linux/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c

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/*
* Copyright (C) 1995 Linus Torvalds
*
* Pentium III FXSR, SSE support
* Gareth Hughes <gareth@valinux.com>, May 2000
*
* X86-64 port
* Andi Kleen.
*
* CPU hotplug support - ashok.raj@intel.com
*/
/*
* This file handles the architecture-dependent parts of process handling..
*/
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/elfcore.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <linux/tick.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/i387.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/pda.h>
#include <asm/prctl.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
#include <asm/ia32.h>
#include <asm/idle.h>
#include <asm/syscalls.h>
asmlinkage extern void ret_from_fork(void);
unsigned long kernel_thread_flags = CLONE_VM | CLONE_UNTRACED;
[PATCH] Notifier chain update: API changes The kernel's implementation of notifier chains is unsafe. There is no protection against entries being added to or removed from a chain while the chain is in use. The issues were discussed in this thread: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=113018709002036&w=2 We noticed that notifier chains in the kernel fall into two basic usage classes: "Blocking" chains are always called from a process context and the callout routines are allowed to sleep; "Atomic" chains can be called from an atomic context and the callout routines are not allowed to sleep. We decided to codify this distinction and make it part of the API. Therefore this set of patches introduces three new, parallel APIs: one for blocking notifiers, one for atomic notifiers, and one for "raw" notifiers (which is really just the old API under a new name). New kinds of data structures are used for the heads of the chains, and new routines are defined for registration, unregistration, and calling a chain. The three APIs are explained in include/linux/notifier.h and their implementation is in kernel/sys.c. With atomic and blocking chains, the implementation guarantees that the chain links will not be corrupted and that chain callers will not get messed up by entries being added or removed. For raw chains the implementation provides no guarantees at all; users of this API must provide their own protections. (The idea was that situations may come up where the assumptions of the atomic and blocking APIs are not appropriate, so it should be possible for users to handle these things in their own way.) There are some limitations, which should not be too hard to live with. For atomic/blocking chains, registration and unregistration must always be done in a process context since the chain is protected by a mutex/rwsem. Also, a callout routine for a non-raw chain must not try to register or unregister entries on its own chain. (This did happen in a couple of places and the code had to be changed to avoid it.) Since atomic chains may be called from within an NMI handler, they cannot use spinlocks for synchronization. Instead we use RCU. The overhead falls almost entirely in the unregister routine, which is okay since unregistration is much less frequent that calling a chain. Here is the list of chains that we adjusted and their classifications. None of them use the raw API, so for the moment it is only a placeholder. ATOMIC CHAINS ------------- arch/i386/kernel/traps.c: i386die_chain arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c: ia64die_chain arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c: powerpc_die_chain arch/sparc64/kernel/traps.c: sparc64die_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/traps.c: die_chain drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c: xaction_notifier_list kernel/panic.c: panic_notifier_list kernel/profile.c: task_free_notifier net/bluetooth/hci_core.c: hci_notifier net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_chain net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_expect_chain net/ipv6/addrconf.c: inet6addr_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_expect_chain net/netlink/af_netlink.c: netlink_chain BLOCKING CHAINS --------------- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/reconfig.c: pSeries_reconfig_chain arch/s390/kernel/process.c: idle_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c idle_notifier drivers/base/memory.c: memory_chain drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_policy_notifier_list drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_transition_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/adb.c: adb_client_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu68k.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/windfarm_core.c wf_client_list drivers/usb/core/notify.c usb_notifier_list drivers/video/fbmem.c fb_notifier_list kernel/cpu.c cpu_chain kernel/module.c module_notify_list kernel/profile.c munmap_notifier kernel/profile.c task_exit_notifier kernel/sys.c reboot_notifier_list net/core/dev.c netdev_chain net/decnet/dn_dev.c: dnaddr_chain net/ipv4/devinet.c: inetaddr_chain It's possible that some of these classifications are wrong. If they are, please let us know or submit a patch to fix them. Note that any chain that gets called very frequently should be atomic, because the rwsem read-locking used for blocking chains is very likely to incur cache misses on SMP systems. (However, if the chain's callout routines may sleep then the chain cannot be atomic.) The patch set was written by Alan Stern and Chandra Seetharaman, incorporating material written by Keith Owens and suggestions from Paul McKenney and Andrew Morton. [jes@sgi.com: restructure the notifier chain initialization macros] Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Chandra Seetharaman <sekharan@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-27 09:16:30 +00:00
static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(idle_notifier);
void idle_notifier_register(struct notifier_block *n)
{
[PATCH] Notifier chain update: API changes The kernel's implementation of notifier chains is unsafe. There is no protection against entries being added to or removed from a chain while the chain is in use. The issues were discussed in this thread: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=113018709002036&w=2 We noticed that notifier chains in the kernel fall into two basic usage classes: "Blocking" chains are always called from a process context and the callout routines are allowed to sleep; "Atomic" chains can be called from an atomic context and the callout routines are not allowed to sleep. We decided to codify this distinction and make it part of the API. Therefore this set of patches introduces three new, parallel APIs: one for blocking notifiers, one for atomic notifiers, and one for "raw" notifiers (which is really just the old API under a new name). New kinds of data structures are used for the heads of the chains, and new routines are defined for registration, unregistration, and calling a chain. The three APIs are explained in include/linux/notifier.h and their implementation is in kernel/sys.c. With atomic and blocking chains, the implementation guarantees that the chain links will not be corrupted and that chain callers will not get messed up by entries being added or removed. For raw chains the implementation provides no guarantees at all; users of this API must provide their own protections. (The idea was that situations may come up where the assumptions of the atomic and blocking APIs are not appropriate, so it should be possible for users to handle these things in their own way.) There are some limitations, which should not be too hard to live with. For atomic/blocking chains, registration and unregistration must always be done in a process context since the chain is protected by a mutex/rwsem. Also, a callout routine for a non-raw chain must not try to register or unregister entries on its own chain. (This did happen in a couple of places and the code had to be changed to avoid it.) Since atomic chains may be called from within an NMI handler, they cannot use spinlocks for synchronization. Instead we use RCU. The overhead falls almost entirely in the unregister routine, which is okay since unregistration is much less frequent that calling a chain. Here is the list of chains that we adjusted and their classifications. None of them use the raw API, so for the moment it is only a placeholder. ATOMIC CHAINS ------------- arch/i386/kernel/traps.c: i386die_chain arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c: ia64die_chain arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c: powerpc_die_chain arch/sparc64/kernel/traps.c: sparc64die_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/traps.c: die_chain drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c: xaction_notifier_list kernel/panic.c: panic_notifier_list kernel/profile.c: task_free_notifier net/bluetooth/hci_core.c: hci_notifier net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_chain net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_expect_chain net/ipv6/addrconf.c: inet6addr_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_expect_chain net/netlink/af_netlink.c: netlink_chain BLOCKING CHAINS --------------- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/reconfig.c: pSeries_reconfig_chain arch/s390/kernel/process.c: idle_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c idle_notifier drivers/base/memory.c: memory_chain drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_policy_notifier_list drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_transition_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/adb.c: adb_client_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu68k.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/windfarm_core.c wf_client_list drivers/usb/core/notify.c usb_notifier_list drivers/video/fbmem.c fb_notifier_list kernel/cpu.c cpu_chain kernel/module.c module_notify_list kernel/profile.c munmap_notifier kernel/profile.c task_exit_notifier kernel/sys.c reboot_notifier_list net/core/dev.c netdev_chain net/decnet/dn_dev.c: dnaddr_chain net/ipv4/devinet.c: inetaddr_chain It's possible that some of these classifications are wrong. If they are, please let us know or submit a patch to fix them. Note that any chain that gets called very frequently should be atomic, because the rwsem read-locking used for blocking chains is very likely to incur cache misses on SMP systems. (However, if the chain's callout routines may sleep then the chain cannot be atomic.) The patch set was written by Alan Stern and Chandra Seetharaman, incorporating material written by Keith Owens and suggestions from Paul McKenney and Andrew Morton. [jes@sgi.com: restructure the notifier chain initialization macros] Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Chandra Seetharaman <sekharan@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-27 09:16:30 +00:00
atomic_notifier_chain_register(&idle_notifier, n);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(idle_notifier_register);
void idle_notifier_unregister(struct notifier_block *n)
{
atomic_notifier_chain_unregister(&idle_notifier, n);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(idle_notifier_unregister);
void enter_idle(void)
{
write_pda(isidle, 1);
[PATCH] Notifier chain update: API changes The kernel's implementation of notifier chains is unsafe. There is no protection against entries being added to or removed from a chain while the chain is in use. The issues were discussed in this thread: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=113018709002036&w=2 We noticed that notifier chains in the kernel fall into two basic usage classes: "Blocking" chains are always called from a process context and the callout routines are allowed to sleep; "Atomic" chains can be called from an atomic context and the callout routines are not allowed to sleep. We decided to codify this distinction and make it part of the API. Therefore this set of patches introduces three new, parallel APIs: one for blocking notifiers, one for atomic notifiers, and one for "raw" notifiers (which is really just the old API under a new name). New kinds of data structures are used for the heads of the chains, and new routines are defined for registration, unregistration, and calling a chain. The three APIs are explained in include/linux/notifier.h and their implementation is in kernel/sys.c. With atomic and blocking chains, the implementation guarantees that the chain links will not be corrupted and that chain callers will not get messed up by entries being added or removed. For raw chains the implementation provides no guarantees at all; users of this API must provide their own protections. (The idea was that situations may come up where the assumptions of the atomic and blocking APIs are not appropriate, so it should be possible for users to handle these things in their own way.) There are some limitations, which should not be too hard to live with. For atomic/blocking chains, registration and unregistration must always be done in a process context since the chain is protected by a mutex/rwsem. Also, a callout routine for a non-raw chain must not try to register or unregister entries on its own chain. (This did happen in a couple of places and the code had to be changed to avoid it.) Since atomic chains may be called from within an NMI handler, they cannot use spinlocks for synchronization. Instead we use RCU. The overhead falls almost entirely in the unregister routine, which is okay since unregistration is much less frequent that calling a chain. Here is the list of chains that we adjusted and their classifications. None of them use the raw API, so for the moment it is only a placeholder. ATOMIC CHAINS ------------- arch/i386/kernel/traps.c: i386die_chain arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c: ia64die_chain arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c: powerpc_die_chain arch/sparc64/kernel/traps.c: sparc64die_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/traps.c: die_chain drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c: xaction_notifier_list kernel/panic.c: panic_notifier_list kernel/profile.c: task_free_notifier net/bluetooth/hci_core.c: hci_notifier net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_chain net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_expect_chain net/ipv6/addrconf.c: inet6addr_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_expect_chain net/netlink/af_netlink.c: netlink_chain BLOCKING CHAINS --------------- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/reconfig.c: pSeries_reconfig_chain arch/s390/kernel/process.c: idle_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c idle_notifier drivers/base/memory.c: memory_chain drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_policy_notifier_list drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_transition_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/adb.c: adb_client_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu68k.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/windfarm_core.c wf_client_list drivers/usb/core/notify.c usb_notifier_list drivers/video/fbmem.c fb_notifier_list kernel/cpu.c cpu_chain kernel/module.c module_notify_list kernel/profile.c munmap_notifier kernel/profile.c task_exit_notifier kernel/sys.c reboot_notifier_list net/core/dev.c netdev_chain net/decnet/dn_dev.c: dnaddr_chain net/ipv4/devinet.c: inetaddr_chain It's possible that some of these classifications are wrong. If they are, please let us know or submit a patch to fix them. Note that any chain that gets called very frequently should be atomic, because the rwsem read-locking used for blocking chains is very likely to incur cache misses on SMP systems. (However, if the chain's callout routines may sleep then the chain cannot be atomic.) The patch set was written by Alan Stern and Chandra Seetharaman, incorporating material written by Keith Owens and suggestions from Paul McKenney and Andrew Morton. [jes@sgi.com: restructure the notifier chain initialization macros] Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Chandra Seetharaman <sekharan@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-27 09:16:30 +00:00
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&idle_notifier, IDLE_START, NULL);
}
static void __exit_idle(void)
{
if (test_and_clear_bit_pda(0, isidle) == 0)
return;
[PATCH] Notifier chain update: API changes The kernel's implementation of notifier chains is unsafe. There is no protection against entries being added to or removed from a chain while the chain is in use. The issues were discussed in this thread: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=113018709002036&w=2 We noticed that notifier chains in the kernel fall into two basic usage classes: "Blocking" chains are always called from a process context and the callout routines are allowed to sleep; "Atomic" chains can be called from an atomic context and the callout routines are not allowed to sleep. We decided to codify this distinction and make it part of the API. Therefore this set of patches introduces three new, parallel APIs: one for blocking notifiers, one for atomic notifiers, and one for "raw" notifiers (which is really just the old API under a new name). New kinds of data structures are used for the heads of the chains, and new routines are defined for registration, unregistration, and calling a chain. The three APIs are explained in include/linux/notifier.h and their implementation is in kernel/sys.c. With atomic and blocking chains, the implementation guarantees that the chain links will not be corrupted and that chain callers will not get messed up by entries being added or removed. For raw chains the implementation provides no guarantees at all; users of this API must provide their own protections. (The idea was that situations may come up where the assumptions of the atomic and blocking APIs are not appropriate, so it should be possible for users to handle these things in their own way.) There are some limitations, which should not be too hard to live with. For atomic/blocking chains, registration and unregistration must always be done in a process context since the chain is protected by a mutex/rwsem. Also, a callout routine for a non-raw chain must not try to register or unregister entries on its own chain. (This did happen in a couple of places and the code had to be changed to avoid it.) Since atomic chains may be called from within an NMI handler, they cannot use spinlocks for synchronization. Instead we use RCU. The overhead falls almost entirely in the unregister routine, which is okay since unregistration is much less frequent that calling a chain. Here is the list of chains that we adjusted and their classifications. None of them use the raw API, so for the moment it is only a placeholder. ATOMIC CHAINS ------------- arch/i386/kernel/traps.c: i386die_chain arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c: ia64die_chain arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c: powerpc_die_chain arch/sparc64/kernel/traps.c: sparc64die_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/traps.c: die_chain drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c: xaction_notifier_list kernel/panic.c: panic_notifier_list kernel/profile.c: task_free_notifier net/bluetooth/hci_core.c: hci_notifier net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_chain net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c: ip_conntrack_expect_chain net/ipv6/addrconf.c: inet6addr_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_chain net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: nf_conntrack_expect_chain net/netlink/af_netlink.c: netlink_chain BLOCKING CHAINS --------------- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/reconfig.c: pSeries_reconfig_chain arch/s390/kernel/process.c: idle_chain arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c idle_notifier drivers/base/memory.c: memory_chain drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_policy_notifier_list drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c cpufreq_transition_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/adb.c: adb_client_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/via-pmu68k.c sleep_notifier_list drivers/macintosh/windfarm_core.c wf_client_list drivers/usb/core/notify.c usb_notifier_list drivers/video/fbmem.c fb_notifier_list kernel/cpu.c cpu_chain kernel/module.c module_notify_list kernel/profile.c munmap_notifier kernel/profile.c task_exit_notifier kernel/sys.c reboot_notifier_list net/core/dev.c netdev_chain net/decnet/dn_dev.c: dnaddr_chain net/ipv4/devinet.c: inetaddr_chain It's possible that some of these classifications are wrong. If they are, please let us know or submit a patch to fix them. Note that any chain that gets called very frequently should be atomic, because the rwsem read-locking used for blocking chains is very likely to incur cache misses on SMP systems. (However, if the chain's callout routines may sleep then the chain cannot be atomic.) The patch set was written by Alan Stern and Chandra Seetharaman, incorporating material written by Keith Owens and suggestions from Paul McKenney and Andrew Morton. [jes@sgi.com: restructure the notifier chain initialization macros] Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Chandra Seetharaman <sekharan@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-27 09:16:30 +00:00
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&idle_notifier, IDLE_END, NULL);
}
/* Called from interrupts to signify idle end */
void exit_idle(void)
{
/* idle loop has pid 0 */
if (current->pid)
return;
__exit_idle();
}
#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
static inline void play_dead(void)
{
BUG();
}
#endif
/*
* The idle thread. There's no useful work to be
* done, so just try to conserve power and have a
* low exit latency (ie sit in a loop waiting for
* somebody to say that they'd like to reschedule)
*/
void cpu_idle(void)
{
current_thread_info()->status |= TS_POLLING;
/* endless idle loop with no priority at all */
while (1) {
tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick(1);
while (!need_resched()) {
rmb();
if (cpu_is_offline(smp_processor_id()))
play_dead();
/*
* Idle routines should keep interrupts disabled
* from here on, until they go to idle.
* Otherwise, idle callbacks can misfire.
*/
local_irq_disable();
enter_idle();
ftrace: trace irq disabled critical timings This patch adds latency tracing for critical timings (how long interrupts are disabled for). "irqsoff" is added to /debugfs/tracing/available_tracers Note: tracing_max_latency also holds the max latency for irqsoff (in usecs). (default to large number so one must start latency tracing) tracing_thresh threshold (in usecs) to always print out if irqs off is detected to be longer than stated here. If irq_thresh is non-zero, then max_irq_latency is ignored. Here's an example of a trace with ftrace_enabled = 0 ======= preemption latency trace v1.1.5 on 2.6.24-rc7 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> -------------------------------------------------------------------- latency: 100 us, #3/3, CPU#1 | (M:rt VP:0, KP:0, SP:0 HP:0 #P:2) ----------------- | task: swapper-0 (uid:0 nice:0 policy:0 rt_prio:0) ----------------- => started at: _spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0xb7 => ended at: _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f _------=> CPU# / _-----=> irqs-off | / _----=> need-resched || / _---=> hardirq/softirq ||| / _--=> preempt-depth |||| / ||||| delay cmd pid ||||| time | caller \ / ||||| \ | / swapper-0 1d.s3 0us+: _spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0xb7 (e1000_update_stats+0x47/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1d.s3 100us : _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f (e1000_update_stats+0x641/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1d.s3 100us : trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x75/0x89 (_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f) vim:ft=help ======= And this is a trace with ftrace_enabled == 1 ======= preemption latency trace v1.1.5 on 2.6.24-rc7 -------------------------------------------------------------------- latency: 102 us, #12/12, CPU#1 | (M:rt VP:0, KP:0, SP:0 HP:0 #P:2) ----------------- | task: swapper-0 (uid:0 nice:0 policy:0 rt_prio:0) ----------------- => started at: _spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0xb7 => ended at: _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f _------=> CPU# / _-----=> irqs-off | / _----=> need-resched || / _---=> hardirq/softirq ||| / _--=> preempt-depth |||| / ||||| delay cmd pid ||||| time | caller \ / ||||| \ | / swapper-0 1dNs3 0us+: _spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0xb7 (e1000_update_stats+0x47/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 46us : e1000_read_phy_reg+0x16/0x225 [e1000] (e1000_update_stats+0x5e2/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 46us : e1000_swfw_sync_acquire+0x10/0x99 [e1000] (e1000_read_phy_reg+0x49/0x225 [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 46us : e1000_get_hw_eeprom_semaphore+0x12/0xa6 [e1000] (e1000_swfw_sync_acquire+0x36/0x99 [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 47us : __const_udelay+0x9/0x47 (e1000_read_phy_reg+0x116/0x225 [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 47us+: __delay+0x9/0x50 (__const_udelay+0x45/0x47) swapper-0 1dNs3 97us : preempt_schedule+0xc/0x84 (__delay+0x4e/0x50) swapper-0 1dNs3 98us : e1000_swfw_sync_release+0xc/0x55 [e1000] (e1000_read_phy_reg+0x211/0x225 [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 99us+: e1000_put_hw_eeprom_semaphore+0x9/0x35 [e1000] (e1000_swfw_sync_release+0x50/0x55 [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 101us : _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xe/0x5f (e1000_update_stats+0x641/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 102us : _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f (e1000_update_stats+0x641/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 102us : trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x75/0x89 (_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f) vim:ft=help ======= Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-05-12 19:20:42 +00:00
/* Don't trace irqs off for idle */
stop_critical_timings();
pm_idle();
ftrace: trace irq disabled critical timings This patch adds latency tracing for critical timings (how long interrupts are disabled for). "irqsoff" is added to /debugfs/tracing/available_tracers Note: tracing_max_latency also holds the max latency for irqsoff (in usecs). (default to large number so one must start latency tracing) tracing_thresh threshold (in usecs) to always print out if irqs off is detected to be longer than stated here. If irq_thresh is non-zero, then max_irq_latency is ignored. Here's an example of a trace with ftrace_enabled = 0 ======= preemption latency trace v1.1.5 on 2.6.24-rc7 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> -------------------------------------------------------------------- latency: 100 us, #3/3, CPU#1 | (M:rt VP:0, KP:0, SP:0 HP:0 #P:2) ----------------- | task: swapper-0 (uid:0 nice:0 policy:0 rt_prio:0) ----------------- => started at: _spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0xb7 => ended at: _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f _------=> CPU# / _-----=> irqs-off | / _----=> need-resched || / _---=> hardirq/softirq ||| / _--=> preempt-depth |||| / ||||| delay cmd pid ||||| time | caller \ / ||||| \ | / swapper-0 1d.s3 0us+: _spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0xb7 (e1000_update_stats+0x47/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1d.s3 100us : _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f (e1000_update_stats+0x641/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1d.s3 100us : trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x75/0x89 (_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f) vim:ft=help ======= And this is a trace with ftrace_enabled == 1 ======= preemption latency trace v1.1.5 on 2.6.24-rc7 -------------------------------------------------------------------- latency: 102 us, #12/12, CPU#1 | (M:rt VP:0, KP:0, SP:0 HP:0 #P:2) ----------------- | task: swapper-0 (uid:0 nice:0 policy:0 rt_prio:0) ----------------- => started at: _spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0xb7 => ended at: _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f _------=> CPU# / _-----=> irqs-off | / _----=> need-resched || / _---=> hardirq/softirq ||| / _--=> preempt-depth |||| / ||||| delay cmd pid ||||| time | caller \ / ||||| \ | / swapper-0 1dNs3 0us+: _spin_lock_irqsave+0x2a/0xb7 (e1000_update_stats+0x47/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 46us : e1000_read_phy_reg+0x16/0x225 [e1000] (e1000_update_stats+0x5e2/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 46us : e1000_swfw_sync_acquire+0x10/0x99 [e1000] (e1000_read_phy_reg+0x49/0x225 [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 46us : e1000_get_hw_eeprom_semaphore+0x12/0xa6 [e1000] (e1000_swfw_sync_acquire+0x36/0x99 [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 47us : __const_udelay+0x9/0x47 (e1000_read_phy_reg+0x116/0x225 [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 47us+: __delay+0x9/0x50 (__const_udelay+0x45/0x47) swapper-0 1dNs3 97us : preempt_schedule+0xc/0x84 (__delay+0x4e/0x50) swapper-0 1dNs3 98us : e1000_swfw_sync_release+0xc/0x55 [e1000] (e1000_read_phy_reg+0x211/0x225 [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 99us+: e1000_put_hw_eeprom_semaphore+0x9/0x35 [e1000] (e1000_swfw_sync_release+0x50/0x55 [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 101us : _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xe/0x5f (e1000_update_stats+0x641/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 102us : _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f (e1000_update_stats+0x641/0x64c [e1000]) swapper-0 1dNs3 102us : trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x75/0x89 (_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x32/0x5f) vim:ft=help ======= Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-05-12 19:20:42 +00:00
start_critical_timings();
/* In many cases the interrupt that ended idle
has already called exit_idle. But some idle
loops can be woken up without interrupt. */
__exit_idle();
}
tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick();
preempt_enable_no_resched();
schedule();
preempt_disable();
}
}
/* Prints also some state that isn't saved in the pt_regs */
void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, int all)
{
unsigned long cr0 = 0L, cr2 = 0L, cr3 = 0L, cr4 = 0L, fs, gs, shadowgs;
unsigned long d0, d1, d2, d3, d6, d7;
unsigned int fsindex, gsindex;
unsigned int ds, cs, es;
printk("\n");
print_modules();
printk(KERN_INFO "Pid: %d, comm: %.20s %s %s %.*s\n",
current->pid, current->comm, print_tainted(),
init_utsname()->release,
(int)strcspn(init_utsname()->version, " "),
init_utsname()->version);
printk(KERN_INFO "RIP: %04lx:[<%016lx>] ", regs->cs & 0xffff, regs->ip);
printk_address(regs->ip, 1);
printk(KERN_INFO "RSP: %04lx:%016lx EFLAGS: %08lx\n", regs->ss,
regs->sp, regs->flags);
printk(KERN_INFO "RAX: %016lx RBX: %016lx RCX: %016lx\n",
regs->ax, regs->bx, regs->cx);
printk(KERN_INFO "RDX: %016lx RSI: %016lx RDI: %016lx\n",
regs->dx, regs->si, regs->di);
printk(KERN_INFO "RBP: %016lx R08: %016lx R09: %016lx\n",
regs->bp, regs->r8, regs->r9);
printk(KERN_INFO "R10: %016lx R11: %016lx R12: %016lx\n",
regs->r10, regs->r11, regs->r12);
printk(KERN_INFO "R13: %016lx R14: %016lx R15: %016lx\n",
regs->r13, regs->r14, regs->r15);
asm("movl %%ds,%0" : "=r" (ds));
asm("movl %%cs,%0" : "=r" (cs));
asm("movl %%es,%0" : "=r" (es));
asm("movl %%fs,%0" : "=r" (fsindex));
asm("movl %%gs,%0" : "=r" (gsindex));
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, fs);
rdmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, gs);
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, shadowgs);
if (!all)
return;
cr0 = read_cr0();
cr2 = read_cr2();
cr3 = read_cr3();
cr4 = read_cr4();
printk(KERN_INFO "FS: %016lx(%04x) GS:%016lx(%04x) knlGS:%016lx\n",
fs, fsindex, gs, gsindex, shadowgs);
printk(KERN_INFO "CS: %04x DS: %04x ES: %04x CR0: %016lx\n", cs, ds,
es, cr0);
printk(KERN_INFO "CR2: %016lx CR3: %016lx CR4: %016lx\n", cr2, cr3,
cr4);
get_debugreg(d0, 0);
get_debugreg(d1, 1);
get_debugreg(d2, 2);
printk(KERN_INFO "DR0: %016lx DR1: %016lx DR2: %016lx\n", d0, d1, d2);
get_debugreg(d3, 3);
get_debugreg(d6, 6);
get_debugreg(d7, 7);
printk(KERN_INFO "DR3: %016lx DR6: %016lx DR7: %016lx\n", d3, d6, d7);
}
void show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk(KERN_INFO "CPU %d:", smp_processor_id());
__show_regs(regs, 1);
show_trace(NULL, regs, (void *)(regs + 1), regs->bp);
}
/*
* Free current thread data structures etc..
*/
void exit_thread(void)
{
struct task_struct *me = current;
struct thread_struct *t = &me->thread;
[PATCH] x86_64 specific function return probes The following patch adds the x86_64 architecture specific implementation for function return probes. Function return probes is a mechanism built on top of kprobes that allows a caller to register a handler to be called when a given function exits. For example, to instrument the return path of sys_mkdir: static int sys_mkdir_exit(struct kretprobe_instance *i, struct pt_regs *regs) { printk("sys_mkdir exited\n"); return 0; } static struct kretprobe return_probe = { .handler = sys_mkdir_exit, }; <inside setup function> return_probe.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("sys_mkdir"); if (register_kretprobe(&return_probe)) { printk(KERN_DEBUG "Unable to register return probe!\n"); /* do error path */ } <inside cleanup function> unregister_kretprobe(&return_probe); The way this works is that: * At system initialization time, kernel/kprobes.c installs a kprobe on a function called kretprobe_trampoline() that is implemented in the arch/x86_64/kernel/kprobes.c (More on this later) * When a return probe is registered using register_kretprobe(), kernel/kprobes.c will install a kprobe on the first instruction of the targeted function with the pre handler set to arch_prepare_kretprobe() which is implemented in arch/x86_64/kernel/kprobes.c. * arch_prepare_kretprobe() will prepare a kretprobe instance that stores: - nodes for hanging this instance in an empty or free list - a pointer to the return probe - the original return address - a pointer to the stack address With all this stowed away, arch_prepare_kretprobe() then sets the return address for the targeted function to a special trampoline function called kretprobe_trampoline() implemented in arch/x86_64/kernel/kprobes.c * The kprobe completes as normal, with control passing back to the target function that executes as normal, and eventually returns to our trampoline function. * Since a kprobe was installed on kretprobe_trampoline() during system initialization, control passes back to kprobes via the architecture specific function trampoline_probe_handler() which will lookup the instance in an hlist maintained by kernel/kprobes.c, and then call the handler function. * When trampoline_probe_handler() is done, the kprobes infrastructure single steps the original instruction (in this case just a top), and then calls trampoline_post_handler(). trampoline_post_handler() then looks up the instance again, puts the instance back on the free list, and then makes a long jump back to the original return instruction. So to recap, to instrument the exit path of a function this implementation will cause four interruptions: - A breakpoint at the very beginning of the function allowing us to switch out the return address - A single step interruption to execute the original instruction that we replaced with the break instruction (normal kprobe flow) - A breakpoint in the trampoline function where our instrumented function returned to - A single step interruption to execute the original instruction that we replaced with the break instruction (normal kprobe flow) Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 07:09:23 +00:00
if (me->thread.io_bitmap_ptr) {
struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
kfree(t->io_bitmap_ptr);
t->io_bitmap_ptr = NULL;
clear_thread_flag(TIF_IO_BITMAP);
/*
* Careful, clear this in the TSS too:
*/
memset(tss->io_bitmap, 0xff, t->io_bitmap_max);
t->io_bitmap_max = 0;
put_cpu();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_DS
/* Free any DS contexts that have not been properly released. */
if (unlikely(t->ds_ctx)) {
/* we clear debugctl to make sure DS is not used. */
update_debugctlmsr(0);
ds_free(t->ds_ctx);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_DS */
}
void flush_thread(void)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_ABI_PENDING)) {
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_ABI_PENDING);
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_IA32)) {
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_IA32);
} else {
set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_IA32);
current_thread_info()->status |= TS_COMPAT;
}
}
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_DEBUG);
tsk->thread.debugreg0 = 0;
tsk->thread.debugreg1 = 0;
tsk->thread.debugreg2 = 0;
tsk->thread.debugreg3 = 0;
tsk->thread.debugreg6 = 0;
tsk->thread.debugreg7 = 0;
memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array));
/*
* Forget coprocessor state..
*/
x86: fix NULL pointer deref in __switch_to Patrick McHardy reported a crash: > > I get this oops once a day, its apparently triggered by something > > run by cron, but the process is a different one each time. > > > > Kernel is -git from yesterday shortly before the -rc6 release > > (last commit is the usb-2.6 merge, the x86 patches are missing), > > .config is attached. > > > > I'll retry with current -git, but the patches that have gone in > > since I last updated don't look related. > > > > [62060.043009] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at > > 000001ff > > [62060.043009] IP: [<c0102a9b>] __switch_to+0x2f/0x118 > > [62060.043009] *pde = 00000000 > > [62060.043009] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT Vegard Nossum analyzed it: > This decodes to > > 0: 0f ae 00 fxsave (%eax) > > so it's related to the floating-point context. This is the exact > location of the crash: > > $ addr2line -e arch/x86/kernel/process_32.o -i ab0 > include/asm/i387.h:232 > include/asm/i387.h:262 > arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c:595 > > ...so it looks like prev_task->thread.xstate->fxsave has become NULL. > Or maybe it never had any other value. Somehow (as described below) TS_USEDFPU is set but the fpu is not allocated or freed. Another possible FPU pre-emption issue with the sleazy FPU optimization which was benign before but not so anymore, with the dynamic FPU allocation patch. New task is getting exec'd and it is prempted at the below point. flush_thread() { ... /* * Forget coprocessor state.. */ clear_fpu(tsk); <----- Preemption point clear_used_math(); ... } Now when it context switches in again, as the used_math() is still set and fpu_counter can be > 5, we will do a math_state_restore() which sets the task's TS_USEDFPU. After it continues from the above preemption point it does clear_used_math() and much later free_thread_xstate(). Now, at the next context switch, it is quite possible that xstate is null, used_math() is not set and TS_USEDFPU is still set. This will trigger unlazy_fpu() causing kernel oops. Fix this by clearing tsk's fpu_counter before clearing task's fpu. Reported-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-06-13 22:47:12 +00:00
tsk->fpu_counter = 0;
clear_fpu(tsk);
clear_used_math();
}
void release_thread(struct task_struct *dead_task)
{
if (dead_task->mm) {
if (dead_task->mm->context.size) {
printk("WARNING: dead process %8s still has LDT? <%p/%d>\n",
dead_task->comm,
dead_task->mm->context.ldt,
dead_task->mm->context.size);
BUG();
}
}
}
static inline void set_32bit_tls(struct task_struct *t, int tls, u32 addr)
{
struct user_desc ud = {
.base_addr = addr,
.limit = 0xfffff,
.seg_32bit = 1,
.limit_in_pages = 1,
.useable = 1,
};
struct desc_struct *desc = t->thread.tls_array;
desc += tls;
fill_ldt(desc, &ud);
}
static inline u32 read_32bit_tls(struct task_struct *t, int tls)
{
return get_desc_base(&t->thread.tls_array[tls]);
}
/*
* This gets called before we allocate a new thread and copy
* the current task into it.
*/
void prepare_to_copy(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
unlazy_fpu(tsk);
}
int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
unsigned long unused,
struct task_struct *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int err;
struct pt_regs *childregs;
struct task_struct *me = current;
childregs = ((struct pt_regs *)
(THREAD_SIZE + task_stack_page(p))) - 1;
*childregs = *regs;
childregs->ax = 0;
childregs->sp = sp;
if (sp == ~0UL)
childregs->sp = (unsigned long)childregs;
p->thread.sp = (unsigned long) childregs;
p->thread.sp0 = (unsigned long) (childregs+1);
p->thread.usersp = me->thread.usersp;
set_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_FORK);
p->thread.fs = me->thread.fs;
p->thread.gs = me->thread.gs;
savesegment(gs, p->thread.gsindex);
savesegment(fs, p->thread.fsindex);
savesegment(es, p->thread.es);
savesegment(ds, p->thread.ds);
if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(me, TIF_IO_BITMAP))) {
p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = kmalloc(IO_BITMAP_BYTES, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr) {
p->thread.io_bitmap_max = 0;
return -ENOMEM;
}
memcpy(p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr, me->thread.io_bitmap_ptr,
IO_BITMAP_BYTES);
set_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_IO_BITMAP);
}
/*
* Set a new TLS for the child thread?
*/
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS) {
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32))
err = do_set_thread_area(p, -1,
(struct user_desc __user *)childregs->si, 0);
else
#endif
err = do_arch_prctl(p, ARCH_SET_FS, childregs->r8);
if (err)
goto out;
}
err = 0;
out:
if (err && p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr) {
kfree(p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr);
p->thread.io_bitmap_max = 0;
}
return err;
}
void
start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip, unsigned long new_sp)
{
loadsegment(fs, 0);
loadsegment(es, 0);
loadsegment(ds, 0);
load_gs_index(0);
regs->ip = new_ip;
regs->sp = new_sp;
write_pda(oldrsp, new_sp);
regs->cs = __USER_CS;
regs->ss = __USER_DS;
regs->flags = 0x200;
set_fs(USER_DS);
/*
* Free the old FP and other extended state
*/
free_thread_xstate(current);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(start_thread);
static void hard_disable_TSC(void)
{
write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_TSD);
}
void disable_TSC(void)
{
preempt_disable();
if (!test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_NOTSC))
/*
* Must flip the CPU state synchronously with
* TIF_NOTSC in the current running context.
*/
hard_disable_TSC();
preempt_enable();
}
static void hard_enable_TSC(void)
{
write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_TSD);
}
static void enable_TSC(void)
{
preempt_disable();
if (test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTSC))
/*
* Must flip the CPU state synchronously with
* TIF_NOTSC in the current running context.
*/
hard_enable_TSC();
preempt_enable();
}
int get_tsc_mode(unsigned long adr)
{
unsigned int val;
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NOTSC))
val = PR_TSC_SIGSEGV;
else
val = PR_TSC_ENABLE;
return put_user(val, (unsigned int __user *)adr);
}
int set_tsc_mode(unsigned int val)
{
if (val == PR_TSC_SIGSEGV)
disable_TSC();
else if (val == PR_TSC_ENABLE)
enable_TSC();
else
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/*
* This special macro can be used to load a debugging register
*/
#define loaddebug(thread, r) set_debugreg(thread->debugreg ## r, r)
static inline void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p,
struct task_struct *next_p,
struct tss_struct *tss)
{
struct thread_struct *prev, *next;
unsigned long debugctl;
prev = &prev_p->thread,
next = &next_p->thread;
debugctl = prev->debugctlmsr;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_DS
{
unsigned long ds_prev = 0, ds_next = 0;
if (prev->ds_ctx)
ds_prev = (unsigned long)prev->ds_ctx->ds;
if (next->ds_ctx)
ds_next = (unsigned long)next->ds_ctx->ds;
if (ds_next != ds_prev) {
/*
* We clear debugctl to make sure DS
* is not in use when we change it:
*/
debugctl = 0;
update_debugctlmsr(0);
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DS_AREA, ds_next);
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_DS */
if (next->debugctlmsr != debugctl)
update_debugctlmsr(next->debugctlmsr);
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_DEBUG)) {
loaddebug(next, 0);
loaddebug(next, 1);
loaddebug(next, 2);
loaddebug(next, 3);
/* no 4 and 5 */
loaddebug(next, 6);
loaddebug(next, 7);
}
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_NOTSC) ^
test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOTSC)) {
/* prev and next are different */
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOTSC))
hard_disable_TSC();
else
hard_enable_TSC();
}
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_IO_BITMAP)) {
/*
* Copy the relevant range of the IO bitmap.
* Normally this is 128 bytes or less:
*/
memcpy(tss->io_bitmap, next->io_bitmap_ptr,
max(prev->io_bitmap_max, next->io_bitmap_max));
} else if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_IO_BITMAP)) {
/*
* Clear any possible leftover bits:
*/
memset(tss->io_bitmap, 0xff, prev->io_bitmap_max);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PTRACE_BTS
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_BTS_TRACE_TS))
ptrace_bts_take_timestamp(prev_p, BTS_TASK_DEPARTS);
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_BTS_TRACE_TS))
ptrace_bts_take_timestamp(next_p, BTS_TASK_ARRIVES);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_PTRACE_BTS */
}
/*
* switch_to(x,y) should switch tasks from x to y.
*
* This could still be optimized:
* - fold all the options into a flag word and test it with a single test.
* - could test fs/gs bitsliced
*
* Kprobes not supported here. Set the probe on schedule instead.
*/
struct task_struct *
__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
{
struct thread_struct *prev = &prev_p->thread;
struct thread_struct *next = &next_p->thread;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
unsigned fsindex, gsindex;
/* we're going to use this soon, after a few expensive things */
if (next_p->fpu_counter > 5)
prefetch(next->xstate);
/*
* Reload esp0, LDT and the page table pointer:
*/
load_sp0(tss, next);
/*
* Switch DS and ES.
* This won't pick up thread selector changes, but I guess that is ok.
*/
savesegment(es, prev->es);
if (unlikely(next->es | prev->es))
loadsegment(es, next->es);
savesegment(ds, prev->ds);
if (unlikely(next->ds | prev->ds))
loadsegment(ds, next->ds);
/* We must save %fs and %gs before load_TLS() because
* %fs and %gs may be cleared by load_TLS().
*
* (e.g. xen_load_tls())
*/
savesegment(fs, fsindex);
savesegment(gs, gsindex);
load_TLS(next, cpu);
/*
* Leave lazy mode, flushing any hypercalls made here.
* This must be done before restoring TLS segments so
* the GDT and LDT are properly updated, and must be
* done before math_state_restore, so the TS bit is up
* to date.
*/
arch_leave_lazy_cpu_mode();
/*
* Switch FS and GS.
*
* Segment register != 0 always requires a reload. Also
* reload when it has changed. When prev process used 64bit
* base always reload to avoid an information leak.
*/
if (unlikely(fsindex | next->fsindex | prev->fs)) {
loadsegment(fs, next->fsindex);
/*
* Check if the user used a selector != 0; if yes
* clear 64bit base, since overloaded base is always
* mapped to the Null selector
*/
if (fsindex)
prev->fs = 0;
}
/* when next process has a 64bit base use it */
if (next->fs)
wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, next->fs);
prev->fsindex = fsindex;
if (unlikely(gsindex | next->gsindex | prev->gs)) {
load_gs_index(next->gsindex);
if (gsindex)
prev->gs = 0;
}
if (next->gs)
wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, next->gs);
prev->gsindex = gsindex;
/* Must be after DS reload */
unlazy_fpu(prev_p);
/*
* Switch the PDA and FPU contexts.
*/
prev->usersp = read_pda(oldrsp);
write_pda(oldrsp, next->usersp);
write_pda(pcurrent, next_p);
write_pda(kernelstack,
(unsigned long)task_stack_page(next_p) +
THREAD_SIZE - PDA_STACKOFFSET);
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
write_pda(stack_canary, next_p->stack_canary);
/*
* Build time only check to make sure the stack_canary is at
* offset 40 in the pda; this is a gcc ABI requirement
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct x8664_pda, stack_canary) != 40);
#endif
/*
* Now maybe reload the debug registers and handle I/O bitmaps
*/
if (unlikely(task_thread_info(next_p)->flags & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT ||
task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV))
__switch_to_xtra(prev_p, next_p, tss);
/* If the task has used fpu the last 5 timeslices, just do a full
* restore of the math state immediately to avoid the trap; the
* chances of needing FPU soon are obviously high now
*
* tsk_used_math() checks prevent calling math_state_restore(),
* which can sleep in the case of !tsk_used_math()
*/
if (tsk_used_math(next_p) && next_p->fpu_counter > 5)
math_state_restore();
return prev_p;
}
/*
* sys_execve() executes a new program.
*/
asmlinkage
long sys_execve(char __user *name, char __user * __user *argv,
char __user * __user *envp, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
long error;
char *filename;
filename = getname(name);
error = PTR_ERR(filename);
if (IS_ERR(filename))
return error;
error = do_execve(filename, argv, envp, regs);
putname(filename);
return error;
}
void set_personality_64bit(void)
{
/* inherit personality from parent */
/* Make sure to be in 64bit mode */
clear_thread_flag(TIF_IA32);
/* TBD: overwrites user setup. Should have two bits.
But 64bit processes have always behaved this way,
so it's not too bad. The main problem is just that
32bit childs are affected again. */
current->personality &= ~READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
}
asmlinkage long sys_fork(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return do_fork(SIGCHLD, regs->sp, regs, 0, NULL, NULL);
}
asmlinkage long
sys_clone(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long newsp,
void __user *parent_tid, void __user *child_tid, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (!newsp)
newsp = regs->sp;
return do_fork(clone_flags, newsp, regs, 0, parent_tid, child_tid);
}
/*
* This is trivial, and on the face of it looks like it
* could equally well be done in user mode.
*
* Not so, for quite unobvious reasons - register pressure.
* In user mode vfork() cannot have a stack frame, and if
* done by calling the "clone()" system call directly, you
* do not have enough call-clobbered registers to hold all
* the information you need.
*/
asmlinkage long sys_vfork(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return do_fork(CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM | SIGCHLD, regs->sp, regs, 0,
NULL, NULL);
}
unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p)
{
unsigned long stack;
u64 fp, ip;
int count = 0;
if (!p || p == current || p->state == TASK_RUNNING)
return 0;
stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p);
if (p->thread.sp < stack || p->thread.sp >= stack+THREAD_SIZE)
return 0;
fp = *(u64 *)(p->thread.sp);
do {
if (fp < (unsigned long)stack ||
fp >= (unsigned long)stack+THREAD_SIZE)
return 0;
ip = *(u64 *)(fp+8);
if (!in_sched_functions(ip))
return ip;
fp = *(u64 *)fp;
} while (count++ < 16);
return 0;
}
long do_arch_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int code, unsigned long addr)
{
int ret = 0;
int doit = task == current;
int cpu;
switch (code) {
case ARCH_SET_GS:
if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_OF(task))
return -EPERM;
cpu = get_cpu();
/* handle small bases via the GDT because that's faster to
switch. */
if (addr <= 0xffffffff) {
set_32bit_tls(task, GS_TLS, addr);
if (doit) {
load_TLS(&task->thread, cpu);
load_gs_index(GS_TLS_SEL);
}
task->thread.gsindex = GS_TLS_SEL;
task->thread.gs = 0;
} else {
task->thread.gsindex = 0;
task->thread.gs = addr;
if (doit) {
load_gs_index(0);
ret = checking_wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, addr);
}
}
put_cpu();
break;
case ARCH_SET_FS:
/* Not strictly needed for fs, but do it for symmetry
with gs */
if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_OF(task))
return -EPERM;
cpu = get_cpu();
/* handle small bases via the GDT because that's faster to
switch. */
if (addr <= 0xffffffff) {
set_32bit_tls(task, FS_TLS, addr);
if (doit) {
load_TLS(&task->thread, cpu);
loadsegment(fs, FS_TLS_SEL);
}
task->thread.fsindex = FS_TLS_SEL;
task->thread.fs = 0;
} else {
task->thread.fsindex = 0;
task->thread.fs = addr;
if (doit) {
/* set the selector to 0 to not confuse
__switch_to */
loadsegment(fs, 0);
ret = checking_wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, addr);
}
}
put_cpu();
break;
case ARCH_GET_FS: {
unsigned long base;
if (task->thread.fsindex == FS_TLS_SEL)
base = read_32bit_tls(task, FS_TLS);
else if (doit)
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, base);
else
base = task->thread.fs;
ret = put_user(base, (unsigned long __user *)addr);
break;
}
case ARCH_GET_GS: {
unsigned long base;
[PATCH] x86_64: Plug GS leak in arch_prctl() In linux-2.6.16, we have noticed a problem where the gs base value returned from an arch_prtcl(ARCH_GET_GS, ...) call will be incorrect if: - the current/calling task has NOT set its own gs base yet to a non-zero value, - some other task that ran on the same processor previously set their own gs base to a non-zero value. In this situation, the ARCH_GET_GS code will read and return the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE msr register. However, since the __switch_to() code does NOT load/zero the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE register when the task that is switched IN has a zero next->gs value, the caller of arch_prctl(ARCH_GET_GS, ...) will get back the value of some previous tasks's gs base value instead of 0. Change the arch_prctl() ARCH_GET_GS code to only read and return the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE msr register if the 'gs' register of the calling task is non-zero. Side note: Since in addition to using arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_GS, ...), a task can also setup a gs base value by using modify_ldt() and write an index value into 'gs' from user space, the patch below reads 'gs' instead of using thread.gs, since in the modify_ldt() case, the thread.gs value will be 0, and incorrect value would be returned (the task->thread.gs value). When the user has not set its own gs base value and the 'gs' register is zero, then the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE register will not be read and a value of zero will be returned by reading and returning 'task->thread.gs'. The first patch shown below is an attempt at implementing this approach. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-04-07 17:50:25 +00:00
unsigned gsindex;
if (task->thread.gsindex == GS_TLS_SEL)
base = read_32bit_tls(task, GS_TLS);
[PATCH] x86_64: Plug GS leak in arch_prctl() In linux-2.6.16, we have noticed a problem where the gs base value returned from an arch_prtcl(ARCH_GET_GS, ...) call will be incorrect if: - the current/calling task has NOT set its own gs base yet to a non-zero value, - some other task that ran on the same processor previously set their own gs base to a non-zero value. In this situation, the ARCH_GET_GS code will read and return the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE msr register. However, since the __switch_to() code does NOT load/zero the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE register when the task that is switched IN has a zero next->gs value, the caller of arch_prctl(ARCH_GET_GS, ...) will get back the value of some previous tasks's gs base value instead of 0. Change the arch_prctl() ARCH_GET_GS code to only read and return the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE msr register if the 'gs' register of the calling task is non-zero. Side note: Since in addition to using arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_GS, ...), a task can also setup a gs base value by using modify_ldt() and write an index value into 'gs' from user space, the patch below reads 'gs' instead of using thread.gs, since in the modify_ldt() case, the thread.gs value will be 0, and incorrect value would be returned (the task->thread.gs value). When the user has not set its own gs base value and the 'gs' register is zero, then the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE register will not be read and a value of zero will be returned by reading and returning 'task->thread.gs'. The first patch shown below is an attempt at implementing this approach. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-04-07 17:50:25 +00:00
else if (doit) {
savesegment(gs, gsindex);
[PATCH] x86_64: Plug GS leak in arch_prctl() In linux-2.6.16, we have noticed a problem where the gs base value returned from an arch_prtcl(ARCH_GET_GS, ...) call will be incorrect if: - the current/calling task has NOT set its own gs base yet to a non-zero value, - some other task that ran on the same processor previously set their own gs base to a non-zero value. In this situation, the ARCH_GET_GS code will read and return the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE msr register. However, since the __switch_to() code does NOT load/zero the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE register when the task that is switched IN has a zero next->gs value, the caller of arch_prctl(ARCH_GET_GS, ...) will get back the value of some previous tasks's gs base value instead of 0. Change the arch_prctl() ARCH_GET_GS code to only read and return the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE msr register if the 'gs' register of the calling task is non-zero. Side note: Since in addition to using arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_GS, ...), a task can also setup a gs base value by using modify_ldt() and write an index value into 'gs' from user space, the patch below reads 'gs' instead of using thread.gs, since in the modify_ldt() case, the thread.gs value will be 0, and incorrect value would be returned (the task->thread.gs value). When the user has not set its own gs base value and the 'gs' register is zero, then the MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE register will not be read and a value of zero will be returned by reading and returning 'task->thread.gs'. The first patch shown below is an attempt at implementing this approach. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-04-07 17:50:25 +00:00
if (gsindex)
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, base);
else
base = task->thread.gs;
} else
base = task->thread.gs;
ret = put_user(base, (unsigned long __user *)addr);
break;
}
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return ret;
}
long sys_arch_prctl(int code, unsigned long addr)
{
return do_arch_prctl(current, code, addr);
}
unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
{
if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
return sp & ~0xf;
}
x86: randomize brk Randomize the location of the heap (brk) for i386 and x86_64. The range is randomized in the range starting at current brk location up to 0x02000000 offset for both architectures. This, together with pie-executable-randomization.patch and pie-executable-randomization-fix.patch, should make the address space randomization on i386 and x86_64 complete. Arjan says: This is known to break older versions of some emacs variants, whose dumper code assumed that the last variable declared in the program is equal to the start of the dynamically allocated memory region. (The dumper is the code where emacs effectively dumps core at the end of it's compilation stage; this coredump is then loaded as the main program during normal use) iirc this was 5 years or so; we found this way back when I was at RH and we first did the security stuff there (including this brk randomization). It wasn't all variants of emacs, and it got fixed as a result (I vaguely remember that emacs already had code to deal with it for other archs/oses, just ifdeffed wrongly). It's a rare and wrong assumption as a general thing, just on x86 it mostly happened to be true (but to be honest, it'll break too if gcc does something fancy or if the linker does a non-standard order). Still its something we should at least document. Note 2: afaik it only broke the emacs *build*. I'm not 100% sure about that (it IS 5 years ago) though. [ akpm@linux-foundation.org: deuglification ] Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30 12:30:40 +00:00
unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long range_end = mm->brk + 0x02000000;
return randomize_range(mm->brk, range_end, 0) ? : mm->brk;
}