34 lines
1.2 KiB
Plaintext
34 lines
1.2 KiB
Plaintext
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UC1. Bootstraping itself
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UC2. Issuing new certificates
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UC2.1 Key Generation + Archival
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UC2.2 Signing external CRL's
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UC3. Revoking existing keys (CRL)
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UC3.1 Renewing CRL (no need of KC interaction if there was no additional certs)
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UC3.2? DeltaCRL
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UC4. Monitoring
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UC5. Backup
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UC5.1 Backup verification
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UC6 High availability (cluster)
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UC6.1 Adding/decomissioning new Root CA node to PKI cluster
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UC6.2 Adding/decomissioning new CA node to PKI cluster
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UC6.3 Adding/decomissioning new Monitor
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UC7 RA
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UC7.1 RA notifies KC on new requests (ra@pki.hackerspace.pl?)
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UC Agent(?) to request/renew certificates from end device
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UC ICC deployment agent (for issuing member cards)
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UC Renewing member certificate / lost password (other 2 members is enough,
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no KC need to be involved)
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UC ICC for servers (how to secure?)
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UC Agent(?) to fetch CRL
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UC Enrollment agent for stupid devices (ansible/salt)
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SR1. CA Private key is never under control of single user or device (SPOF)
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SR2. Low level verification if CA is issuing only end-user certificates
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SR2.1 Policy constraints with certificate depth for CA
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SR3. Auditing
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SR3.1 Non repudative audit log (merkle trees)
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SR4 Adding new KC
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SR4.1 Revoking KC
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SR5 Mass revoke/renew certificates
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