linux/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c

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46 KiB
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/* xfrm_user.c: User interface to configure xfrm engine.
*
* Copyright (C) 2002 David S. Miller (davem@redhat.com)
*
* Changes:
* Mitsuru KANDA @USAGI
* Kazunori MIYAZAWA @USAGI
* Kunihiro Ishiguro <kunihiro@ipinfusion.com>
* IPv6 support
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
*
*/
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <linux/pfkeyv2.h>
#include <linux/ipsec.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
static int verify_one_alg(struct rtattr **xfrma, enum xfrm_attr_type_t type)
{
struct rtattr *rt = xfrma[type - 1];
struct xfrm_algo *algp;
int len;
if (!rt)
return 0;
len = (rt->rta_len - sizeof(*rt)) - sizeof(*algp);
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
algp = RTA_DATA(rt);
len -= (algp->alg_key_len + 7U) / 8;
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
switch (type) {
case XFRMA_ALG_AUTH:
if (!algp->alg_key_len &&
strcmp(algp->alg_name, "digest_null") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT:
if (!algp->alg_key_len &&
strcmp(algp->alg_name, "cipher_null") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case XFRMA_ALG_COMP:
/* Zero length keys are legal. */
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
};
algp->alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME - 1] = '\0';
return 0;
}
static int verify_encap_tmpl(struct rtattr **xfrma)
{
struct rtattr *rt = xfrma[XFRMA_ENCAP - 1];
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap;
if (!rt)
return 0;
if ((rt->rta_len - sizeof(*rt)) < sizeof(*encap))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static int verify_one_addr(struct rtattr **xfrma, enum xfrm_attr_type_t type,
xfrm_address_t **addrp)
{
struct rtattr *rt = xfrma[type - 1];
if (!rt)
return 0;
if ((rt->rta_len - sizeof(*rt)) < sizeof(**addrp))
return -EINVAL;
if (addrp)
*addrp = RTA_DATA(rt);
return 0;
}
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
static inline int verify_sec_ctx_len(struct rtattr **xfrma)
{
struct rtattr *rt = xfrma[XFRMA_SEC_CTX - 1];
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx;
int len = 0;
if (!rt)
return 0;
if (rt->rta_len < sizeof(*uctx))
return -EINVAL;
uctx = RTA_DATA(rt);
len += sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx);
len += uctx->ctx_len;
if (uctx->len != len)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
struct rtattr **xfrma)
{
int err;
err = -EINVAL;
switch (p->family) {
case AF_INET:
break;
case AF_INET6:
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
break;
#else
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
goto out;
#endif
default:
goto out;
};
err = -EINVAL;
switch (p->id.proto) {
case IPPROTO_AH:
if (!xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH-1] ||
xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT-1] ||
xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_COMP-1])
goto out;
break;
case IPPROTO_ESP:
if ((!xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH-1] &&
!xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT-1]) ||
xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_COMP-1])
goto out;
break;
case IPPROTO_COMP:
if (!xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_COMP-1] ||
xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH-1] ||
xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT-1])
goto out;
break;
default:
goto out;
};
if ((err = verify_one_alg(xfrma, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH)))
goto out;
if ((err = verify_one_alg(xfrma, XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT)))
goto out;
if ((err = verify_one_alg(xfrma, XFRMA_ALG_COMP)))
goto out;
if ((err = verify_encap_tmpl(xfrma)))
goto out;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
if ((err = verify_sec_ctx_len(xfrma)))
goto out;
if ((err = verify_one_addr(xfrma, XFRMA_COADDR, NULL)))
goto out;
err = -EINVAL;
switch (p->mode) {
case XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT:
case XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL:
case XFRM_MODE_ROUTEOPTIMIZATION:
break;
default:
goto out;
};
err = 0;
out:
return err;
}
static int attach_one_algo(struct xfrm_algo **algpp, u8 *props,
struct xfrm_algo_desc *(*get_byname)(char *, int),
struct rtattr *u_arg)
{
struct rtattr *rta = u_arg;
struct xfrm_algo *p, *ualg;
struct xfrm_algo_desc *algo;
int len;
if (!rta)
return 0;
ualg = RTA_DATA(rta);
algo = get_byname(ualg->alg_name, 1);
if (!algo)
return -ENOSYS;
*props = algo->desc.sadb_alg_id;
len = sizeof(*ualg) + (ualg->alg_key_len + 7U) / 8;
p = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(p, ualg, len);
strcpy(p->alg_name, algo->name);
*algpp = p;
return 0;
}
static int attach_encap_tmpl(struct xfrm_encap_tmpl **encapp, struct rtattr *u_arg)
{
struct rtattr *rta = u_arg;
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *p, *uencap;
if (!rta)
return 0;
uencap = RTA_DATA(rta);
p = kmalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(p, uencap, sizeof(*p));
*encapp = p;
return 0;
}
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
static inline int xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
{
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx = xp->security;
int len = 0;
if (xfrm_ctx) {
len += sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx);
len += xfrm_ctx->ctx_len;
}
return len;
}
static int attach_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_state *x, struct rtattr *u_arg)
{
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx;
if (!u_arg)
return 0;
uctx = RTA_DATA(u_arg);
return security_xfrm_state_alloc(x, uctx);
}
static int attach_one_addr(xfrm_address_t **addrpp, struct rtattr *u_arg)
{
struct rtattr *rta = u_arg;
xfrm_address_t *p, *uaddrp;
if (!rta)
return 0;
uaddrp = RTA_DATA(rta);
p = kmalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(p, uaddrp, sizeof(*p));
*addrpp = p;
return 0;
}
static void copy_from_user_state(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_usersa_info *p)
{
memcpy(&x->id, &p->id, sizeof(x->id));
memcpy(&x->sel, &p->sel, sizeof(x->sel));
memcpy(&x->lft, &p->lft, sizeof(x->lft));
x->props.mode = p->mode;
x->props.replay_window = p->replay_window;
x->props.reqid = p->reqid;
x->props.family = p->family;
x->props.saddr = p->saddr;
x->props.flags = p->flags;
}
/*
* someday when pfkey also has support, we could have the code
* somehow made shareable and move it to xfrm_state.c - JHS
*
*/
static int xfrm_update_ae_params(struct xfrm_state *x, struct rtattr **xfrma)
{
int err = - EINVAL;
struct rtattr *rp = xfrma[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL-1];
struct rtattr *lt = xfrma[XFRMA_LTIME_VAL-1];
struct rtattr *et = xfrma[XFRMA_ETIMER_THRESH-1];
struct rtattr *rt = xfrma[XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH-1];
if (rp) {
struct xfrm_replay_state *replay;
if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rp) < sizeof(*replay))
goto error;
replay = RTA_DATA(rp);
memcpy(&x->replay, replay, sizeof(*replay));
memcpy(&x->preplay, replay, sizeof(*replay));
}
if (lt) {
struct xfrm_lifetime_cur *ltime;
if (RTA_PAYLOAD(lt) < sizeof(*ltime))
goto error;
ltime = RTA_DATA(lt);
x->curlft.bytes = ltime->bytes;
x->curlft.packets = ltime->packets;
x->curlft.add_time = ltime->add_time;
x->curlft.use_time = ltime->use_time;
}
if (et) {
if (RTA_PAYLOAD(et) < sizeof(u32))
goto error;
x->replay_maxage = *(u32*)RTA_DATA(et);
}
if (rt) {
if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rt) < sizeof(u32))
goto error;
x->replay_maxdiff = *(u32*)RTA_DATA(rt);
}
return 0;
error:
return err;
}
static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_construct(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
struct rtattr **xfrma,
int *errp)
{
struct xfrm_state *x = xfrm_state_alloc();
int err = -ENOMEM;
if (!x)
goto error_no_put;
copy_from_user_state(x, p);
if ((err = attach_one_algo(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo,
xfrm_aalg_get_byname,
xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH-1])))
goto error;
if ((err = attach_one_algo(&x->ealg, &x->props.ealgo,
xfrm_ealg_get_byname,
xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT-1])))
goto error;
if ((err = attach_one_algo(&x->calg, &x->props.calgo,
xfrm_calg_get_byname,
xfrma[XFRMA_ALG_COMP-1])))
goto error;
if ((err = attach_encap_tmpl(&x->encap, xfrma[XFRMA_ENCAP-1])))
goto error;
if ((err = attach_one_addr(&x->coaddr, xfrma[XFRMA_COADDR-1])))
goto error;
err = xfrm_init_state(x);
if (err)
goto error;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
if ((err = attach_sec_ctx(x, xfrma[XFRMA_SEC_CTX-1])))
goto error;
x->km.seq = p->seq;
x->replay_maxdiff = sysctl_xfrm_aevent_rseqth;
/* sysctl_xfrm_aevent_etime is in 100ms units */
x->replay_maxage = (sysctl_xfrm_aevent_etime*HZ)/XFRM_AE_ETH_M;
x->preplay.bitmap = 0;
x->preplay.seq = x->replay.seq+x->replay_maxdiff;
x->preplay.oseq = x->replay.oseq +x->replay_maxdiff;
/* override default values from above */
err = xfrm_update_ae_params(x, (struct rtattr **)xfrma);
if (err < 0)
goto error;
return x;
error:
x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
xfrm_state_put(x);
error_no_put:
*errp = err;
return NULL;
}
static int xfrm_add_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
struct xfrm_state *x;
int err;
struct km_event c;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
err = verify_newsa_info(p, (struct rtattr **)xfrma);
if (err)
return err;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
x = xfrm_state_construct(p, (struct rtattr **)xfrma, &err);
if (!x)
return err;
xfrm_state_hold(x);
if (nlh->nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_NEWSA)
err = xfrm_state_add(x);
else
err = xfrm_state_update(x);
if (err < 0) {
x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
__xfrm_state_put(x);
goto out;
}
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
km_state_notify(x, &c);
out:
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_user_state_lookup(struct xfrm_usersa_id *p,
struct rtattr **xfrma,
int *errp)
{
struct xfrm_state *x = NULL;
int err;
if (xfrm_id_proto_match(p->proto, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY)) {
err = -ESRCH;
x = xfrm_state_lookup(&p->daddr, p->spi, p->proto, p->family);
} else {
xfrm_address_t *saddr = NULL;
err = verify_one_addr(xfrma, XFRMA_SRCADDR, &saddr);
if (err)
goto out;
if (!saddr) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
x = xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(&p->daddr, saddr, p->proto,
p->family);
}
out:
if (!x && errp)
*errp = err;
return x;
}
static int xfrm_del_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_state *x;
int err = -ESRCH;
struct km_event c;
struct xfrm_usersa_id *p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
x = xfrm_user_state_lookup(p, (struct rtattr **)xfrma, &err);
if (x == NULL)
return err;
if ((err = security_xfrm_state_delete(x)) != 0)
[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 06:39:49 +00:00
goto out;
if (xfrm_state_kern(x)) {
[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 06:39:49 +00:00
err = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
err = xfrm_state_delete(x);
[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 06:39:49 +00:00
if (err < 0)
goto out;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
km_state_notify(x, &c);
[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 06:39:49 +00:00
out:
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
static void copy_to_user_state(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_usersa_info *p)
{
memcpy(&p->id, &x->id, sizeof(p->id));
memcpy(&p->sel, &x->sel, sizeof(p->sel));
memcpy(&p->lft, &x->lft, sizeof(p->lft));
memcpy(&p->curlft, &x->curlft, sizeof(p->curlft));
memcpy(&p->stats, &x->stats, sizeof(p->stats));
p->saddr = x->props.saddr;
p->mode = x->props.mode;
p->replay_window = x->props.replay_window;
p->reqid = x->props.reqid;
p->family = x->props.family;
p->flags = x->props.flags;
p->seq = x->km.seq;
}
struct xfrm_dump_info {
struct sk_buff *in_skb;
struct sk_buff *out_skb;
u32 nlmsg_seq;
u16 nlmsg_flags;
int start_idx;
int this_idx;
};
static int dump_one_state(struct xfrm_state *x, int count, void *ptr)
{
struct xfrm_dump_info *sp = ptr;
struct sk_buff *in_skb = sp->in_skb;
struct sk_buff *skb = sp->out_skb;
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned char *b = skb->tail;
if (sp->this_idx < sp->start_idx)
goto out;
nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid,
sp->nlmsg_seq,
XFRM_MSG_NEWSA, sizeof(*p));
nlh->nlmsg_flags = sp->nlmsg_flags;
p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
copy_to_user_state(x, p);
if (x->aalg)
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH,
sizeof(*(x->aalg))+(x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8, x->aalg);
if (x->ealg)
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT,
sizeof(*(x->ealg))+(x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8, x->ealg);
if (x->calg)
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ALG_COMP, sizeof(*(x->calg)), x->calg);
if (x->encap)
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ENCAP, sizeof(*x->encap), x->encap);
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
if (x->security) {
int ctx_size = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) +
x->security->ctx_len;
struct rtattr *rt = __RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_SEC_CTX, ctx_size);
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = RTA_DATA(rt);
uctx->exttype = XFRMA_SEC_CTX;
uctx->len = ctx_size;
uctx->ctx_doi = x->security->ctx_doi;
uctx->ctx_alg = x->security->ctx_alg;
uctx->ctx_len = x->security->ctx_len;
memcpy(uctx + 1, x->security->ctx_str, x->security->ctx_len);
}
if (x->coaddr)
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_COADDR, sizeof(*x->coaddr), x->coaddr);
if (x->lastused)
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_LASTUSED, sizeof(x->lastused), &x->lastused);
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
out:
sp->this_idx++;
return 0;
nlmsg_failure:
rtattr_failure:
skb_trim(skb, b - skb->data);
return -1;
}
static int xfrm_dump_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct xfrm_dump_info info;
info.in_skb = cb->skb;
info.out_skb = skb;
info.nlmsg_seq = cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq;
info.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_MULTI;
info.this_idx = 0;
info.start_idx = cb->args[0];
(void) xfrm_state_walk(0, dump_one_state, &info);
cb->args[0] = info.this_idx;
return skb->len;
}
static struct sk_buff *xfrm_state_netlink(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
struct xfrm_state *x, u32 seq)
{
struct xfrm_dump_info info;
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_pid = NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid;
info.in_skb = in_skb;
info.out_skb = skb;
info.nlmsg_seq = seq;
info.nlmsg_flags = 0;
info.this_idx = info.start_idx = 0;
if (dump_one_state(x, 0, &info)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NULL;
}
return skb;
}
static int xfrm_get_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_usersa_id *p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
struct xfrm_state *x;
struct sk_buff *resp_skb;
int err = -ESRCH;
x = xfrm_user_state_lookup(p, (struct rtattr **)xfrma, &err);
if (x == NULL)
goto out_noput;
resp_skb = xfrm_state_netlink(skb, x, nlh->nlmsg_seq);
if (IS_ERR(resp_skb)) {
err = PTR_ERR(resp_skb);
} else {
err = netlink_unicast(xfrm_nl, resp_skb,
NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
xfrm_state_put(x);
out_noput:
return err;
}
static int verify_userspi_info(struct xfrm_userspi_info *p)
{
switch (p->info.id.proto) {
case IPPROTO_AH:
case IPPROTO_ESP:
break;
case IPPROTO_COMP:
/* IPCOMP spi is 16-bits. */
if (p->max >= 0x10000)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
};
if (p->min > p->max)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static int xfrm_alloc_userspi(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_state *x;
struct xfrm_userspi_info *p;
struct sk_buff *resp_skb;
xfrm_address_t *daddr;
int family;
int err;
p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
err = verify_userspi_info(p);
if (err)
goto out_noput;
family = p->info.family;
daddr = &p->info.id.daddr;
x = NULL;
if (p->info.seq) {
x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(p->info.seq);
if (x && xfrm_addr_cmp(&x->id.daddr, daddr, family)) {
xfrm_state_put(x);
x = NULL;
}
}
if (!x)
x = xfrm_find_acq(p->info.mode, p->info.reqid,
p->info.id.proto, daddr,
&p->info.saddr, 1,
family);
err = -ENOENT;
if (x == NULL)
goto out_noput;
resp_skb = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
if (x->km.state != XFRM_STATE_DEAD) {
xfrm_alloc_spi(x, htonl(p->min), htonl(p->max));
if (x->id.spi)
resp_skb = xfrm_state_netlink(skb, x, nlh->nlmsg_seq);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
if (IS_ERR(resp_skb)) {
err = PTR_ERR(resp_skb);
goto out;
}
err = netlink_unicast(xfrm_nl, resp_skb,
NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, MSG_DONTWAIT);
out:
xfrm_state_put(x);
out_noput:
return err;
}
static int verify_policy_dir(__u8 dir)
{
switch (dir) {
case XFRM_POLICY_IN:
case XFRM_POLICY_OUT:
case XFRM_POLICY_FWD:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
};
return 0;
}
static int verify_newpolicy_info(struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p)
{
switch (p->share) {
case XFRM_SHARE_ANY:
case XFRM_SHARE_SESSION:
case XFRM_SHARE_USER:
case XFRM_SHARE_UNIQUE:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
};
switch (p->action) {
case XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW:
case XFRM_POLICY_BLOCK:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
};
switch (p->sel.family) {
case AF_INET:
break;
case AF_INET6:
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
break;
#else
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
#endif
default:
return -EINVAL;
};
return verify_policy_dir(p->dir);
}
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
static int copy_from_user_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_policy *pol, struct rtattr **xfrma)
{
struct rtattr *rt = xfrma[XFRMA_SEC_CTX-1];
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx;
if (!rt)
return 0;
uctx = RTA_DATA(rt);
return security_xfrm_policy_alloc(pol, uctx);
}
static void copy_templates(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_tmpl *ut,
int nr)
{
int i;
xp->xfrm_nr = nr;
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++, ut++) {
struct xfrm_tmpl *t = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
memcpy(&t->id, &ut->id, sizeof(struct xfrm_id));
memcpy(&t->saddr, &ut->saddr,
sizeof(xfrm_address_t));
t->reqid = ut->reqid;
t->mode = ut->mode;
t->share = ut->share;
t->optional = ut->optional;
t->aalgos = ut->aalgos;
t->ealgos = ut->ealgos;
t->calgos = ut->calgos;
}
}
static int copy_from_user_tmpl(struct xfrm_policy *pol, struct rtattr **xfrma)
{
struct rtattr *rt = xfrma[XFRMA_TMPL-1];
struct xfrm_user_tmpl *utmpl;
int nr;
if (!rt) {
pol->xfrm_nr = 0;
} else {
nr = (rt->rta_len - sizeof(*rt)) / sizeof(*utmpl);
if (nr > XFRM_MAX_DEPTH)
return -EINVAL;
copy_templates(pol, RTA_DATA(rt), nr);
}
return 0;
}
static void copy_from_user_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p)
{
xp->priority = p->priority;
xp->index = p->index;
memcpy(&xp->selector, &p->sel, sizeof(xp->selector));
memcpy(&xp->lft, &p->lft, sizeof(xp->lft));
xp->action = p->action;
xp->flags = p->flags;
xp->family = p->sel.family;
/* XXX xp->share = p->share; */
}
static void copy_to_user_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p, int dir)
{
memcpy(&p->sel, &xp->selector, sizeof(p->sel));
memcpy(&p->lft, &xp->lft, sizeof(p->lft));
memcpy(&p->curlft, &xp->curlft, sizeof(p->curlft));
p->priority = xp->priority;
p->index = xp->index;
p->sel.family = xp->family;
p->dir = dir;
p->action = xp->action;
p->flags = xp->flags;
p->share = XFRM_SHARE_ANY; /* XXX xp->share */
}
static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_construct(struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p, struct rtattr **xfrma, int *errp)
{
struct xfrm_policy *xp = xfrm_policy_alloc(GFP_KERNEL);
int err;
if (!xp) {
*errp = -ENOMEM;
return NULL;
}
copy_from_user_policy(xp, p);
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
if (!(err = copy_from_user_tmpl(xp, xfrma)))
err = copy_from_user_sec_ctx(xp, xfrma);
if (err) {
*errp = err;
kfree(xp);
xp = NULL;
}
return xp;
}
static int xfrm_add_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct km_event c;
int err;
int excl;
err = verify_newpolicy_info(p);
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
if (err)
return err;
err = verify_sec_ctx_len((struct rtattr **)xfrma);
if (err)
return err;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
xp = xfrm_policy_construct(p, (struct rtattr **)xfrma, &err);
if (!xp)
return err;
/* shouldnt excl be based on nlh flags??
* Aha! this is anti-netlink really i.e more pfkey derived
* in netlink excl is a flag and you wouldnt need
* a type XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY - JHS */
excl = nlh->nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
err = xfrm_policy_insert(p->dir, xp, excl);
if (err) {
security_xfrm_policy_free(xp);
kfree(xp);
return err;
}
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
km_policy_notify(xp, p->dir, &c);
xfrm_pol_put(xp);
return 0;
}
static int copy_to_user_tmpl(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xfrm_user_tmpl vec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
int i;
if (xp->xfrm_nr == 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < xp->xfrm_nr; i++) {
struct xfrm_user_tmpl *up = &vec[i];
struct xfrm_tmpl *kp = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
memcpy(&up->id, &kp->id, sizeof(up->id));
up->family = xp->family;
memcpy(&up->saddr, &kp->saddr, sizeof(up->saddr));
up->reqid = kp->reqid;
up->mode = kp->mode;
up->share = kp->share;
up->optional = kp->optional;
up->aalgos = kp->aalgos;
up->ealgos = kp->ealgos;
up->calgos = kp->calgos;
}
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_TMPL,
(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr),
vec);
return 0;
rtattr_failure:
return -1;
}
static int copy_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *s, struct sk_buff *skb)
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
{
int ctx_size = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) + s->ctx_len;
struct rtattr *rt = __RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_SEC_CTX, ctx_size);
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = RTA_DATA(rt);
uctx->exttype = XFRMA_SEC_CTX;
uctx->len = ctx_size;
uctx->ctx_doi = s->ctx_doi;
uctx->ctx_alg = s->ctx_alg;
uctx->ctx_len = s->ctx_len;
memcpy(uctx + 1, s->ctx_str, s->ctx_len);
return 0;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
rtattr_failure:
return -1;
}
static inline int copy_to_user_state_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (x->security) {
return copy_sec_ctx(x->security, skb);
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
}
return 0;
}
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
static inline int copy_to_user_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (xp->security) {
return copy_sec_ctx(xp->security, skb);
}
return 0;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
}
static int dump_one_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, int count, void *ptr)
{
struct xfrm_dump_info *sp = ptr;
struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p;
struct sk_buff *in_skb = sp->in_skb;
struct sk_buff *skb = sp->out_skb;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned char *b = skb->tail;
if (sp->this_idx < sp->start_idx)
goto out;
nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid,
sp->nlmsg_seq,
XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY, sizeof(*p));
p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
nlh->nlmsg_flags = sp->nlmsg_flags;
copy_to_user_policy(xp, p, dir);
if (copy_to_user_tmpl(xp, skb) < 0)
goto nlmsg_failure;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
if (copy_to_user_sec_ctx(xp, skb))
goto nlmsg_failure;
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
out:
sp->this_idx++;
return 0;
nlmsg_failure:
skb_trim(skb, b - skb->data);
return -1;
}
static int xfrm_dump_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct xfrm_dump_info info;
info.in_skb = cb->skb;
info.out_skb = skb;
info.nlmsg_seq = cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq;
info.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_MULTI;
info.this_idx = 0;
info.start_idx = cb->args[0];
(void) xfrm_policy_walk(dump_one_policy, &info);
cb->args[0] = info.this_idx;
return skb->len;
}
static struct sk_buff *xfrm_policy_netlink(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
int dir, u32 seq)
{
struct xfrm_dump_info info;
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_pid = NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid;
info.in_skb = in_skb;
info.out_skb = skb;
info.nlmsg_seq = seq;
info.nlmsg_flags = 0;
info.this_idx = info.start_idx = 0;
if (dump_one_policy(xp, dir, 0, &info) < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NULL;
}
return skb;
}
static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct xfrm_userpolicy_id *p;
int err;
struct km_event c;
int delete;
p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
delete = nlh->nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY;
err = verify_policy_dir(p->dir);
if (err)
return err;
if (p->index)
xp = xfrm_policy_byid(p->dir, p->index, delete);
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
else {
struct rtattr **rtattrs = (struct rtattr **)xfrma;
struct rtattr *rt = rtattrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX-1];
struct xfrm_policy tmp;
err = verify_sec_ctx_len(rtattrs);
if (err)
return err;
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(struct xfrm_policy));
if (rt) {
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = RTA_DATA(rt);
if ((err = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&tmp, uctx)))
return err;
}
xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(p->dir, &p->sel, tmp.security, delete);
security_xfrm_policy_free(&tmp);
}
if (xp == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
if (!delete) {
struct sk_buff *resp_skb;
resp_skb = xfrm_policy_netlink(skb, xp, p->dir, nlh->nlmsg_seq);
if (IS_ERR(resp_skb)) {
err = PTR_ERR(resp_skb);
} else {
err = netlink_unicast(xfrm_nl, resp_skb,
NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
} else {
if ((err = security_xfrm_policy_delete(xp)) != 0)
[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 06:39:49 +00:00
goto out;
c.data.byid = p->index;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
km_policy_notify(xp, p->dir, &c);
}
xfrm_pol_put(xp);
[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 06:39:49 +00:00
out:
return err;
}
static int xfrm_flush_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct km_event c;
struct xfrm_usersa_flush *p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
xfrm_state_flush(p->proto);
c.data.proto = p->proto;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
km_state_notify(NULL, &c);
return 0;
}
static int build_aevent(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x, struct km_event *c)
{
struct xfrm_aevent_id *id;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct xfrm_lifetime_cur ltime;
unsigned char *b = skb->tail;
nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, c->pid, c->seq, XFRM_MSG_NEWAE, sizeof(*id));
id = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
nlh->nlmsg_flags = 0;
id->sa_id.daddr = x->id.daddr;
id->sa_id.spi = x->id.spi;
id->sa_id.family = x->props.family;
id->sa_id.proto = x->id.proto;
id->flags = c->data.aevent;
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL, sizeof(x->replay), &x->replay);
ltime.bytes = x->curlft.bytes;
ltime.packets = x->curlft.packets;
ltime.add_time = x->curlft.add_time;
ltime.use_time = x->curlft.use_time;
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_LTIME_VAL, sizeof(struct xfrm_lifetime_cur), &ltime);
if (id->flags&XFRM_AE_RTHR) {
RTA_PUT(skb,XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH,sizeof(u32),&x->replay_maxdiff);
}
if (id->flags&XFRM_AE_ETHR) {
u32 etimer = x->replay_maxage*10/HZ;
RTA_PUT(skb,XFRMA_ETIMER_THRESH,sizeof(u32),&etimer);
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
return skb->len;
rtattr_failure:
nlmsg_failure:
skb_trim(skb, b - skb->data);
return -1;
}
static int xfrm_get_ae(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_state *x;
struct sk_buff *r_skb;
int err;
struct km_event c;
struct xfrm_aevent_id *p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
int len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct xfrm_aevent_id));
struct xfrm_usersa_id *id = &p->sa_id;
len += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state));
len += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_lifetime_cur));
if (p->flags&XFRM_AE_RTHR)
len+=RTA_SPACE(sizeof(u32));
if (p->flags&XFRM_AE_ETHR)
len+=RTA_SPACE(sizeof(u32));
r_skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (r_skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
x = xfrm_state_lookup(&id->daddr, id->spi, id->proto, id->family);
if (x == NULL) {
kfree(r_skb);
return -ESRCH;
}
/*
* XXX: is this lock really needed - none of the other
* gets lock (the concern is things getting updated
* while we are still reading) - jhs
*/
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
c.data.aevent = p->flags;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
if (build_aevent(r_skb, x, &c) < 0)
BUG();
err = netlink_unicast(xfrm_nl, r_skb,
NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, MSG_DONTWAIT);
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
static int xfrm_new_ae(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_state *x;
struct km_event c;
int err = - EINVAL;
struct xfrm_aevent_id *p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
struct rtattr *rp = xfrma[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL-1];
struct rtattr *lt = xfrma[XFRMA_LTIME_VAL-1];
if (!lt && !rp)
return err;
/* pedantic mode - thou shalt sayeth replaceth */
if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_REPLACE))
return err;
x = xfrm_state_lookup(&p->sa_id.daddr, p->sa_id.spi, p->sa_id.proto, p->sa_id.family);
if (x == NULL)
return -ESRCH;
if (x->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID)
goto out;
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
err = xfrm_update_ae_params(x,(struct rtattr **)xfrma);
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
c.data.aevent = XFRM_AE_CU;
km_state_notify(x, &c);
err = 0;
out:
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
static int xfrm_flush_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct km_event c;
xfrm_policy_flush();
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.pid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
km_policy_notify(NULL, 0, &c);
return 0;
}
static int xfrm_add_pol_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct xfrm_user_polexpire *up = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p = &up->pol;
int err = -ENOENT;
if (p->index)
xp = xfrm_policy_byid(p->dir, p->index, 0);
else {
struct rtattr **rtattrs = (struct rtattr **)xfrma;
struct rtattr *rt = rtattrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX-1];
struct xfrm_policy tmp;
err = verify_sec_ctx_len(rtattrs);
if (err)
return err;
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(struct xfrm_policy));
if (rt) {
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = RTA_DATA(rt);
if ((err = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&tmp, uctx)))
return err;
}
xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(p->dir, &p->sel, tmp.security, 0);
security_xfrm_policy_free(&tmp);
}
if (xp == NULL)
return err;
read_lock(&xp->lock);
if (xp->dead) {
read_unlock(&xp->lock);
goto out;
}
read_unlock(&xp->lock);
err = 0;
if (up->hard) {
xfrm_policy_delete(xp, p->dir);
} else {
// reset the timers here?
printk("Dont know what to do with soft policy expire\n");
}
km_policy_expired(xp, p->dir, up->hard, current->pid);
out:
xfrm_pol_put(xp);
return err;
}
static int xfrm_add_sa_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_state *x;
int err;
struct xfrm_user_expire *ue = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p = &ue->state;
x = xfrm_state_lookup(&p->id.daddr, p->id.spi, p->id.proto, p->family);
err = -ENOENT;
if (x == NULL)
return err;
err = -EINVAL;
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
if (x->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID)
goto out;
km_state_expired(x, ue->hard, current->pid);
if (ue->hard)
__xfrm_state_delete(x);
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
static int xfrm_add_acquire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void **xfrma)
{
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct xfrm_user_tmpl *ut;
int i;
struct rtattr *rt = xfrma[XFRMA_TMPL-1];
struct xfrm_user_acquire *ua = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
struct xfrm_state *x = xfrm_state_alloc();
int err = -ENOMEM;
if (!x)
return err;
err = verify_newpolicy_info(&ua->policy);
if (err) {
printk("BAD policy passed\n");
kfree(x);
return err;
}
/* build an XP */
xp = xfrm_policy_construct(&ua->policy, (struct rtattr **) xfrma, &err); if (!xp) {
kfree(x);
return err;
}
memcpy(&x->id, &ua->id, sizeof(ua->id));
memcpy(&x->props.saddr, &ua->saddr, sizeof(ua->saddr));
memcpy(&x->sel, &ua->sel, sizeof(ua->sel));
ut = RTA_DATA(rt);
/* extract the templates and for each call km_key */
for (i = 0; i < xp->xfrm_nr; i++, ut++) {
struct xfrm_tmpl *t = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
memcpy(&x->id, &t->id, sizeof(x->id));
x->props.mode = t->mode;
x->props.reqid = t->reqid;
x->props.family = ut->family;
t->aalgos = ua->aalgos;
t->ealgos = ua->ealgos;
t->calgos = ua->calgos;
err = km_query(x, t, xp);
}
kfree(x);
kfree(xp);
return 0;
}
#define XMSGSIZE(type) NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct type))
static const int xfrm_msg_min[XFRM_NR_MSGTYPES] = {
[XFRM_MSG_NEWSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_usersa_info),
[XFRM_MSG_DELSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_usersa_id),
[XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_usersa_id),
[XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_userpolicy_info),
[XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_userpolicy_id),
[XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_userpolicy_id),
[XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_userspi_info),
[XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_user_acquire),
[XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_user_expire),
[XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_userpolicy_info),
[XFRM_MSG_UPDSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_usersa_info),
[XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_user_polexpire),
[XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_usersa_flush),
[XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = NLMSG_LENGTH(0),
[XFRM_MSG_NEWAE - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_aevent_id),
[XFRM_MSG_GETAE - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = XMSGSIZE(xfrm_aevent_id),
};
#undef XMSGSIZE
static struct xfrm_link {
int (*doit)(struct sk_buff *, struct nlmsghdr *, void **);
int (*dump)(struct sk_buff *, struct netlink_callback *);
} xfrm_dispatch[XFRM_NR_MSGTYPES] = {
[XFRM_MSG_NEWSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_add_sa },
[XFRM_MSG_DELSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_del_sa },
[XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_get_sa,
.dump = xfrm_dump_sa },
[XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_add_policy },
[XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_get_policy },
[XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_get_policy,
.dump = xfrm_dump_policy },
[XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_alloc_userspi },
[XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_add_acquire },
[XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_add_sa_expire },
[XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_add_policy },
[XFRM_MSG_UPDSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_add_sa },
[XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_add_pol_expire},
[XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_flush_sa },
[XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_flush_policy },
[XFRM_MSG_NEWAE - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_new_ae },
[XFRM_MSG_GETAE - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_get_ae },
};
static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int *errp)
{
struct rtattr *xfrma[XFRMA_MAX];
struct xfrm_link *link;
int type, min_len;
if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REQUEST))
return 0;
type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
/* A control message: ignore them */
if (type < XFRM_MSG_BASE)
return 0;
/* Unknown message: reply with EINVAL */
if (type > XFRM_MSG_MAX)
goto err_einval;
type -= XFRM_MSG_BASE;
link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
/* All operations require privileges, even GET */
if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
*errp = -EPERM;
return -1;
}
if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
type == (XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY - XFRM_MSG_BASE)) &&
(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP)) {
if (link->dump == NULL)
goto err_einval;
if ((*errp = netlink_dump_start(xfrm_nl, skb, nlh,
link->dump, NULL)) != 0) {
return -1;
}
netlink_queue_skip(nlh, skb);
return -1;
}
memset(xfrma, 0, sizeof(xfrma));
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < (min_len = xfrm_msg_min[type]))
goto err_einval;
if (nlh->nlmsg_len > min_len) {
int attrlen = nlh->nlmsg_len - NLMSG_ALIGN(min_len);
struct rtattr *attr = (void *) nlh + NLMSG_ALIGN(min_len);
while (RTA_OK(attr, attrlen)) {
unsigned short flavor = attr->rta_type;
if (flavor) {
if (flavor > XFRMA_MAX)
goto err_einval;
xfrma[flavor - 1] = attr;
}
attr = RTA_NEXT(attr, attrlen);
}
}
if (link->doit == NULL)
goto err_einval;
*errp = link->doit(skb, nlh, (void **) &xfrma);
return *errp;
err_einval:
*errp = -EINVAL;
return -1;
}
static void xfrm_netlink_rcv(struct sock *sk, int len)
{
unsigned int qlen = 0;
[NETLINK]: Synchronous message processing. Let's recap the problem. The current asynchronous netlink kernel message processing is vulnerable to these attacks: 1) Hit and run: Attacker sends one or more messages and then exits before they're processed. This may confuse/disable the next netlink user that gets the netlink address of the attacker since it may receive the responses to the attacker's messages. Proposed solutions: a) Synchronous processing. b) Stream mode socket. c) Restrict/prohibit binding. 2) Starvation: Because various netlink rcv functions were written to not return until all messages have been processed on a socket, it is possible for these functions to execute for an arbitrarily long period of time. If this is successfully exploited it could also be used to hold rtnl forever. Proposed solutions: a) Synchronous processing. b) Stream mode socket. Firstly let's cross off solution c). It only solves the first problem and it has user-visible impacts. In particular, it'll break user space applications that expect to bind or communicate with specific netlink addresses (pid's). So we're left with a choice of synchronous processing versus SOCK_STREAM for netlink. For the moment I'm sticking with the synchronous approach as suggested by Alexey since it's simpler and I'd rather spend my time working on other things. However, it does have a number of deficiencies compared to the stream mode solution: 1) User-space to user-space netlink communication is still vulnerable. 2) Inefficient use of resources. This is especially true for rtnetlink since the lock is shared with other users such as networking drivers. The latter could hold the rtnl while communicating with hardware which causes the rtnetlink user to wait when it could be doing other things. 3) It is still possible to DoS all netlink users by flooding the kernel netlink receive queue. The attacker simply fills the receive socket with a single netlink message that fills up the entire queue. The attacker then continues to call sendmsg with the same message in a loop. Point 3) can be countered by retransmissions in user-space code, however it is pretty messy. In light of these problems (in particular, point 3), we should implement stream mode netlink at some point. In the mean time, here is a patch that implements synchronous processing. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-05-03 21:55:09 +00:00
do {
mutex_lock(&xfrm_cfg_mutex);
netlink_run_queue(sk, &qlen, &xfrm_user_rcv_msg);
mutex_unlock(&xfrm_cfg_mutex);
[NETLINK]: Synchronous message processing. Let's recap the problem. The current asynchronous netlink kernel message processing is vulnerable to these attacks: 1) Hit and run: Attacker sends one or more messages and then exits before they're processed. This may confuse/disable the next netlink user that gets the netlink address of the attacker since it may receive the responses to the attacker's messages. Proposed solutions: a) Synchronous processing. b) Stream mode socket. c) Restrict/prohibit binding. 2) Starvation: Because various netlink rcv functions were written to not return until all messages have been processed on a socket, it is possible for these functions to execute for an arbitrarily long period of time. If this is successfully exploited it could also be used to hold rtnl forever. Proposed solutions: a) Synchronous processing. b) Stream mode socket. Firstly let's cross off solution c). It only solves the first problem and it has user-visible impacts. In particular, it'll break user space applications that expect to bind or communicate with specific netlink addresses (pid's). So we're left with a choice of synchronous processing versus SOCK_STREAM for netlink. For the moment I'm sticking with the synchronous approach as suggested by Alexey since it's simpler and I'd rather spend my time working on other things. However, it does have a number of deficiencies compared to the stream mode solution: 1) User-space to user-space netlink communication is still vulnerable. 2) Inefficient use of resources. This is especially true for rtnetlink since the lock is shared with other users such as networking drivers. The latter could hold the rtnl while communicating with hardware which causes the rtnetlink user to wait when it could be doing other things. 3) It is still possible to DoS all netlink users by flooding the kernel netlink receive queue. The attacker simply fills the receive socket with a single netlink message that fills up the entire queue. The attacker then continues to call sendmsg with the same message in a loop. Point 3) can be countered by retransmissions in user-space code, however it is pretty messy. In light of these problems (in particular, point 3), we should implement stream mode netlink at some point. In the mean time, here is a patch that implements synchronous processing. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-05-03 21:55:09 +00:00
} while (qlen);
}
static int build_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x, struct km_event *c)
{
struct xfrm_user_expire *ue;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned char *b = skb->tail;
nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, c->pid, 0, XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE,
sizeof(*ue));
ue = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
nlh->nlmsg_flags = 0;
copy_to_user_state(x, &ue->state);
ue->hard = (c->data.hard != 0) ? 1 : 0;
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
return skb->len;
nlmsg_failure:
skb_trim(skb, b - skb->data);
return -1;
}
static int xfrm_exp_state_notify(struct xfrm_state *x, struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_expire));
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (build_expire(skb, x, c) < 0)
BUG();
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE;
return netlink_broadcast(xfrm_nl, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
static int xfrm_aevent_state_notify(struct xfrm_state *x, struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct xfrm_aevent_id));
len += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state));
len += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_lifetime_cur));
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (build_aevent(skb, x, c) < 0)
BUG();
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = XFRMNLGRP_AEVENTS;
return netlink_broadcast(xfrm_nl, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_AEVENTS, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
static int xfrm_notify_sa_flush(struct km_event *c)
{
struct xfrm_usersa_flush *p;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned char *b;
int len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct xfrm_usersa_flush));
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
b = skb->tail;
nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, c->pid, c->seq,
XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA, sizeof(*p));
nlh->nlmsg_flags = 0;
p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
p->proto = c->data.proto;
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = XFRMNLGRP_SA;
return netlink_broadcast(xfrm_nl, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_SA, GFP_ATOMIC);
nlmsg_failure:
kfree_skb(skb);
return -1;
}
static int inline xfrm_sa_len(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
int l = 0;
if (x->aalg)
l += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*x->aalg) + (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8);
if (x->ealg)
l += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*x->ealg) + (x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8);
if (x->calg)
l += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*x->calg));
if (x->encap)
l += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*x->encap));
return l;
}
static int xfrm_notify_sa(struct xfrm_state *x, struct km_event *c)
{
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p;
struct xfrm_usersa_id *id;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned char *b;
int len = xfrm_sa_len(x);
int headlen;
headlen = sizeof(*p);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
len += RTA_SPACE(headlen);
headlen = sizeof(*id);
}
len += NLMSG_SPACE(headlen);
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
b = skb->tail;
nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, c->pid, c->seq, c->event, headlen);
nlh->nlmsg_flags = 0;
p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
id = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
memcpy(&id->daddr, &x->id.daddr, sizeof(id->daddr));
id->spi = x->id.spi;
id->family = x->props.family;
id->proto = x->id.proto;
p = RTA_DATA(__RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_SA, sizeof(*p)));
}
copy_to_user_state(x, p);
if (x->aalg)
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH,
sizeof(*(x->aalg))+(x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8, x->aalg);
if (x->ealg)
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT,
sizeof(*(x->ealg))+(x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8, x->ealg);
if (x->calg)
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ALG_COMP, sizeof(*(x->calg)), x->calg);
if (x->encap)
RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ENCAP, sizeof(*x->encap), x->encap);
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = XFRMNLGRP_SA;
return netlink_broadcast(xfrm_nl, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_SA, GFP_ATOMIC);
nlmsg_failure:
rtattr_failure:
kfree_skb(skb);
return -1;
}
static int xfrm_send_state_notify(struct xfrm_state *x, struct km_event *c)
{
switch (c->event) {
case XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE:
return xfrm_exp_state_notify(x, c);
case XFRM_MSG_NEWAE:
return xfrm_aevent_state_notify(x, c);
case XFRM_MSG_DELSA:
case XFRM_MSG_UPDSA:
case XFRM_MSG_NEWSA:
return xfrm_notify_sa(x, c);
case XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA:
return xfrm_notify_sa_flush(c);
default:
printk("xfrm_user: Unknown SA event %d\n", c->event);
break;
}
return 0;
}
static int build_acquire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_tmpl *xt, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
int dir)
{
struct xfrm_user_acquire *ua;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
unsigned char *b = skb->tail;
__u32 seq = xfrm_get_acqseq();
nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, 0, 0, XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE,
sizeof(*ua));
ua = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
nlh->nlmsg_flags = 0;
memcpy(&ua->id, &x->id, sizeof(ua->id));
memcpy(&ua->saddr, &x->props.saddr, sizeof(ua->saddr));
memcpy(&ua->sel, &x->sel, sizeof(ua->sel));
copy_to_user_policy(xp, &ua->policy, dir);
ua->aalgos = xt->aalgos;
ua->ealgos = xt->ealgos;
ua->calgos = xt->calgos;
ua->seq = x->km.seq = seq;
if (copy_to_user_tmpl(xp, skb) < 0)
goto nlmsg_failure;
if (copy_to_user_state_sec_ctx(x, skb))
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
goto nlmsg_failure;
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
return skb->len;
nlmsg_failure:
skb_trim(skb, b - skb->data);
return -1;
}
static int xfrm_send_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *xt,
struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t len;
len = RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr);
len += NLMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_acquire));
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
len += RTA_SPACE(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(xp));
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (build_acquire(skb, x, xt, xp, dir) < 0)
BUG();
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = XFRMNLGRP_ACQUIRE;
return netlink_broadcast(xfrm_nl, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_ACQUIRE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
/* User gives us xfrm_user_policy_info followed by an array of 0
* or more templates.
*/
static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_compile_policy(struct sock *sk, int opt,
u8 *data, int len, int *dir)
{
struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p = (struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *)data;
struct xfrm_user_tmpl *ut = (struct xfrm_user_tmpl *) (p + 1);
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
int nr;
switch (sk->sk_family) {
case AF_INET:
if (opt != IP_XFRM_POLICY) {
*dir = -EOPNOTSUPP;
return NULL;
}
break;
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
case AF_INET6:
if (opt != IPV6_XFRM_POLICY) {
*dir = -EOPNOTSUPP;
return NULL;
}
break;
#endif
default:
*dir = -EINVAL;
return NULL;
}
*dir = -EINVAL;
if (len < sizeof(*p) ||
verify_newpolicy_info(p))
return NULL;
nr = ((len - sizeof(*p)) / sizeof(*ut));
if (nr > XFRM_MAX_DEPTH)
return NULL;
if (p->dir > XFRM_POLICY_OUT)
return NULL;
xp = xfrm_policy_alloc(GFP_KERNEL);
if (xp == NULL) {
*dir = -ENOBUFS;
return NULL;
}
copy_from_user_policy(xp, p);
copy_templates(xp, ut, nr);
if (!xp->security) {
int err = security_xfrm_sock_policy_alloc(xp, sk);
if (err) {
kfree(xp);
*dir = err;
return NULL;
}
}
*dir = p->dir;
return xp;
}
static int build_polexpire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
int dir, struct km_event *c)
{
struct xfrm_user_polexpire *upe;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int hard = c->data.hard;
unsigned char *b = skb->tail;
nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, c->pid, 0, XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE, sizeof(*upe));
upe = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
nlh->nlmsg_flags = 0;
copy_to_user_policy(xp, &upe->pol, dir);
if (copy_to_user_tmpl(xp, skb) < 0)
goto nlmsg_failure;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
if (copy_to_user_sec_ctx(xp, skb))
goto nlmsg_failure;
upe->hard = !!hard;
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
return skb->len;
nlmsg_failure:
skb_trim(skb, b - skb->data);
return -1;
}
static int xfrm_exp_policy_notify(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t len;
len = RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr);
len += NLMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_polexpire));
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
len += RTA_SPACE(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(xp));
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (build_polexpire(skb, xp, dir, c) < 0)
BUG();
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE;
return netlink_broadcast(xfrm_nl, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
static int xfrm_notify_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, struct km_event *c)
{
struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p;
struct xfrm_userpolicy_id *id;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned char *b;
int len = RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr);
int headlen;
headlen = sizeof(*p);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY) {
len += RTA_SPACE(headlen);
headlen = sizeof(*id);
}
len += NLMSG_SPACE(headlen);
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
b = skb->tail;
nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, c->pid, c->seq, c->event, headlen);
p = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY) {
id = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
id->dir = dir;
if (c->data.byid)
id->index = xp->index;
else
memcpy(&id->sel, &xp->selector, sizeof(id->sel));
p = RTA_DATA(__RTA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_POLICY, sizeof(*p)));
}
nlh->nlmsg_flags = 0;
copy_to_user_policy(xp, p, dir);
if (copy_to_user_tmpl(xp, skb) < 0)
goto nlmsg_failure;
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = XFRMNLGRP_POLICY;
return netlink_broadcast(xfrm_nl, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_POLICY, GFP_ATOMIC);
nlmsg_failure:
rtattr_failure:
kfree_skb(skb);
return -1;
}
static int xfrm_notify_policy_flush(struct km_event *c)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned char *b;
int len = NLMSG_LENGTH(0);
skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
b = skb->tail;
nlh = NLMSG_PUT(skb, c->pid, c->seq, XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY, 0);
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->tail - b;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = XFRMNLGRP_POLICY;
return netlink_broadcast(xfrm_nl, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_POLICY, GFP_ATOMIC);
nlmsg_failure:
kfree_skb(skb);
return -1;
}
static int xfrm_send_policy_notify(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, struct km_event *c)
{
switch (c->event) {
case XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY:
case XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY:
case XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY:
return xfrm_notify_policy(xp, dir, c);
case XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY:
return xfrm_notify_policy_flush(c);
case XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE:
return xfrm_exp_policy_notify(xp, dir, c);
default:
printk("xfrm_user: Unknown Policy event %d\n", c->event);
}
return 0;
}
static struct xfrm_mgr netlink_mgr = {
.id = "netlink",
.notify = xfrm_send_state_notify,
.acquire = xfrm_send_acquire,
.compile_policy = xfrm_compile_policy,
.notify_policy = xfrm_send_policy_notify,
};
static int __init xfrm_user_init(void)
{
struct sock *nlsk;
printk(KERN_INFO "Initializing XFRM netlink socket\n");
nlsk = netlink_kernel_create(NETLINK_XFRM, XFRMNLGRP_MAX,
xfrm_netlink_rcv, THIS_MODULE);
if (nlsk == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
rcu_assign_pointer(xfrm_nl, nlsk);
xfrm_register_km(&netlink_mgr);
return 0;
}
static void __exit xfrm_user_exit(void)
{
struct sock *nlsk = xfrm_nl;
xfrm_unregister_km(&netlink_mgr);
rcu_assign_pointer(xfrm_nl, NULL);
synchronize_rcu();
sock_release(nlsk->sk_socket);
}
module_init(xfrm_user_init);
module_exit(xfrm_user_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_ALIAS_NET_PF_PROTO(PF_NETLINK, NETLINK_XFRM);