 lsm_audit: don't specify the audit pre/post callbacks in 'struct common_audit_data'
It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just before calling the
common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those
fields.

So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than
bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is
initialized in hot paths.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-03 09:49:59 -07:00
Eric Paris
3f0882c482 SELinux: do not allocate stack space for AVC data unless needed
Instead of declaring the entire selinux_audit_data on the stack when we
start an operation on declare it on the stack if we are going to use it.
We know it's usefulness at the end of the security decision and can declare
it there.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-03 09:49:41 -07:00
Eric Paris
f8294f1144 SELinux: remove avd from slow_avc_audit()
We don't use the argument, so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-03 09:49:10 -07:00
Eric Paris
7f6a47cf14 SELinux: remove avd from selinux_audit_data
We do not use it.  Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-03 09:49:10 -07:00
Eric Paris
48c62af68a LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union.  To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack.  Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures.  I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path.  We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-03 09:49:10 -07:00
Eric Paris
3b3b0e4fc1 LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop.  This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union.  Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-03 09:48:40 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
8bb1f22952 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull second try at vfs part d#2 from Al Viro:
 "Miklos' first series (with do_lookup() rewrite split into edible
  chunks) + assorted bits and pieces.

  The 'untangling of do_lookup()' series is is a splitup of what used to
  be a monolithic patch from Miklos, so this series is basically "how do
  I convince myself that his patch is correct (or find a hole in it)".
  No holes found and I like the resulting cleanup, so in it went..."

Changes from try 1: Fix a boot problem with selinux, and commit messages
prettied up a bit.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (24 commits)
  vfs: fix out-of-date dentry_unhash() comment
  vfs: split __lookup_hash
  untangling do_lookup() - take __lookup_hash()-calling case out of line.
  untangling do_lookup() - switch to calling __lookup_hash()
  untangling do_lookup() - merge d_alloc_and_lookup() callers
  untangling do_lookup() - merge failure exits in !dentry case
  untangling do_lookup() - massage !dentry case towards __lookup_hash()
  untangling do_lookup() - get rid of need_reval in !dentry case
  untangling do_lookup() - eliminate a loop.
  untangling do_lookup() - expand the area under ->i_mutex
  untangling do_lookup() - isolate !dentry stuff from the rest of it.
  vfs: move MAY_EXEC check from __lookup_hash()
  vfs: don't revalidate just looked up dentry
  vfs: fix d_need_lookup/d_revalidate order in do_lookup
  ext3: move headers to fs/ext3/
  migrate ext2_fs.h guts to fs/ext2/ext2.h
  new helper: ext2_image_size()
  get rid of pointless includes of ext2_fs.h
  ext2: No longer export ext2_fs.h to user space
  mtdchar: kill persistently held vfsmount
  ...
2012-03-31 13:42:57 -07:00
Al Viro
2f99c36986 get rid of pointless includes of ext2_fs.h
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-03-31 16:03:15 -04:00
Al Viro
a1c2aa1e86 selinuxfs: merge dentry allocation into sel_make_dir()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-03-31 16:03:15 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
cdb0f9a1ad selinux: inline avc_audit() and avc_has_perm_noaudit() into caller
Now that all the slow-path code is gone from these functions, we can
inline them into the main caller - avc_has_perm_flags().

Now the compiler can see that 'avc' is allocated on the stack for this
case, which helps register pressure a bit.  It also actually shrinks the
total stack frame, because the stack frame that avc_has_perm_flags()
always needed (for that 'avc' allocation) is now sufficient for the
inlined functions too.

Inlining isn't bad - but mindless inlining of cold code (see the
previous commit) is.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-31 11:24:22 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
a554bea899 selinux: don't inline slow-path code into avc_has_perm_noaudit()
The selinux AVC paths remain some of the hottest (and deepest) codepaths
at filename lookup time, and we make it worse by having the slow path
cases take up I$ and stack space even when they don't trigger.  Gcc
tends to always want to inline functions that are just called once -
never mind that this might make for slower and worse code in the caller.

So this tries to improve on it a bit by making the slow-path cases
explicitly separate functions that are marked noinline, causing gcc to
at least no longer allocate stack space for them unless they are
actually called.  It also seems to help register allocation a tiny bit,
since gcc now doesn't take the slow case code into account.

Uninlining the slow path may also allow us to inline the remaining hot
path into the one caller that actually matters: avc_has_perm_flags().
I'll have to look at that separately, but both avc_audit() and
avc_has_perm_noaudit() are now small and lean enough that inlining them
may make sense.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-31 11:24:22 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
a591afc01d Merge branch 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x32 support for x86-64 from Ingo Molnar:
 "This tree introduces the X32 binary format and execution mode for x86:
  32-bit data space binaries using 64-bit instructions and 64-bit kernel
  syscalls.

  This allows applications whose working set fits into a 32 bits address
  space to make use of 64-bit instructions while using a 32-bit address
  space with shorter pointers, more compressed data structures, etc."

Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/{Kconfig,vdso/vma.c}

* 'x86-x32-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (71 commits)
  x32: Fix alignment fail in struct compat_siginfo
  x32: Fix stupid ia32/x32 inversion in the siginfo format
  x32: Add ptrace for x32
  x32: Switch to a 64-bit clock_t
  x32: Provide separate is_ia32_task() and is_x32_task() predicates
  x86, mtrr: Use explicit sizing and padding for the 64-bit ioctls
  x86/x32: Fix the binutils auto-detect
  x32: Warn and disable rather than error if binutils too old
  x32: Only clear TIF_X32 flag once
  x32: Make sure TS_COMPAT is cleared for x32 tasks
  fs: Remove missed ->fds_bits from cessation use of fd_set structs internally
  fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable
  x32: Drop non-__vdso weak symbols from the x32 VDSO
  x32: Fix coding style violations in the x32 VDSO code
  x32: Add x32 VDSO support
  x32: Allow x32 to be configured
  x32: If configured, add x32 system calls to system call tables
  x32: Handle process creation
  x32: Signal-related system calls
  x86: Add #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT to <asm/sys_ia32.h>
  ...
2012-03-29 18:12:23 -07:00
David Howells
9ffc93f203 Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h
Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing
it.  Performed with the following command:

perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>.*\n!!' `grep -Irl '^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>' *`

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-03-28 18:30:03 +01:00
David Howells
778aae84ef SELinux: selinux/xfrm.h needs net/flow.h
selinux/xfrm.h needs to #include net/flow.h or else suffer:

In file included from security/selinux/ss/services.c:69:0:
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h: In function 'selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload':
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:53:14: error: 'flow_cache_genid' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:53:14: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-03-26 16:38:47 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
48aab2f79d security: optimize avc_audit() common path
avc_audit() did a lot of jumping around and had a big stack frame, all
for the uncommon case.

Split up the uncommon case (which we really can't make go fast anyway)
into its own slow function, and mark the conditional branches
appropriately for the common likely case.

This causes avc_audit() to no longer show up as one of the hottest
functions on the branch profiles (the new "perf -b" thing), and makes
the cycle profiles look really nice and dense too.

The whole audit path is still annoyingly very much one of the biggest
costs of name lookup, so these things are worth optimizing for.  I wish
we could just tell people to turn it off, but realistically we do need
it: we just need to make sure that the overhead of the necessary evil is
as low as possible.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-22 17:01:41 -07:00
David Howells
1fd36adcd9 Replace the fd_sets in struct fdtable with an array of unsigned longs
Replace the fd_sets in struct fdtable with an array of unsigned longs and then
use the standard non-atomic bit operations rather than the FD_* macros.

This:

 (1) Removes the abuses of struct fd_set:

     (a) Since we don't want to allocate a full fd_set the vast majority of the
     	 time, we actually, in effect, just allocate a just-big-enough array of
     	 unsigned longs and cast it to an fd_set type - so why bother with the
     	 fd_set at all?

     (b) Some places outside of the core fdtable handling code (such as
     	 SELinux) want to look inside the array of unsigned longs hidden inside
     	 the fd_set struct for more efficient iteration over the entire set.

 (2) Eliminates the use of FD_*() macros in the kernel completely.

 (3) Permits the __FD_*() macros to be deleted entirely where not exposed to
     userspace.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174954.23314.48147.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-02-19 10:30:57 -08:00
Al Viro
4040153087 security: trim security.h
Trim security.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-02-14 10:45:42 +11:00
Linus Torvalds
c49c41a413 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
  capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
  security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
  ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
  capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
  capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
  capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
  capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
  capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
  capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
  capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
  capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
  capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
  selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
  selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
  selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
  selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
  selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
  selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
  SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()

Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():

 - the interface was removed in commit fd77846152 ("security: remove
   the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")

 - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b9 ("crypto: Add
   userspace configuration API")

causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.
2012-01-14 18:36:33 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
e7691a1ce3 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (32 commits)
  ima: fix invalid memory reference
  ima: free duplicate measurement memory
  security: update security_file_mmap() docs
  selinux: Casting (void *) value returned by kmalloc is useless
  apparmor: fix module parameter handling
  Security: tomoyo: add .gitignore file
  tomoyo: add missing rcu_dereference()
  apparmor: add missing rcu_dereference()
  evm: prevent racing during tfm allocation
  evm: key must be set once during initialization
  mpi/mpi-mpow: NULL dereference on allocation failure
  digsig: build dependency fix
  KEYS: Give key types their own lockdep class for key->sem
  TPM: fix transmit_cmd error logic
  TPM: NSC and TIS drivers X86 dependency fix
  TPM: Export wait_for_stat for other vendor specific drivers
  TPM: Use vendor specific function for status probe
  tpm_tis: add delay after aborting command
  tpm_tis: Check return code from getting timeouts/durations
  tpm: Introduce function to poll for result of self test
  ...

Fix up trivial conflict in lib/Makefile due to addition of CONFIG_MPI
and SIGSIG next to CONFIG_DQL addition.
2012-01-10 21:51:23 -08:00
James Morris
8fcc995495 Merge branch 'next' into for-linus
Conflicts:
	security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c

Resolved upstream fix vs. next conflict manually.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-01-09 12:16:48 +11:00
Linus Torvalds
972b2c7199 Merge branch 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
* 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (165 commits)
  reiserfs: Properly display mount options in /proc/mounts
  vfs: prevent remount read-only if pending removes
  vfs: count unlinked inodes
  vfs: protect remounting superblock read-only
  vfs: keep list of mounts for each superblock
  vfs: switch ->show_options() to struct dentry *
  vfs: switch ->show_path() to struct dentry *
  vfs: switch ->show_devname() to struct dentry *
  vfs: switch ->show_stats to struct dentry *
  switch security_path_chmod() to struct path *
  vfs: prefer ->dentry->d_sb to ->mnt->mnt_sb
  vfs: trim includes a bit
  switch mnt_namespace ->root to struct mount
  vfs: take /proc/*/mounts and friends to fs/proc_namespace.c
  vfs: opencode mntget() mnt_set_mountpoint()
  vfs: spread struct mount - remaining argument of next_mnt()
  vfs: move fsnotify junk to struct mount
  vfs: move mnt_devname
  vfs: move mnt_list to struct mount
  vfs: switch pnode.h macros to struct mount *
  ...
2012-01-08 12:19:57 -08:00
Al Viro
d8c9584ea2 vfs: prefer ->dentry->d_sb to ->mnt->mnt_sb
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-06 23:16:53 -05:00