RootCA Init; Interesting external resources
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@ -50,13 +50,27 @@ Components:
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- Monitor ICC (javacard + NXP)
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Roles:
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- Root CA: Issue CA ceritifcates and KC certificates (at least N>2)
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- CA: Issues end-user/device certificates (N>2)
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- Key Custodian: PKI peptide control interface (N>2)
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- Key Custodian: CA KC performing action in ceremony.
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- CA: Certificate Authority.
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Issues end-user/device certificates (N>2)
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CA is online, connected to infrastructure.
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- Root CA: Issue CA ceritifcates and KC certificates (at least N>2).
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Root CA is offline, airgapped device.
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- AIA: Authority Information Access - CA certificates repo (ldap/https)
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- CRL: Certificate Revocation List. List of certificates that CA issued
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but must be revoked (i.e. compromised) before end of it's
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lifetime.
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- CDP: CRL distribution point.
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- Key Custodian: PKI peptide control interface (N>2).
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- Master of Ceremony: PKI meta-peptide control interface for CA ceremonies.
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Should not be Key Custodian during ceremony. N=1
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- Key Manager: Spin all this shit around.
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- Auditor: Looking at others hands.
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I Bootstrap
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@ -65,7 +79,7 @@ A KC cards
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?> First 2 KCs generate their keys and CSR's on KC ICC using KC tools.
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This can be done on their workstation, but doing it on Root CA will be more convinient.
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># KC init
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># kc init
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<# Set PIN
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># ****
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<# PIN set
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@ -73,33 +87,82 @@ A KC cards
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># cn=<username>,ou=pki,ou=Services,dc=hackerspace,dc=pl
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<# KC ICC done
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<- KC1_ICC:KC1PK
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<- KC1.csr
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<- KC2_ICC:KC2PK
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<- KC2.csr
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<- KC1_ICC:KC1_sigPK #Used for issuing commands to CA/RootCA
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<- KC1_ICC:KC1_CAzmkPK #Used to protect backups of CA private keys
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<- KC1_sigPK.csr #Export to RootCA to get KC certificate
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<- KC1_zmkPK.csr #Export for CA to encrypt it's private keys
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B Root_CA_1
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<- KC2_ICC:KC2_sigPK #Same as above for KC2
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<- KC2_ICC:KC2_CAzmkPK
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<- KC2_sigPK.csr
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<- KC2_zmkPK.csr
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...
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<- KCN_ICC:KCN_sigPK #Same as above for KCN
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<- KCN_ICC:KCN_CAzmkPK
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<- KCN_sigPK.csr
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<- KCN_CAzmkPK.csr
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B Root_CA_N1
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CA_N1
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-> Key manager initiates self-generation of asymmetric crypto keys on 1st CA ICC and
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sets two initial KC:
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sets two (or more) initial KC's:
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># ca init -a KC1.csr -a KC2.csr
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<# CA
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># ca root init -kc KC1*.csr -kc KC2*.csr [-kc KCN*.csr]
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<- CA_N1_ICC:CA_sigPK
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<- CA_N1_ICC:CA_srvPK
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<- CA_N1_ICC:CA_admPK
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<- CA_N1_InitCAsig.crt
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<- CA_N1_InitCAsrv.crt
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<- CA_N1_InitCAadm.crt
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<- CA1_KC1.crt
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<- CA1_KC2.crt
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<- Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_sigPK:pub #Will be used in CA cert but also for integrity
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<- Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_sigPK:priv #Used for issuing CA and KC certificates
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<- Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_KC_zmkPK:pub #Will be used by KC to send recovery share to CA
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<- Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_KC_zmkPK:priv #Will be used by CA to decrypt share from KC
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<- (Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_sigPK:priv(.aes_key) #Option: generate AES key for protection
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# of CA signing key
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<- (Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_sigPK:priv.encr.aes) #Option: Encrypt signing key with AES
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<- Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_sigPK:priv(.aes_key)_SSSS_1..N # Split signing key (or it's
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# encryption key) into shares
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# for each KC
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<- Root_CA_N1_sigPriv_SSSS_1_KC1_zmk.enc #Encrypt CA private key share1 with KC1
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#encryption key
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<x Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_sigPK:priv(.aes_key)_SSSS_1 #Remove share1
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<- Root_CA_N1_sigPriv_SSSS_2_KC2_zmk.enc #Share2 for KC2
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<x Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_sigPK:priv(.aes_key)_SSSS_2 #Remove share2
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...
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<- Root_CA_N1_sigPriv_SSSS_N_KCN_zmk.enc #ShareN for KCN
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<x Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_sigPK:priv(.aes_key)_SSSS_N #Remove shareN
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<- Root_CA_N1_sigPriv_SSSS_1_KC1_zmk.enc.RootCA_sigPK.sig #Integrity check enc -> sig
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<- Root_CA_N1_sigPriv_SSSS_2_KC2_zmk.enc.RootCA_sigPK.sig #Integrity check enc -> sig
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...
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<- Root_CA_N1_sigPriv_SSSS_N_KCN_zmk.enc.RootCA_sigPK.sig #Integrity check enc -> sig
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<- Root_CA_N1_sigPriv_SSSS_1_RootCA_sigPK.sig_KC1_zmk.enc #Integrity check sig -> enc
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<- Root_CA_N1_sigPriv_SSSS_2_RootCA_sigPK.sig_KC1_zmk.enc #Integrity check sig -> enc
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...
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<- Root_CA_N1_sigPriv_SSSS_N_RootCA_sigPK.sig_KC1_zmk.enc #Integrity check sig -> enc
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<- Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_KC1_encPK # CA encryption public key for KC to send
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# their encrypted shares
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<- Root_CA_N1_KC1.kc.crt # KC1 certificate issued with Root_CA
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# This will be used to issue commands to RootCA
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<- Root_CA_N1_KC2.kc.crt # Same as above for KC2 ...
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...
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<- Root_CA_N1_KCN.crt.kc # ... and KCN
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<- Root_CA_N1.crt # Issue self-signed certificate
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<- Root_CA_N1.csr # Issue CSR for root cross-signing
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<x Root_CA_N1_ICC:RootCA_sigPK:priv # Destroy signing private key
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===================================
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Root_CA_N1_ICC:
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RootCA_sigPK:pub # Retain it or not?
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RootCA_KC_zmkPK:priv # Decrypt CA signing private key shares from KC
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C CA_N2
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-> Key manager initiates key generation on 2nd CA ICC
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># ca
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># ca root init -ca
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.B same as 1.A but on 2nd CA ICC and any further CA ICC
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@ -15,12 +15,6 @@ cn=CA1,cn=AIA,cn=PKI,ou=Services,dc=hackerspace,dc=pl
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cn=CA2,cn=AIA,cn=PKI,ou=Services,dc=hackerspace,dc=pl
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...
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# PKI KC certs store (rw for servers, ro for KC):
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cn=KC,cn=AIA,cn=PKI,ou=Services,dc=hackerspace,dc=pl
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uid=enleth,cn=KC,cn=AIA,cn=PKI,ou=Services,dc=hackerspace,dc=pl
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uid=cranix,cn=KC,cn=AIA,cn=PKI,ou=Services,dc=hackerspace,dc=pl
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uid=q3k,cn=KC,cn=AIA,cn=PKI,ou=Services,dc=hackerspace,dc=pl
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# CRL Distribution Points - each CA has its own
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cn=CDP,cn=PKI,ou=Services,dc=hackerspace,dc=pl
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cn=CA1,cn=CA1,cn=PKI,ou=Services,dc=hackerspace,dc=pl
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@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
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Serial numbers: sequence or *hash*?
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Root CA cert valid for 6y
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Root CA CRL valid for 14m
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* need ceremony at least once per y to renew CRL
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@ -1,19 +1,34 @@
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End user:
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End user split in:
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- soft stored certs
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- obfuscated certs
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- hardware secured certs
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Category depending on how keys are protected
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- soft stored certs
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- obfuscated certs
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- hardware secured certs
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- fips secured certs
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End user:
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- Client certs (auth)
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- E-mail certs (signing)
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- Encryption
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Usage:
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- Signing
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* Code
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* E-Mails
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* WS Requests / RPC / Messages
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- Authentication
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* TLS
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* SSH(?)
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Device:
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- TLS certs (encr/auth)
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* server
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* client
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* server+client(?)
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* Server
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* Client
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* Server + Client (?)
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- Encryption
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* Recovery
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Algos:
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-Encrypt / auth: RSA, EC
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-Integrity: SHA-1,SHA-2,SHA-3
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Network Zone:
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- External (public certificates)
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- DMZ
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- Internal
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- Core
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All above should be issued per application or generally applications should
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leverage main user certificate
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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
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UC1. Bootstraping itself
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UC2. Issuing new certificates
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UC2.1 Key Generation + Archival
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UC2.2 Signing external CRL's
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UC3. Revoking existing keys (CRL)
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UC3.1 Renewing CRL (no need of KC interaction if there was no additional certs)
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UC3.2? DeltaCRL
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UC4. Monitoring
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UC5. Backup
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UC5.1 Backup verification
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UC6 High availability (cluster)
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UC6.1 Adding/decomissioning new Root CA node to PKI cluster
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UC6.2 Adding/decomissioning new CA node to PKI cluster
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UC6.3 Adding/decomissioning new Monitor
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UC7 RA
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UC7.1 RA notifies KC on new requests (ra@pki.hackerspace.pl?)
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UC Agent(?) to request/renew certificates from end device
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UC ICC deployment agent (for issuing member cards)
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UC Renewing member certificate / lost password (other 2 members is enough,
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no KC need to be involved)
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UC ICC for servers (how to secure?)
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UC Agent(?) to fetch CRL
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UC Enrollment agent for stupid devices (ansible/salt)
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SR1. CA Private key is never under control of single user or device (SPOF)
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SR2. Low level verification if CA is issuing only end-user certificates
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SR2.1 Policy constraints with certificate depth for CA
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SR3. Auditing
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SR3.1 Non repudative audit log (merkle trees)
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SR4 Adding new KC
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SR4.1 Revoking KC
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SR5 Mass revoke/renew certificates
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
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UC1. Bootstraping itself
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UC2. Issuing new certificates
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UC2.1 Key Generation + Archival (encryption certs)
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UC2.2 Signing external CRL's
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UC2.3 End user certificates
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UC2.4 Applications
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UC2.4.1 Device certificates
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UC2.4.1.1 Servers
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UC2.4.1.1.1 Linux
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UC2.4.1.1.2 Hypervisors
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UC2.4.1.1.2.1 Kubernetes
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UC2.4.1.1.2.1.1 POD
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UC2.4.1.2 Network devices
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UC2.4.1.3 HS Access
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UC2.4.2 Dedicated user certificates (if main user certificate is not suitable)
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UC2.4.3 Other certificates (?)
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UC2.5 Certificate templates
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UC2.5.1 Device certificate templates
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UC2.5.2 End user certificate templates (US CAC format preferred)
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UC2.5.3 Other certificates (?)
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UC3. Revoking existing keys (CRL)
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UC3.1 Renewing CRL (no need of KC interaction if there was no additional certs)
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UC3.2? DeltaCRL
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UC4. Monitoring
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UC5. Backup
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UC5.1 Backup verification
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UC5.2 Backup of encryption certificates
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UC6 High availability (cluster)
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UC6.1 Adding/decomissioning new Root CA node to PKI cluster
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UC6.2 Adding/decomissioning new CA node to PKI cluster
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UC6.3 Adding/decomissioning new Monitor
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UC7 RA
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UC7.1 RA notifies KC on new requests (ra@pki.hackerspace.pl?)
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UC8 Enrollment
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UC8.1 Agent(?) to request/renew certificates from end device (a'la certbot)
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UC8.2 ICC deployment agent
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UC8.2.1 for member cards
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UC8.2.2 for devices
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UC8.2.2.1 support device migration between hosts
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UC8.2.3 Enrollment agent for stupid devices (ansible/salt)
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UC8.3 Manage certificates issued by external CA
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UC8.3.1 Notify about expiry
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UC8.3.2 Manage renewal (if possible) & redeploy (letsencrypt)
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UC9 Certificate renewal
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UC9.1 Renewing member certificate / lost password (other 2 members is enough,
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no KC need to be involved)
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UC9.2 Plain renewal - use plain cert authentication, to ask for renewal
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UC9.2.1 Consider signing / encryption certs without auth extensions
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UC10 Agent(?) to fetch CRL
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UC11 List of all certificates
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UC11.1 Certificate status from whole infrastructure on demand
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UC12 Support for PKCS#11 interface
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SR1. CA Private key is never under control of single user or device (SPOF)
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SR2. Low level verification if CA is issuing only end-user certificates
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SR2.1 Policy constraints with certificate depth for CA
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SR3. Auditing
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SR3.1 Non repudative audit log (merkle trees with pbkdf2)
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SR3.2 COINKS?
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SR4 Adding new KC
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SR4.1 Revoking KC
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SR5 Mass revoke/renew certificates
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