2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/*
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* linux/fs/binfmt_aout.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992, 1996 Linus Torvalds
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/time.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/a.out.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/stat.h>
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#include <linux/fcntl.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/user.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/binfmts.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <asm/system.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
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2008-02-08 12:19:28 +00:00
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#include <asm/a.out-core.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *, struct pt_regs * regs);
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static int load_aout_library(struct file*);
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2009-12-17 23:27:16 +00:00
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static int aout_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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static struct linux_binfmt aout_format = {
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.module = THIS_MODULE,
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.load_binary = load_aout_binary,
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.load_shlib = load_aout_library,
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.core_dump = aout_core_dump,
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.min_coredump = PAGE_SIZE
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};
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#define BAD_ADDR(x) ((unsigned long)(x) >= TASK_SIZE)
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static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
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{
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start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
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end = PAGE_ALIGN(end);
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if (end > start) {
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unsigned long addr;
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down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
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addr = do_brk(start, end - start);
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up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
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if (BAD_ADDR(addr))
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return addr;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* These are the only things you should do on a core-file: use only these
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* macros to write out all the necessary info.
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*/
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static int dump_write(struct file *file, const void *addr, int nr)
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{
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return file->f_op->write(file, addr, nr, &file->f_pos) == nr;
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}
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#define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr) \
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if (!dump_write(file, (void *)(addr), (nr))) \
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goto end_coredump;
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#define DUMP_SEEK(offset) \
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if (file->f_op->llseek) { \
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if (file->f_op->llseek(file,(offset),0) != (offset)) \
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goto end_coredump; \
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} else file->f_pos = (offset)
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/*
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* Routine writes a core dump image in the current directory.
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* Currently only a stub-function.
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*
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* Note that setuid/setgid files won't make a core-dump if the uid/gid
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* changed due to the set[u|g]id. It's enforced by the "current->mm->dumpable"
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* field, which also makes sure the core-dumps won't be recursive if the
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* dumping of the process results in another error..
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*/
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2009-12-17 23:27:16 +00:00
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static int aout_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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{
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2009-12-17 23:27:16 +00:00
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struct file *file = cprm->file;
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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mm_segment_t fs;
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int has_dumped = 0;
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unsigned long dump_start, dump_size;
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struct user dump;
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2009-01-03 07:16:23 +00:00
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#ifdef __alpha__
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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# define START_DATA(u) (u.start_data)
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2009-01-03 07:16:23 +00:00
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#else
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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# define START_DATA(u) ((u.u_tsize << PAGE_SHIFT) + u.start_code)
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#endif
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# define START_STACK(u) (u.start_stack)
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fs = get_fs();
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set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
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has_dumped = 1;
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current->flags |= PF_DUMPCORE;
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strncpy(dump.u_comm, current->comm, sizeof(dump.u_comm));
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2008-02-07 08:15:57 +00:00
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dump.u_ar0 = offsetof(struct user, regs);
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2009-12-17 23:27:16 +00:00
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dump.signal = cprm->signr;
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aout_dump_thread(cprm->regs, &dump);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen
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if we wrote the stack, but not the data area. */
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2009-12-17 23:27:16 +00:00
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if ((dump.u_dsize + dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE > cprm->limit)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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dump.u_dsize = 0;
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/* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */
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2009-12-17 23:27:16 +00:00
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if ((dump.u_ssize + 1) * PAGE_SIZE > cprm->limit)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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dump.u_ssize = 0;
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/* make sure we actually have a data and stack area to dump */
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set_fs(USER_DS);
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if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (void __user *)START_DATA(dump), dump.u_dsize << PAGE_SHIFT))
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dump.u_dsize = 0;
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if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (void __user *)START_STACK(dump), dump.u_ssize << PAGE_SHIFT))
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dump.u_ssize = 0;
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set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
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/* struct user */
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DUMP_WRITE(&dump,sizeof(dump));
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/* Now dump all of the user data. Include malloced stuff as well */
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DUMP_SEEK(PAGE_SIZE);
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/* now we start writing out the user space info */
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set_fs(USER_DS);
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/* Dump the data area */
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if (dump.u_dsize != 0) {
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dump_start = START_DATA(dump);
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dump_size = dump.u_dsize << PAGE_SHIFT;
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DUMP_WRITE(dump_start,dump_size);
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}
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/* Now prepare to dump the stack area */
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if (dump.u_ssize != 0) {
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dump_start = START_STACK(dump);
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dump_size = dump.u_ssize << PAGE_SHIFT;
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DUMP_WRITE(dump_start,dump_size);
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}
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/* Finally dump the task struct. Not be used by gdb, but could be useful */
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set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
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DUMP_WRITE(current,sizeof(*current));
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end_coredump:
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set_fs(fs);
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return has_dumped;
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}
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/*
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* create_aout_tables() parses the env- and arg-strings in new user
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* memory and creates the pointer tables from them, and puts their
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* addresses on the "stack", returning the new stack pointer value.
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*/
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static unsigned long __user *create_aout_tables(char __user *p, struct linux_binprm * bprm)
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{
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char __user * __user *argv;
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char __user * __user *envp;
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unsigned long __user *sp;
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int argc = bprm->argc;
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int envc = bprm->envc;
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sp = (void __user *)((-(unsigned long)sizeof(char *)) & (unsigned long) p);
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#ifdef __alpha__
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/* whee.. test-programs are so much fun. */
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put_user(0, --sp);
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put_user(0, --sp);
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if (bprm->loader) {
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put_user(0, --sp);
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2009-01-03 07:16:23 +00:00
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put_user(1003, --sp);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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put_user(bprm->loader, --sp);
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2009-01-03 07:16:23 +00:00
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put_user(1002, --sp);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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}
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put_user(bprm->exec, --sp);
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2009-01-03 07:16:23 +00:00
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put_user(1001, --sp);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#endif
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sp -= envc+1;
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envp = (char __user * __user *) sp;
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sp -= argc+1;
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argv = (char __user * __user *) sp;
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2009-01-03 07:16:23 +00:00
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#ifndef __alpha__
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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put_user((unsigned long) envp,--sp);
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put_user((unsigned long) argv,--sp);
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#endif
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put_user(argc,--sp);
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current->mm->arg_start = (unsigned long) p;
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while (argc-->0) {
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char c;
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put_user(p,argv++);
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do {
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get_user(c,p++);
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} while (c);
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}
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put_user(NULL,argv);
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current->mm->arg_end = current->mm->env_start = (unsigned long) p;
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while (envc-->0) {
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char c;
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put_user(p,envp++);
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do {
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get_user(c,p++);
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} while (c);
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}
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put_user(NULL,envp);
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current->mm->env_end = (unsigned long) p;
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return sp;
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}
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/*
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* These are the functions used to load a.out style executables and shared
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* libraries. There is no binary dependent code anywhere else.
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*/
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static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs)
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{
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struct exec ex;
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unsigned long error;
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unsigned long fd_offset;
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unsigned long rlim;
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int retval;
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ex = *((struct exec *) bprm->buf); /* exec-header */
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if ((N_MAGIC(ex) != ZMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != OMAGIC &&
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N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) ||
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N_TRSIZE(ex) || N_DRSIZE(ex) ||
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2006-12-08 10:36:35 +00:00
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i_size_read(bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) < ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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return -ENOEXEC;
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}
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2006-09-29 08:59:33 +00:00
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/*
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* Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out
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* as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities.
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*/
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if (!bprm->file->f_op || !bprm->file->f_op->mmap)
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return -ENOEXEC;
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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fd_offset = N_TXTOFF(ex);
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/* Check initial limits. This avoids letting people circumvent
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* size limits imposed on them by creating programs with large
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* arrays in the data or bss.
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*/
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rlim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
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if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY)
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rlim = ~0;
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if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim)
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* Flush all traces of the currently running executable */
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retval = flush_old_exec(bprm);
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if (retval)
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return retval;
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/* OK, This is the point of no return */
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2009-01-03 07:16:23 +00:00
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#ifdef __alpha__
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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SET_AOUT_PERSONALITY(bprm, ex);
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#else
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set_personality(PER_LINUX);
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#endif
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Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions
'flush_old_exec()' is the point of no return when doing an execve(), and
it is pretty badly misnamed. It doesn't just flush the old executable
environment, it also starts up the new one.
Which is very inconvenient for things like setting up the new
personality, because we want the new personality to affect the starting
of the new environment, but at the same time we do _not_ want the new
personality to take effect if flushing the old one fails.
As a result, the x86-64 '32-bit' personality is actually done using this
insane "I'm going to change the ABI, but I haven't done it yet" bit
(TIF_ABI_PENDING), with SET_PERSONALITY() not actually setting the
personality, but just the "pending" bit, so that "flush_thread()" can do
the actual personality magic.
This patch in no way changes any of that insanity, but it does split the
'flush_old_exec()' function up into a preparatory part that can fail
(still called flush_old_exec()), and a new part that will actually set
up the new exec environment (setup_new_exec()). All callers are changed
to trivially comply with the new world order.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-01-29 06:14:42 +00:00
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setup_new_exec(bprm);
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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current->mm->end_code = ex.a_text +
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(current->mm->start_code = N_TXTADDR(ex));
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current->mm->end_data = ex.a_data +
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(current->mm->start_data = N_DATADDR(ex));
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current->mm->brk = ex.a_bss +
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(current->mm->start_brk = N_BSSADDR(ex));
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current->mm->free_area_cache = current->mm->mmap_base;
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2005-06-22 00:14:49 +00:00
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current->mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
of no return with no possibility of failure.
I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)
but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
(they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).
The following sequence of events now happens:
(a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
creds that we make.
(a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
bprm->cred.
This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
unnecessary, and so they've been removed.
(b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
bprm->unsafe for future reference.
(c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
(i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
fail.
(ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.
This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
Anything that might fail must be done at this point.
(iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
not on the interpreter.
(d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
performs the following steps with regard to credentials:
(i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
may not be covered by commit_creds().
(ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
(c.i).
(e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
credentials:
(i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
must be done before the credentials are changed.
This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
must have been done in (c.ii).
(ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
should be part of struct creds.
(iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.
(iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
are now immutable.
(v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.
(f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
made.
(2) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
(*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()
Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
(*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()
Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
second and subsequent calls.
(*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
(*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()
New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
to the process; when the latter is called, they have.
The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
(3) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
the credentials-under-construction approach.
(c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:24 +00:00
|
|
|
install_exec_creds(bprm);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (N_MAGIC(ex) == OMAGIC) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long text_addr, map_size;
|
|
|
|
loff_t pos;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
text_addr = N_TXTADDR(ex);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-03 07:16:13 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __alpha__
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
pos = fd_offset;
|
|
|
|
map_size = ex.a_text+ex.a_data + PAGE_SIZE - 1;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
pos = 32;
|
|
|
|
map_size = ex.a_text+ex.a_data;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
error = do_brk(text_addr & PAGE_MASK, map_size);
|
|
|
|
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
if (error != (text_addr & PAGE_MASK)) {
|
|
|
|
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = bprm->file->f_op->read(bprm->file,
|
|
|
|
(char __user *)text_addr,
|
|
|
|
ex.a_text+ex.a_data, &pos);
|
|
|
|
if ((signed long)error < 0) {
|
|
|
|
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
flush_icache_range(text_addr, text_addr+ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if ((ex.a_text & 0xfff || ex.a_data & 0xfff) &&
|
2008-04-29 07:59:26 +00:00
|
|
|
(N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) && printk_ratelimit())
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_NOTICE "executable not page aligned\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 07:59:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0 && printk_ratelimit())
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_WARNING
|
|
|
|
"fd_offset is not page aligned. Please convert program: %s\n",
|
2006-12-08 10:36:35 +00:00
|
|
|
bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!bprm->file->f_op->mmap||((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0)) {
|
|
|
|
loff_t pos = fd_offset;
|
|
|
|
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
do_brk(N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
|
|
|
|
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
bprm->file->f_op->read(bprm->file,
|
|
|
|
(char __user *)N_TXTADDR(ex),
|
|
|
|
ex.a_text+ex.a_data, &pos);
|
|
|
|
flush_icache_range((unsigned long) N_TXTADDR(ex),
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) N_TXTADDR(ex) +
|
|
|
|
ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
|
|
|
|
goto beyond_if;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
error = do_mmap(bprm->file, N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text,
|
|
|
|
PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC,
|
|
|
|
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE,
|
|
|
|
fd_offset);
|
|
|
|
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (error != N_TXTADDR(ex)) {
|
|
|
|
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
error = do_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
|
|
|
|
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
|
|
|
|
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE,
|
|
|
|
fd_offset + ex.a_text);
|
|
|
|
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
if (error != N_DATADDR(ex)) {
|
|
|
|
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
beyond_if:
|
|
|
|
set_binfmt(&aout_format);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = set_brk(current->mm->start_brk, current->mm->brk);
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0) {
|
|
|
|
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = setup_arg_pages(bprm, STACK_TOP, EXSTACK_DEFAULT);
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Someone check-me: is this error path enough? */
|
|
|
|
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current->mm->start_stack =
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) create_aout_tables((char __user *) bprm->p, bprm);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __alpha__
|
|
|
|
regs->gp = ex.a_gpvalue;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
start_thread(regs, ex.a_entry, current->mm->start_stack);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct inode * inode;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long bss, start_addr, len;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long error;
|
|
|
|
int retval;
|
|
|
|
struct exec ex;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-12-08 10:36:35 +00:00
|
|
|
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = -ENOEXEC;
|
|
|
|
error = kernel_read(file, 0, (char *) &ex, sizeof(ex));
|
|
|
|
if (error != sizeof(ex))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We come in here for the regular a.out style of shared libraries */
|
|
|
|
if ((N_MAGIC(ex) != ZMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC) || N_TRSIZE(ex) ||
|
|
|
|
N_DRSIZE(ex) || ((ex.a_entry & 0xfff) && N_MAGIC(ex) == ZMAGIC) ||
|
|
|
|
i_size_read(inode) < ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-09-29 08:59:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out
|
|
|
|
* as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!file->f_op || !file->f_op->mmap)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (N_FLAGS(ex))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For QMAGIC, the starting address is 0x20 into the page. We mask
|
|
|
|
this off to get the starting address for the page */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
start_addr = ex.a_entry & 0xfffff000;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((N_TXTOFF(ex) & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
loff_t pos = N_TXTOFF(ex);
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 07:59:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (printk_ratelimit())
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
printk(KERN_WARNING
|
|
|
|
"N_TXTOFF is not page aligned. Please convert library: %s\n",
|
2006-12-08 10:36:35 +00:00
|
|
|
file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
do_brk(start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data + ex.a_bss);
|
|
|
|
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
file->f_op->read(file, (char __user *)start_addr,
|
|
|
|
ex.a_text + ex.a_data, &pos);
|
|
|
|
flush_icache_range((unsigned long) start_addr,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) start_addr + ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now use mmap to map the library into memory. */
|
|
|
|
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
error = do_mmap(file, start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data,
|
|
|
|
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
|
|
|
|
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE,
|
|
|
|
N_TXTOFF(ex));
|
|
|
|
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
retval = error;
|
|
|
|
if (error != start_addr)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len = PAGE_ALIGN(ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
|
|
|
|
bss = ex.a_text + ex.a_data + ex.a_bss;
|
|
|
|
if (bss > len) {
|
|
|
|
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
error = do_brk(start_addr + len, bss - len);
|
|
|
|
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
|
|
|
|
retval = error;
|
|
|
|
if (error != start_addr + len)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init init_aout_binfmt(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return register_binfmt(&aout_format);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __exit exit_aout_binfmt(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unregister_binfmt(&aout_format);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
core_initcall(init_aout_binfmt);
|
|
|
|
module_exit(exit_aout_binfmt);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|